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ABSTRACT
Though commonly overlooked, communities of displaced persons often play a complex
and significant role in the emergence and perpetuation of ethnic conflict. This paper looks at the
intersection of these themes in the conflict between the former Soviet Republic of Georgia and
the separatist region of Abkhazia. In particular it looks at the nature of protracted or “frozen”
conflict with particular attention to the role of the displaced community in the conflict’s
entrenchment. Specifically, it seeks to answer the question: why do certain conflicts go
unresolved for so long, and what role do refugees play in this resolution resistance? The paper is
based on field research conducted in Georgia, including interviews with 45 Georgian internally
displaced persons (IDPs) from Abkhazia. The results of the study suggest that various forces and
motivations acting on the IDP community have the effect of entrenching it in the ambiguous state
of neither returning to Abkhazia nor integrating into Georgian society that has become the status
quo, and that this entrenchment plays a role in the factors that contribute to the frozen state of the
conflict. In particular, the study suggests that power and identity play an unexpectedly large role
in maintaining this population’s status quo.
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Introduction
The double-decker tour bus was heading from the Georgian capital of Tbilisi, skirting the
southeast corner of the Black Sea towards some ocean-side resort in Turkey. Passing through the
Georgian sea-side city of Batumi, two Georgian men on board were playing cards to pass the time
of the multi-day journey. “This is foolish,” one of the men joked to the other. “Why are we going
all this way to Turkey – why don’t we just go to Sukhumi?” Other riders sitting around the men
laughed, betraying the joke’s context.
Sukhumi is the capital city of Abkhazia, a region on the northeast shores of the Black
Sea. The region is internationally recognized as part of the Republic of Georgia, but gained defacto independence from the emerging state in a bloody war fought just after the fall of the Soviet
Union. Although the war was halted by a ceasefire in 1994, the conflict between Abkhazia and
Georgia remains unresolved today, leaving the people of both nations in a state of legal limbo and
uncertain status.
From that ceasefire in 1994 until recently the world saw comparatively little violence
coming from the region, as the urgency of negotiations and the conflict cooled and came to an
apparent stand-still. However, in August of 2008, the headlines of international media outlets
were saturated with news from Georgia. It what has come to be called by some as “The August
War” Russian and Georgian forces clashed in a brief but highly destructive war. The conflict was
sparked over the other of Georgia’s separatist regions, South Ossetia, which although distinct
shares much in common with Abkhazia in terms of history and relations with Georgia. However,
the fighting that began in and around this region quickly spread to Western Georgia as an
additional front opened along the Georgian-Abkhazian border. Russian forces, acting on behalf of
1

the separatist regions, whose claim for independence they support, advanced into Georgian
territory, attacking its military and state infrastructure for roughly one week before withdrawing
amid increasing pressure and criticism from the international community.
The outcomes of this recent round of fighting are not yet clear at the time that this
document is being written, nor is it clear that the recent round of fighting is entirely over, as
occasional skirmishes, kidnappings, and casualties from paramilitary activity continue to occur.
As far as is known to the public, settlement negotiations regarding the substantive issues of
sovereignty and status have yet to take place, and it is uncertain as to what the status of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia will be when or if they are completed. However, despite the uncertainty that
currently surrounds these conflicts, one thing that is clear is the importance of these conflicts’
history as a source of understanding the recent round of violence in them. The initial periods of
violence that began these conflicts, the ceasefires that in theory ended them, and the time that has
passed since then with no resolution and no movement towards either peace or renewed war is all
the more relevant due to recent events. The ceasefires that were signed in the early 1990’s and
their failure to initiate a fruitful peace process ought to be the subject of serious thought and study
for the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE), and any other entity that seeks to serve as a third party in the settlement of
these conflicts.
Understanding why these cease-fires did not lead to a meaningful resolution of the
conflict, and understanding the so-called frozen period that followed, and the dynamics that held
it in this stagnant state are crucial to constructing a successful and implementable peace
agreement at the conclusion of the current round of fighting.
Conflicts such as the one between Georgia and Abkhazia are representative of the kind of
conflict that has proliferated since the fall of the Soviet Union. Perhaps there were some for
whom this fall marked the emergence of a new, more peaceful world order. Nearly two decades
2

later, the major military powers of the world are no longer at war, but the presence of violent
conflict has not abated. Rather, armed conflicts within states and between smaller states have
emerged throughout the world. There are many names given to the armed conflicts that persist
today: international, intrastate, inter-communal, ethnic conflict, ethno-national conflict, border
wars, separatist wars, and so on. While these conflicts take place under vastly different conditions
and for various reasons, many of them are similar in that they are resistant to conventional
conflict resolution methods. A number of these resolution-resistant, or intractable, conflicts
erupted in the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s. In several of the newly formed states such
as Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan full-scale armed conflict erupted shortly after
independence. Yet while these regions have not until recently experienced such high levels of
violence as those in the early-1990s, all of these conflicts have yet to see the implementation of a
successful peace agreement. These have commonly been referred to as “frozen” conflicts, mostly
due to this lack of progress or action. This type of conflict, and the painful stagnation that it tends
to display, is the primary concern of this paper.
The conflicts referred to as frozen appear to have a different dynamic than the wider set
of conflicts that are thought of as intractable. While both are characterized by continuation over a
long period of time and a general resistance to resolution, intractable conflict often has a cyclical
dynamic: phases of relative violence followed by quieter periods, followed in turn by resurgent
violence. The conflicts in Israel-Palestine and in Sri Lanka are examples of intractable conflict;
something as simple as international news coverage demonstrates the cyclical pattern whereby
these conflicts will occasionally flare-up, dominating headlines around the world, only to remain
relatively quiet for a period of time. By contrast, frozen conflict tends to behave a bit differently.
Rather than going through cycles of violence and relative calm, frozen conflict goes through an
initial wave of intense violence which is then stopped by a ceasefire (often internationally
enforced). This begins a long period of stagnation where violence remains low but parties see no
3

resolution to the issues of dispute and little movement in the peace process. Think, for example,
of the conflict in Cyprus or the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh involving Armenia and Azerbaijan.
When these conflicts each reached their respective breaking points, they commanded a great deal
of international attention. However, since these conflicts descended from the height of intensity in
the mid 1970’s and early 1990’s respectively, the international community has heard relatively
little from them, although neither has been resolved.
During this period of no war- no peace, parties may seem to return to normalcy, entering
a post conflict phase before the conflict has actually ended. Sizable populations of displaced
persons and internally displaced persons (IDPs) serve as reminder that the conflict is not over
until it is resolved. As frozen conflict goes unsettled and stagnates, those displaced by the initial
conflict remain unable to return despite low levels of violence. The Greek Cypriots that were
displaced in 1974 and have yet to return to their former homes in North Cyprus are an example of
such a population.
The conflict between the Republic of Georgia and Abkhazia, its breakaway region, is an
example of frozen conflict. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Abkhazian and Georgian forces
engaged in a brief, intense war over the sovereignty of the region. Intervention by the
international community resulted in a ceasefire in 1994, which has more or less held until the
recent round of fighting between Georgia and Russia. Efforts by government officials to negotiate
a settlement have been unsuccessful, and despite the relative absence of subsequent violence
between the groups, the conflict remains unresolved. Between 200,000 and 300,000 ethnic
Georgians were displaced from Abkhazia during the war of the early 1990’s, a population of
uncertain status central to the frozen nature of the conflict. IDP policies, interests, and actions
have a significant impact on this population, the conflict, and on the peacebuilding groups that
attempt to work with them. Furthermore, IDP policy and IDP communities are key factors in
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conflict settlement and must be taken into account by third parties involved in the negotiations of
these settlements.
What accounts for the longevity of frozen conflict? Why do frozen conflicts go
unresolved for so long, and why do they not simply fade away? This paper will turn to the
existing literature in several related fields, and the case of Georgia and Abkhazia in particular in
an attempt to answer these questions. The pursuit of these questions will include the study of
displaced populations, their role in such conflicts, their view of return, and an understanding of
the obstacles that stand in the way of return, both real and perceived.
Focusing on the relationship between frozen conflict and displacement the study suggests
that there are two plausible alternative rival hypotheses that explain the role of displaced persons
in frozen conflict, examining conflict in the IDP community on two levels. The first hypothesis
looks at the conflict that occurs on the refugee-government level, and uses the framework of
William Zartman’s ripeness concept (1989) and Pruitt’s modified readiness model (1997, 2007)1
to explain the continuance of the conflict. In this hypothesis, frozen conflict exists at a sort of
equilibrium - below ripeness and readiness in intensity and motivation and above peace (or nonconflict). According to this hypothesis, opposing forces in the conflict are what keep the conflict
in this sort of equilibrium or limbo. Forces such as peacekeepers, international aid programs, and
state building projects in the separatist regions push the intensity level down, keeping it below the
level of what we might call ripeness. Meanwhile the presence of an IDP population that maintains
a desire to return pushes the intensity up, keeping the conflict at a level that demands formal
resolution and prevents the conflict from fading away. This also offers a conceptualization of
frozen conflict that accommodates the criticisms of post-soviet scholars such as Dov Lynch and
Charles King, who argue that the term “frozen” is misleading as it betrays what in reality is a
1

Both ripeness and readiness theories attempt to describe the element of timing in conflict resolution.
Generally speaking these concepts explain that a conflict is ripe for resolution when the cost of continued
conflict is perceived to be greater than the cost of settlement.
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dynamic conflict situation where both parties have changed and grown over time (Lynch, 2001,
2004; King 2001). If frozen conflict is conceived of as being in a state of equilibrium, held in
what appears to be a standstill by opposite and opposing forces, this allows for a great deal of
movement on both sides without significant movement in the conflict and peace process.
The second hypothesis looks at conflict on the internal level of IDPs, focusing on the
opposing forces within this population to explain the frozen nature of the conflict. This
hypothesis is informed by Kurt Lewin’s classic force-field analysis framework (1958), and posits
that although the IDP population claims the desire to return as an official position, there are
opposing and contradicting forces within IDPs: forces for return and recompense as well as forces
against return and for stagnation. The conflict of these forces within IDPs, acted out in IDP
communities, therefore prevents the return of the displaced population while also preventing their
integration into the host community.
To explore these alternative hypotheses, this research looks at the Georgian-Abkhazian
conflict and examines the population of IDPs displaced during it. The displaced population in
Georgia is a major factor in this conflict, and that which this population can tell us about the issue
of return can in turn tell us about the obstacles or resistance to settlement of the conflict. This
case study will seek to address questions regarding IDP status, IDP views about return, perceived
obstacles to return, and whether grassroots peacebuilding has the ability to overcome these
obstacles.
This study specifically analyzes the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, and more generally
discusses the group of ongoing conflicts that are considered frozen. It does so through a rather
endogenous lens and looks mostly to the internal dynamics of these conflicts for greater
understanding of their causes and entrenchment. However, there are a number of ways in which
these conflicts, and in particular the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, can be interpreted and a
number of outside factors that could be said to have a significant role. First, many have pointed to
6

precedents set since the eruption of these conflicts by both Chechnya and Kosovo. Early analysis
of these conflicts looked to the outcome of the Chechen war as a precedent for the outcome of
similar efforts by Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno Karabakh, and Transnistria for
independence. The precedent set by Chechnya was that of a separatist conflict without
tremendous international involvement ending with the re-absorption of the separatist entity into
the state from which it seceded by force (Lynch, 2004). Naturally, in the case of Chechnya Russia
had that which other former Soviet states do not have: the military capability to repatriate the
separatist states by force. Yet the frozen state that has followed ceasefire in these conflicts has
been interpreted simply as the central states like Georgia waiting to build their military to
sufficient strength.
Kosovo has played an equally precedent setting role in the interpretations of these
conflicts. In particular, the separatist states involved in these conflicts have pointed to the legal
interpretations and reasoning of western states for supporting Kosovo’s Independence, and hold
this reasoning as the legal and political precedent for their own independence. Furthermore, the
Russian government has pointed to the wide recognition of Kosovo’s independence as a
precedent for their official recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states.
Further still, there are interpretations of the “Great Powers” persuasion that paint these
conflicts as proxy wars in which hostilities between Russia and Soviet successor states, especially
Georgia, are played out. This interpretation has been seen throughout media coverage of the most
recent round of fighting in the separatist areas of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. One can also find
this interpretation taken a step further, especially in current media analysis, suggesting that the
hostilities between successor states and Russia as played out in these separatist conflicts, are in
turn a proxy stage for Russia and the Western powers that have supported the newly independent
successor states to confront each other. These and other interpretations of these conflicts and their
respective stalemates all offer both insight and scope to the understanding of these conflicts and
7

their causes. While these insights all merit consideration, this analysis will attempt to focus
endogenous on the causes, factors, and players that drive the dynamics at work in the GeorgianAbkhazian conflict on the micro level.
The proceeding paper contains five sections. The first will offer a review of existing
literature relevant to the question of what exactly frozen conflict is, and why it tends to display
such stagnation. The second will provide a background into the case that this study will focus on,
the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. The third section will provide an account of the methodology
used in this study, while the final chapters will offer the results of this study and discussion and
analysis of these results.
The theoretical literature presented will attempt to unpack the concept of frozen conflict
by looking at the issues surrounding and related to it. Thus, the paper will consider the literature
in several areas including: the dynamics of protracted/intractable conflict, conflict settlement and
power sharing, and the timing of peace processes. The literature review will also look at the
largely sociological and social-psychological theory examining refugee return, theories of social
forces, and the literature that looks on frozen conflict as a phenomenon of the former Soviet
sphere. By exploring the theories offered in these fields, the study arrives at two hypotheses
highlighting possible factors accounting for the longevity of frozen conflict, which will be
explored in this study.
I explored these questions in the summer of 2007 on a two-month site visit to the
Republic of Georgia, collecting data from individuals and organizations including IDPs, service
providers and government officials in various regions of the country. Sources for data were
primarily material collected from NGOs (such as pamphlets, reports, mission statements) as well
as the data collected from interviews with NGO’s and with IDPs. Analysis of the data will
identify sentiments, fears, and experiences that are common in the IDP community while also
attempting to recognize certain themes that emerge inductively from in the IDP responses. Some
8

of these themes connect to those which past literature suggest are significant, such as themes of
return and security. Analysis of the data should suggest that one of the hypotheses presented is
accurate or that neither is correct. It should also be noted that as this study was conducted in
2007, the research and data collection was completed well before the recent eruption of violence
involving Georgia, the separatist regions, and Russia. While this may affect the significance and
context of this study, it does not affect the findings or accuracy of this study, as the research
presented herein was focused not on the specific outcomes of this conflict, but on the sociopolitical phenomenon of conflict “freezing” of which the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict has been
an example.
The discussion and analysis of these factors may shed a bit of light on the stagnant nature
of frozen conflict and may even highlight some causes of this stagnation. Furthermore, by looking
at the role of grassroots peacebuilding in frozen conflict, particularly in respect to their work with
displaced populations, this project’s conclusions may carry implications about the capacity of
multi-track peacebuilding to make a significant contribution in such situations and may even raise
questions about the appropriateness of such interventions in certain conflict scenarios.

9

Literature Review
What accounts for the longevity of frozen conflict, and what role do displaced
populations play in this? In the attempt to find an answer to these questions in existing literature,
this review will cover prominent theories in several areas. These include the literature on
intractable and protracted conflict, power sharing, and peace agreements. However, before such
topics can be explored it is necessary to first develop a definition and understanding of what is
meant by the term frozen conflict. The term is often used to describe conflicts whose peace
process seemingly ends with the imposition of a ceasefire agreement, leaving the initial conflict
unresolved for years or decades. Yet despite the not uncommon use of this term, there has been
little development of a working definition or consensus on what it connotes of the conflicts it is
used to describe.
It could be said that two central characteristics of frozen conflict are longevity and lack of
progress in negotiations or peace processes, two characteristics that are also central to the related
designation of intractable conflicts. Both frozen and intractable conflict possesses a certain
resistance to resolution, and it may even make sense to describe frozen conflict as a particular
phenomenon within the world of intractability. As such, the literature on intractability will be
helpful in defining frozen conflict.

Defining Frozen Conflict
In the most basic sense, we know that protracted conflict is marked by its longevity; yet a
deeper understanding is necessary to describe the nature of frozen conflict as a type of intractable
or protracted conflict. Protracted social conflict (PSC) is defined by Edward Azar (as cited in
10

Fisher, 1997, p. 79) as “hostile interactions which extend over long periods of time with sporadic
outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity." In developing his theory on
protracted social conflict, Azar noted the connection of protracted social conflict to such factors
as identity, human needs, and underdevelopment. Contrary to realist approaches, Azar argues that
PSCs in the post-WWII era are carried out primarily by identity based groups rather than by state
actors. He notes that most conflicts in this era are based on “developmental needs expressed in
terms of cultural values, human rights and security; as such, they are not easily suppressed, and
continue to be pursued in the long term by all means available” (Azar, 1990). These concepts are
heavily influenced by John Burton’s needs theory and Johan Galtung’s structural approaches to
violence.
Galtung’s early work on peace and violence expanded on the common use and
understanding of violence to incorporate forms of deprivation and denial. Under this expanded
view, social injustice, particularly when institutionalized, is interpreted as structural violence
which can be understood as systematic inequality in power and access to resources (Galtung,
1969). Theories of structural violence are interested in the linkages between political, economic
and social structures, institutionalized inequality, and overt violence and conflict (Azar, 1990;
2002), and provide a theoretical foundation for the connection between conflict and development.
Burton’s theory of human needs (1997) draws on Galtung’s theory of structural violence.
Needs theory, Burton explains, emerged as a way of describing the deprivations and problems
created by structural violence (1997). Needs theory distinguishes between “negotiable interests
and non-negotiable needs,” indicating also that while the former can be bargained or bartered for,
the later may require “altered perceptions by the parties concerned, and in some cases agreed
structural change” (Burton, 1997, p.35). Such non-negotiable needs include those for recognition
and identity. Burton posits that social conflict and violence are rooted in the desire or attempt to
secure these non-negotiable needs for one’s self and one’s identity group.
11

Azar conceptualized protracted social conflict as being rooted in such phenomena and
therefore claimed that traditional means of resolving conflict are insufficient in these contexts:
“Outcomes (military victories, negotiated agreements, etc.) insofar as they do not satisfy basic
needs, contain latent conflicts which cause further cycles of manifest violence, often involving a
shift or spill-over in issues and actors” (Azar, 1990). Azar’s theory of protracted social conflict
also identifies main characteristics of these conflicts, which may be helpful in conceptualizing
where frozen conflict stands in theoretical relation to protracted social conflict. The main
characteristics are:
•
•
•
•

Protracted hostility and insecurity characterized by periods of armed violence
and crisis with no clear cycle of genesis, maturity, reduction and termination
Fluctuation in the intensity and frequency of interactions, oscillating between
overt and covert patterns of conflict, while hostile attitudes continue
Absence of a distinct termination point, where war has become the status quo
and the threat of peace may mean crisis
Conflict spillover in terms of both actors and issues, so that the conflict is no
longer intrastate or one-dimensional but regional and multi-causal, with blurring
of internal and external boundaries of the conflict (Azar E. , 2002 p.16)

With these characteristics in mind, perhaps we can begin to outline a conceptualization of
frozen conflict. Building on these characteristics of PSC, frozen conflict might be characterized
as protracted hostility and insecurity characterized by a single period or series of periods of armed
violence, ending in a ceasefire enforced by a third party. The second characteristic also helps to
define frozen conflict if we understand “overt and covert patterns of conflict” more as nontraditional conflict patterns such as forced economic or political isolation or operating through
non-state militias rather than overt armed military aggression. Furthermore, frozen conflict
typically demonstrates a distinct termination of armed conflict, in this way we might understand
the third point as absence of a distinct termination of hostilities, where the effects of these
hostilities (such as displacement) become the status quo. Finally, frozen conflict can be thought of
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as demonstrating the conflict spillover that Azar describes in the final point. The two groups of
characteristics are compared in the table below.
Characteristics of Protracted Social
Conflict (PSC) (Azar, 2002)

Proposed Characteristics of Frozen
Conflict

Periods of armed violence and crisis with no
clear cycle of genesis, maturity, reduction and
termination
Fluctuation in the intensity and frequency of
interactions, oscillating between overt and
covert conflict patterns.

Single period or series of periods of armed
violence, ending in a ceasefire enforced by a
third party
Presence of non-traditional conflict patterns
such as forced economic or political isolation
or operating through non-state militias rather
than overt armed military aggression.

Absence of a distinct termination point, war
becomes the status quo

Distinct termination of armed conflict
without the distinct termination of hostilities
- where the effects of these hostilities (such
as displacement or sanctions) become the
status quo.
Conflict spillover - the conflict is no longer
intrastate or one-dimensional but regional
and multi-causal, blurring of internal and
external boundaries of the conflict

Conflict spillover - the conflict is no longer
intrastate or one-dimensional but regional and
multi-causal, blurring of internal and external
boundaries of the conflict

Table 1: Characteristics of PSC versus Frozen Conflict

The conceptualization of intractability offered by Heidi Burgess and Guy Burgess can
also shed light on the issue of frozen conflict. Burgess and Burgess cite a concept from John
Burton in defining intractability through the distinction between the long-term, underlying
(usually intractable) conflict and the innumerable dispute episodes that occur within the context
of the larger conflict (Burgess & Burgess, 2006). In this sense we might understand frozen
conflict as this type of long term, underlying and intractable conflict, but where these dispute
episodes are either so infrequent or low-level, or are played out in less obvious forms such as
militia activity or structural violence that they do not register as what is commonly considered
conflict.
Furthermore, Jacob Bercovitch (2003) outlines the defining characteristics of intractable
conflict:
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1. In terms of actors, intractable conflicts involve states or other actors with a long sense
of historical grievance, and a strong desire to redress or avenge these.
2. In terms of duration, intractable conflicts take place over a long period of time.
3. In terms of issues, intractable conflicts involve intangible issues such as identity,
sovereignty, or values and beliefs.
4. In terms of relationships, intractable conflicts involve polarized perceptions of
hostility and enmity, and behavior that is violent and destructive.
5. In terms of geopolitics, intractable conflicts usually take place where buffer states
exist between major power blocks or civilizations.
6. In terms of management, intractable conflicts resist many conflict management
efforts and have a history of failed peacemaking efforts (Bercovitch, 2003).

All of these characteristics can be seen in ongoing frozen conflicts such as those in GeorgiaAbkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh or Cyprus. Although the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict will be
discussed at length in the next chapter, a brief discussion here will expand upon how this conflict
reflects Bercovitch’s characteristics listed above. The first characteristic, a long sense of historical
grievance between actors, is ever-present between Georgians and Abkhazians. There has been
disagreement over the status of Abkhazia in relation to Georgian since before both areas were
incorporated into the Russian Empire, and the decline over time, in terms of strength and
numbers, of Abkhazian nationality is a grievance that most Abkhazians blame the Georgians for.
In terms of duration, the present conflict has lasted since 1992, although it could be argued that it
began before the Soviet era. The issues at stake are those of national identity and sovereignty,
which on both sides have been battered by seventy years of Soviet rule. In terms of relations, both
Abkhazians and Georgians view the actions of the other actor as direct assaults on their national
identity and sovereignty. While the parties’ actions have not been overly physically destructive
since the early 1990’s both exhibit behavior that it destructive to their relationship with each other
and to their chances for resolution. The Georgian government has repeatedly embraced rhetoric
that calls for reunification and restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity, highly aggressive
language from the Abkhazian point of view. Meanwhile, as Abkhazian leadership moves
increasingly closer to Russia (for example, carrying Russian passports), they also foster Georgian
fears of renewed Russian domination. In terms of geopolitical placement the Abkhazian conflict
14

can be thought of not only as a buffer between Georgian and Russia, but between Russia and
Europe or “the West.” Finally, in terms of conflict management efforts, the Georgian-Abkhazian
conflict has resisted multiple negotiation efforts, numerous grassroots peacebuilding projects, and
attempts by third parties to intervene (Lynch, 2001).
In the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, historical grievances can be traced back to the
emergences of Armenian and Azerbaijani nationalism in the late nineteenth century, as the
Nagorno-Karabakh region plays a significant role in the mythology of both nations. In duration,
the current conflict erupted in the late 1980’s and despite the signing of a well-observed ceasefire
in 1994, the conflict still exists as this paper is written. Like the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, the
issues at stake in Nagorno-Karabakh are those of national identity and sovereignty, which are
both intangible and non-negotiable (Lynch, 2004). Polarized perceptions of hostility are present,
as both groups view the other as an oppressor and part of a hostile coalition. For Armenians,
Azerbaijan is seen as the close ally and ethnic cousin of its western neighbor, Turkey, leaving
them mostly surrounded by hostile neighbors, and the majority of their border closed. Meanwhile
the significant support that separatists in Nagorno-Karabakh have received from the Armenian
Diaspora is likely viewed by Azerbaijanis as western support of Armenian aggression.
Furthermore, highly destructive and violent behavior was seen between 1988 and 1994 (Lynch,
2004).
Geopolitically, Nagorno-Karabakh may be seen as a buffer state between Armenia and
Azerbaijan, but it is difficult to see these as major power blocks. However, Armenia and
Nagorno-Karabakh could be seen as part of a buffer-region (the Caucasus) which makes up
something of a border region between Christian Europe and the Islamic Near-East. In terms of
Bercovitch’s final characteristic, the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh has been resistant to
resolution and has a history of failed peacemaking efforts, including parallel talks between the
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OSCE and both Azerbaijan and Armenia as well as bilateral talks between Armenia and
Azerbaijan hosted in France and later in the U.S. (Lynch, 2004).
Like the conflicts in Georgia-Abkhazia and in Nagorno-Karabakh, the frozen conflict in
Cyprus also reflects the characteristics of intractable conflict as described by Bercovitch (2003).
The conflict involves Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Although these two specific groups
share a history of mostly harmonious coexistence, their parent nations, Greece and Turkey, have a
long history of hostile and grievous relations that begin as early as the Ottoman conquest of the
Byzantine Empire and Constantinople. The current conflict is most commonly traced to the
eruption of fighting in that took place in 1974, however the current hostilities can be traced back
to guerilla warfare that began in 1955 with Greek-Cypriot agitation for unity with Greece (Fisher,
2001). Like the conflicts discussed above, the issues at stake in the Cyprus conflict involve
intangible issues such as national identity. Like the other conflicts, the Cyprus conflict has also
involved polarized perceptions of the other and destructive behavior, including violent clashed
that have resulted in mass human displacement as well as sanctions and embargos that have been
economically damaging to the parties (Fisher, 2001). Geopolitically, the island of Cyprus sits at
the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, and has historically been a buffer between
major civilizations and empires. Today it sits, not unlike the Caucasus region, at the border where
Europe meets the Middle East. Finally, in regard to the characteristic of resistance to
peacebuilding efforts, the conflict in Cyprus has eluded resolution despite efforts by the UN to
resolve the conflict, numerous negotiations between the parties, and countless unofficial
peacebuilding projects (Fisher, 2001).
Based on the proximity of these conflicts that are commonly referred to as frozen conflict
to the characteristics given by Bercovitch (2003) and the existing conceptualizations of
intractability, such as those offered by Burgess and Burgess and Azar, it would seem that it would
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be useful in developing a working definition of frozen conflict to consider it as a certain type of
intractable or protracted conflict.
As mentioned earlier, the term frozen conflict typically accompanies a certain group of
conflicts, namely those in the former Soviet Union. The literature that describes and analyzes the
Soviet Successor Wars (King, 2001), can generally be sorted into two groups. The first group
tends to analyze these conflicts singularly. They are concerned with what might be called postSoviet order: state transition, democratization and development in the young successor states. In
this literature, conflicts are analyzed as factors within the wider process of transition and
democratization. Treatment of the Soviet Successor Wars in this group typically identifies roots
of conflict in the legacy of Soviet rule, and as such tend to focus on the question of why these
conflicts began as opposed to examining the question that this thesis is most concerned with: why
they have failed to settle. This group includes the work of those such as Ghia Nodia and Bruno
Coppieters which will be discussed later in the case study.
The second group of literature on the Soviet Successor Wars tends to analyze these
conflicts jointly and comparatively, asserting that each of these conflicts, while distinct, is part of
a certain breed of conflict that has developed in fallout of the Soviet Union. As such, authors in
this latter group, such as Dov Lynch and Charles King, offer valuable insight into the questions
under consideration in this review: how do we define frozen conflict and why does it go
unresolved for so long?
While these works do not specifically offer a definition of frozen conflict, they do offer a
number of characteristics of the term and common qualities of the conflicts it describes. Two
works in particular were early to examine the separatist conflicts of the former Soviet Union
comparatively, one by Edward Walker in 1998 the other by Charles King in 2001. Walker (1998)
cites five conflicts of contested sovereignty in the former Soviet Union: Nagorno-Karabakh,
Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Chechnya (Walker, 1998, 2000). While the term
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“frozen conflict” is not specifically used, he does list several similarities between the conflicts
listed above, which are useful in grasping the characteristics that describe frozen conflict. “In all
five cases” he notes “cease-fires have ended most of the violence, but settlements on legal status
remain elusive” (Walker, 2000 p.152). The lack of settlement specifically on the legal status of
parties is a useful articulation of what remains unsettled in these conflicts despite a successful
ceasefire. Walker also notes that in all five of the noted conflicts “secessionists have triumphed
on the battlefield… [but] have failed to win international recognition” (2000 p.152). This raises
an interesting point – that in all of these cases the victor in initial military engagement is a party
that the international community is unwilling to recognize. It is uncertain whether this is a
defining characteristic of frozen conflict, but is certainly a distinction worth keeping in mind.
In another early comparative work on the successor wars, King (2001) examines the state
building projects of separatist states, and seeks to clarify their longevity by looking at those
groups benefiting from the status quo. King is concerned with how the “chaos of war become[s]
transformed into networks of profit” (King, 2001 p.524), which will certainly be reconsidered
when this review identifies possible causes for the longevity of frozen conflict. However, in terms
of defining frozen conflict, King provides several small pieces that contribute to that definition.
King focuses on what he calls the Wars of Soviet Succession: Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria,
South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Chechnya, and Tajikistan. He notes of these conflicts that “each
involved a range of players, including the central governments of newly sovereign states,
territorial separatists, the armed forces of other countries, and international peacemakers” (King,
2001 p.525). There are noteworthy distinctions made here. He notes that the actors in this group
of conflicts are the newly formed central governments and territorial separatists. It may be worth
considering whether separatism is a central element of frozen conflict. Certainly the element of
separatism contributes to the trend noted by Walker (2000) whereby these conflicts have two
winners: one on the battlefield, the other in the proverbial court of international opinion. It is
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uncertain whether this is a defining factor of frozen conflict, but it may be that frozen conflict by
definition has the tendency of forming out of separatist conflicts where separatists triumph on the
battlefield but lose the struggle for international recognition. He also echoes Walker in noting that
in all of these conflicts, with the exception of Chechnya, despite little progress on peace talks
“none of the post-Soviet disputes returned to the previous levels of organized violence” (King, p.
525). Furthermore, King notes that the conflicts he discusses have “evolved from armed
engagements to something close to equilibrium” (p. 525). This description of “close to
equilibrium” echoes the idea of conflict becoming the status quo (Azar, 2002), and reflects a
certain degree of stability in the conflict.
Dov Lynch (2004) offers a full comparative study of the post-Soviet separatist states and
the conflicts that defined them. Building on the work of Walker and King, Lynch provides a
thorough analysis of the status quo in each conflict (Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia,
Transnistria) and identifies factors in both the separatist and metropolitan states driving the status
quo (Lynch, 2004). In his discussion of these conflicts as “frozen” he takes issue with the use of
this term, claiming it overlooks certain dynamic features of both parties. This discussion is useful
for the task of defining frozen conflict, as the reasoning behind this misnomer is helpful in
defining it. Lynch explains in a later article that these conflicts “appear frozen, in that little
progress has been achieved in negotiations and the conflicts remain fixed on cease-fire lines
established in the first half of the 1990s” (Lynch, 2005 p.192 ). But they are not frozen, Lynch
argues that “on the contrary, events have developed dynamically, and the situation on the ground
today is very different from the context that gave rise to these conflicts” (Lynch, 2005 p.192 ). It
is useful to distinguish, as Lynch does, between the frozen or immobile peace process and the
conflicts themselves which are dynamic and have changed significantly since the signing of
ceasefires in the early 1990’s. Lynch views these conflicts as being stuck in their status quo, and
suggests that they are held there by a variety of factors. It may be useful to think of frozen
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conflict and its stagnation or status quo as an equilibrium, appearing to be static, but actually held
in place by a myriad of dynamic forces. This possible conceptualization will be expanded on
when discussing the theories of Lewin (1958, 1969) and Coleman (2000, 2006), but it is worth
noting here the connection between the concept of equilibrium and Lynch’s objection that the
term “frozen” denies the true dynamic nature of these conflicts.
Like Walker and King, Lynch also noted the uncertain status of the parties, describing
them as existing in “legal limbo” (Lynch, 2004 p. 7). Furthermore, Lynch explains that “frozen”
is an inappropriate descriptor, as while the ceasefire lines and peace process have been all but
immobile, this does not mean that the individual parties are stagnant. Lynch’s conceptualization
of “frozen” conflict in the former Soviet Union turns ripeness theory on its head, so to speak. In
these conflicts parties reach a mutually hurting stalemate, however they do not seek to attenuate
the pain through negotiation or settlement, as ripeness theory would assume. Instead, parties in
these conflicts develop their own internal mechanisms and external sources of support to offset
the pain of stalemate (Lynch, 2004). In this way we may conceptualize frozen conflict as one
where parties reach a mutually hurting stalemate, but for one reason or another do not move away
from this stalemate towards resolution.
Thus, synthesizing what the literature on intractability and Soviet successor wars tell us
about the meaning of frozen conflict, we might describe frozen conflict in the following way.
Frozen conflict is a particular phenomenon of intractability where the conflict experiences a long
period of what seems to be stagnation or non movement. This period occurs after most of the
violence in the conflict is ended by ceasefire, but leaves the conflict unresolved and parties in a
state of destructive and painful ambiguity – particularly in regard to parties’ legal relationship
with each other and with the outside world, which becomes the status quo for those involved.
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The Longevity of Frozen Conflict
With an understanding of what is meant by frozen conflict, this review may continue
with the main task of exploring what explanations existing literature may hold for the longevity
of frozen conflict. As with the task of defining this type of conflict, the literature exploring
intractability and factors behind its resistance to resolution is an opportune starting point.

Intractability. Intractability is rooted in a number of factors and circumstances. In
Edward Azar’s writing on protracted social conflict (PSC), he makes the helpful distiction of
factors that contribute to the genesis of the conflict and factors of the process dynamics, which
contribute to the entrenchment (or intractability) of the conflict (Azar, 1990). Azar describes four
clusters of variables that are preconditions for protracted social conflict. Multicommunal
societies, particularly when the communities are politically mobilized, are likely to experience
PSC. Deprivation of human needs for physical security and for access to political institutions are
another main generator of protracted social conflict, particularly when such deprivations are
institutionalized by the state or ruling party, referred to as distributive injustice (Azar, 1985) or
what Galtung calls structural violence.
Azar also describes certain factors that contribute to the entrenchment of such conflicts.
First, he notes that protracted conflicts tend to go from one-issue-conflicts, provoked by a
triggering event, to complex multi-issue-conflicts that are far more difficult to negotiate. As a
power imbalance is likely to exist between parties, the weaker group tends to seek external
assistance, turning the conflict into a multi-party, regional conflict which amplifies its scope and
makes the conflict more protracted (Azar, 1985). Furthermore, protracted conflicts tend to
generate certain conditions, which at the same time further reinforce the conflict. These include
the deterioration of physical security for all parties, the degeneration of political and state
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institutions, domination of war culture and fearful vigilance, and increased dependancy or cliency
on external parties (Azar, 1985).
The Beyond Intractability database assembled by Heidi and Guy Burgess also offers a
number of treatments, both brief and in-depth, on causes and characteristics of intractability. A
treatment offered by Michelle Maise cites a conflict’s intractability as being grounded in high
stakes, non-negotiotiable issues such as morals, identity, the pursuit of justice, or basic human
needs. “Because conflicts grounded in these issues involve the basic molds for thought and action
within given communities and culture, they are usually not resolvable by negotiation or
compromise. This is because the problem in question is one that cannot be resolved in a win-win
way. If one value system is followed, another is threatened” (Maiese, 2003). In another essay by
Heidi and Guy Burgess, intractability is said to stem from irreconcilable moral differences, highstakes distributional issues, and identity conflicts over social status and privilege. When all three
of these factors are involved the conflict tends to be particularly resistent to resolution (Burgess &
Burgess, 2003).
Most interestingly, in an essay for the Beyond Intractability database, Heidi Burgess
notes that it is the benefits of conflicts that cause them to be intractable, noting: “if disputants did
not believe staying in the conflict was better than resolving it (considering both emotional and
material factors), they would be more likely to resolve it” (Burgess, 2004). Profiteers, among both
the parties and external onlookers, have vested interests in the continuation of hostilities and are
often in positions to contribute to further hostilities.
In summary, intractability literature suggests that much like more common intractable
conflicts, the longevity of frozen conflicts stems from a perfect storm of factors. First the conflict
is rooted in high stakes issues like basic human needs, in non-negotiable issues like identity, and
irreconcilable morally rooted differences. In other words, the causes of intractable conflict create
a zero-sum situation. Furthermore, these conflicts grow and stem from one-issue, bi-party
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conflicts into multi-issue, multi-party conflicts which makes their resolution far more complex
and dificult (Azar, 1985). Intractability also notes the development of conditions that reinforce
the conflict. These include increased dependancy on external parties (Azar, 1985) as well as the
development of profiteering parties and networks that become invested in the conflict remaining
unresolved (Burgess, 2004). These various factors identified by scholars in the field of
intractability or protracted conflict shed light on factors in frozen conflict that hinder progress
towards resolution, but still leave unanswered the question of why parties in frozen conflict find
themselves stuck between stages of the peace process.

Conflict settlement, power-sharing and ripeness. Another approach to explaining the
longevity of frozen conflict is to ask why they do not settle. The vast literature on conflict
settlement and resolution lays out numerous factors that affect parties’ willingness to negotiate
and the viability of the agreements they reach. We might sort these various factors, as William
Zartman (2000) does, into two or three schools on the subject. Probably the oldest school on
resolution and settlement looks at the substance of the negotiations and the provisions and
structures provided in the agreements to explain their success or failure. This school includes the
literature on power-sharing, consociational structures, and pluralistic institutions. The second
school on resolution looks at the timing, rather than the substance, of negotiations to explain their
success or failure. This is the school to which William Zartman, Dean Pruitt, and others that work
on ripeness and readiness theory belong. The third school of thought on conflict resolution
includes those such as John Paul Lederach and Herbert Kelman, and focuses on the relationship
between disputants as a key factor in settlement success. In reality, it is most common that all
three sets of factors will be present in any negotiation or settlement situation. However, each
school offers a set of theories and frameworks that are undoubtedly useful in explaining the
protracted nature of some conflicts.
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In looking at the substantive components of conflict settlement, the literature varies from
those looking strictly at ceasefire to material interested in the implementation of an agreement.
Virginia Page Fortna (2004) examines interstate ceasefire agreements, identifying certain factors
that correlate with ceasefires that are able to prevent renewed fighting. Factors such as ending war
in a draw rather than decisive victory, a history of conflict between the belligerents, perceived
threat, and shared borders have a significant negative impact on ceasefire success. Long and
costly wars, however, are claimed to be more conducive to lasting ceasefire. Meanwhile, Fortna
claims that factors such as power symmetry between belligerents, the number of states involved,
and democratic regime shifts are not as significant as is often thought in international relations.
Fortna claims, however, that while these underlying factors have a strong impact, they do not
determine the prospects for peace, and that peace lasts longer with stronger agreements in place.
Agreements within ceasefires that “alter incentives by raising the cost of breaking a cease-fire, to
clear up uncertainty about belligerents’ actions…or to reduce the possibility of accidents or
spirals” are likely to increase the ceasefire’s holding power (Fortna, 2004, p.215). More
specifically, measures such as demilitarized zones and third party involvement prove particularly
effective. Like much of the ceasefire or settlement literature, Fortna acknowledges and identifies
those situational and environmental factors that most strongly affect peace agreements, but argues
that the substance of the agreement can override these factors. However, for the purposes of this
paper, the results in such ceasefire literature are misleading. Within Fortna’s framework,
agreements are considered successful so long as active or violent conflict does not reemerge; as
such, frozen conflicts such as those in Cyprus, North and South Korea, and in parts of the former
Soviet Union would fit the model of successful agreements. Since it is not only the suspension of
armed conflict, but the lack of resolution to the root causes of conflict and the resulting stagnation
that this paper is concerned with, a more comprehensive framework for agreement success is
required.
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On the other hand, literature that focuses on the settlement of intrastate conflicts such as
civil wars and separatist conflicts tend to view success as occurring when root causes of the
conflict are dealt with and a tangible plan for future coexistence is agreed upon. Walter (2002) is
concerned with why some civil wars are settled and others rage on, and in those factors that
contribute to successful implementation of the terms of the agreement. Walter (2002) highlights
third party involvement and power-sharing agreements as necessary factors in the successful
acceptance and implementation of a peace agreement. She proposes that we examine the
resolution of conflict in a three-phase framework. This first phase is the process of getting parties
to the table, so to speak, and the conditions and motivations that cause parties to enter into
negotiations. The second phase is where parties reach a mutually acceptable agreement; this stage
considers both the substantive and environmental factors that enable agreement. The final phase
looks at the implementation of the agreements. Walter is mainly concerned with the second and
third phase, and those aspects of settlement that make a peace settlement conducive to signing
and compliance. Walter lays out the credible commitment theory which posits that combatants in
civil wars will “sign and implement a peace settlement only if they are confident that their
military forces will be safely consolidated and that power will be shared once they relinquish
their own political and military assets” (Walter, 2002, p. 15). This is done through a third party
security guarantee, particularly during demobilization, and strong power-sharing agreements that
distribute political, territorial, and military power.
Focusing on the issue of power-sharing, Caroline Hartzell and Mathew Hoddie seek to
differentiate between power-sharing agreements and argue that power-sharing arrangements that
are more extensive and multi-dimensional are more likely to succeed in maintaining peace
(Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007). Hartzell and Hoddie identify four areas or
forms of power-sharing: political, territorial, military, and economic. Agreements that include
power-sharing arrangements in all four categories are more likely to succeed than those with
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power-sharing in only one area. Their framework also identifies other factors, both substantive
and situational, that influence the success of a peace agreement. First, actors with previous
experience with democratic institutions are more likely to craft a lasting agreement. Furthermore,
wars of long duration increase the likelihood that parties will craft an enduring peace, however
wars yielding a high casualty rate are unlikely to end in durable peace. Third party enforcement is
also a key factor in this framework, as is the timeframe. Hartzell and Hoddie find that settlements
negotiated in the post-Cold War era tend to more successful. They also claim that the risk of war
breaking out again declines with the passage of time.
These theories all underline the argument that while factors like relative power and
timing are significant, they can be overridden by a strong agreement. In opposite fashion,
theorists that focus on the timing of peace negotiations claim that even the best possible
agreements will fail if the timing is not right for resolution. Two of the main proponents of this
claim are William Zartman’s ripeness theory and Dean Pruitt’s modification of this which he calls
readiness theory.
The intention of ripeness theory, as Zartman explains, is to identify “why, and therefore
when, parties to a conflict are susceptible to their own or others’ efforts to turn the conflict toward
resolution through negotiation” (Zartman I.W., 2000, p.228). There are two central components to
ripeness: the perception of a mutually hurting stalemate and the perception of a way out. The
mutually hurting stalemate is a situation where “parties find themselves locked in a conflict from
which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them” (Zartman I.W.,
2000, p.228). Or, one may say that a mutually hurting stalemate is reached when both parties
perceive themselves to be a point where the costs of continued conflict outweigh the expected
costs of negotiation. This moment may be, but is not necessarily, enhanced or induced by a past,
impending, or recently avoided catastrophe which can serve as a deadline or impetus for
movement towards negotiation. The second component, a way out, need not be a specific solution
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that parties can identify going into negotiations. Rather, it is only necessary that parties have a
sense that a negotiated settlement is possible, and that the other party also has the motivation to
seek it (Zartman I.W., 2000). Therefore, the working definition of ripeness, as posited by
Zartman is: “if the (two) parties to a conflict (a) perceive themselves to be in a hurting stalemate
and (b) perceive the possibility of a negotiated solution (a way out), the conflict is ripe for
resolution” (2000, p.229).
Ripeness theory, as posited by Zartman, has had numerous reworkings and contestations
since its emergence. One of the prominent modifications of this theory is Dean Pruitt’s readiness
theory. Pruitt offers readiness theory as revision and elaboration of Zartman’s ripeness theory.
Readiness is treated as a variable whereas ripeness is typically treated as a state, and describes the
thinking of an individual party rather than a moment of joint thinking in the conflict (Pruitt,
2007). Pruitt offers four main criticisms of ripeness theory:
(1) “Ripeness theory only seeks to explain entry into negotiation. Yet it makes
sense that conditions which encourage entry into negotiation should …also
encourage all of the following: throwing large human resources into the
negotiation, taking significant risks to achieve agreement, making deep
concessions, and thus moving toward or to agreement.”
(2) “Ripeness is viewed as a state rather than a variable; situations are either ripe
or unripe. This is fine for an initial, heuristic set of ideas but … viewing ripeness
as a variable allows us to postulate that as ripeness strengthens… agreement is
more likely to be reached.”
(3) The antecedents of ripeness are viewed as joint states that simultaneously
affect both parties to the conflict … a more flexible theory would analyze the
motives and perceptions of each party separately. This would make it easier to
explain the asymmetric patterns that are often found in reality.”
(4) “Ripeness theory has a list-like quality that does not distinguish between
types of antecedents” (Pruitt, 1997).

Based on these criticisms, readiness theory is offered as a modification of sorts. Parallel to
ripeness theory’s components of the mutually hurting stalemate and a perceived way out,
readiness has two components: motivation and optimism. This theory posits that: “a party will
move toward resolution of a heavily escalated conflict (entering negotiation, making concessions,
etc.) to the extent that it is (a) motivated to achieve de-escalation and (b) optimistic about finding
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a mutually acceptable agreement that will be binding on the other party” (Pruitt, 1997, p.239).
Motivation to end the conflict is not entirely unlike the mutually hurting stalemate; parties
achieve this motivation when escalation or the status quo are no longer viable or attractive
options. Optimism, however, serves as a gating variable that determines the extent to which the
motivation to end conflict is expressed as conciliatory gestures and behavior, which are necessary
to successful negotiation (Pruitt, 1997). The component of optimism differs from its counterpart
in ripeness theory, a perceived way out. In addition to the perception that a negotiated settlement
is possible, optimism also requires working trust and lowered aspirations. This conceptualization
of optimism helps to explain why some negotiations fail even though adequate motivation to
resolve the conflict exists (Pruitt, 2007).

Relational approaches and reconciliation.Rather than focusing on the timing or
substance of a peace agreement, there is a third group of peace theorists that focus on the
relationship between the parties, and attribute failed negotiations to the failure of parties to
transition from an antagonistic, zero-sum relationship to a more cooperative and win-win
relationship.
Early major contributions to this school of thought were made by Herbert C. Kelman.
Largely influenced by the work of John Burton and his theory on the centrality of human needs
and their satisfaction in the resolution of conflict, Kelman developed a third party approach to
conflict that has been termed interactive problem solving (Kelman, 1998). Like Burton, Kelman’s
approach and understanding of international and inter-communal conflict is “anchored in socialpsychological principles” (Kelman, 1998 p.190). Being derived from needs theory and informed
by social-psychology, Kelman’s approach to conflict places emphasis on the relationships
between parties and their respective representatives on an individual level. Kelman notes “there
are many aspects of international conflict and conflict resolution for which the individual
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represents the most appropriate unit of analysis” (Kelman, 1998 p. 191). He continues “thus we
can identify certain processes central to conflict resolution … that of necessity take place at the
level of individuals and interaction between individuals” (Kelman, 1998 p. 191).
From these premises Kelman developed the problem solving workshop. This form of
intervention gathers politically influential individuals (but not necessarily political office holders)
of each party for intensive but unofficial meetings. These are not negotiations, and are not
convened for the purpose of reaching political settlements, but are intended to produce change
among workshop participants on the level of individuals and interpersonal interation. With this, it
is intended that participants will develop the ability to work cooperatively and engage in joint
problem solving, with the hope that the proposals and ideas reached cooperatively in the
workshops will feed back into official negotiations (Kelman, 1998). It may seem self-evident that
the interaction between party representatives is important to the success of conflict settlement.
However, the orientation of third party interventions toward the improvement of relationships and
the interaction between key individuals in each party marks a departure from other conflict
resolution strategies. Interactive problem-solving contributes to “the development of new
approaches to conceptualizing and conducting the macroprocess of conflict resolution and
international relations” (Kelman, 1998 p.197).
Another influential figure in the relational school of thought is John Paul Lederach. In his
work, Lederach emphasizes a paradigmatic shift in the resolution of armed conflict from
traditional negotiation between state representatives to the rebuilding of relationships between
parties. Lederach builds on the early concepts of Adam Curle who emphasized the roles that
balance of power and awareness of the conflict play in the readiness of parties to negotiate (Curle
1971 as cited by Lederach 1995). Confrontation between the parties, along with the role of
advocacy, leads to a balancing of power, making negotiation possible and creating a role for
mediation. He explains “sucessful negotiations and mediation lead to a restructuring of the
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relationship…this result is what Curle refers to as increased justice or more peaceful relations”
(Lederach, 1995 p.14).
This focus on the restructuring of the relationship between parties is the core of
Lederach’s conceptual framework for reconciliation. “This paradigmatic shift” he explains “is
articulated in the movement away from a concern with the resolution of issues and towards a
frame of reference that focuses on the restoration and rebuilding of relationships…The
framework must address and engage the relational aspects of reconciliation as the central
component of peacebuilding” (Lederach, 1997 p.24). Reconciliation is the approach that follows
from Lederach’s conceptualization of protracted conflict and of the central role that relational
reformation plays in resolution. The concept of reconciliation as Lederach posits it, rests on three
working assumptions:
1. “Relationship is the basis of both the conflict and its long-term solution
2. Engagement of the conflicting groups assumes an encounter, not only of
people but also of several different and highly interdependant streams of
activity.
3. Reconciliation requires that we look outside the mainstream of international
political traditions, discourse, and operational modalities if we are to find
innovation” (Lederach, 1997 p.27).
This approach to conflict settlement marks a departure from traditional state-centered diplomacy
and peace negotiations in two ways. First, the focus on improvement of relations between parties
rather than the settlement of disputed issues allows conflict resolution activities to take any
number of forms. These include the problem solving workshop as promoted by Kelman, and later
by others such as Ronald Fisher (1997), as well as a host of other unofficial, non-state centered
activities. Second, the reconciliation approach requires that the process of conflict resolution
incorporate the entire society rather than focusing entirely on heads of state and officals. This
approach looks for influential figures at all levels and in all areas of a society, such as business
leaders, media figures, clergy, or grassroots community leaders, and seeks to engage them in the
conflict resolution process. In a word, it could be said that the relational or reconciliatory
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approach seeks to build not just a peace agreement, but a peace-seeking society. Such alternative
approaches to building peace in and between conflicting societies has come to be termed tracktwo or unofficial peacebuilding, and numerous other scholars such as Louise Diamond and John
McDonald (1995) and Louis Kriesberg (1989), for example, have contributed to the expansion
and opening of the concept of peace-building in this way.

Wars of Seccession & De-Facto States. Contrary to some of the above mentioned
literature which looks at characteristics of the peace process to explain the continuation of
conflict, the compartive literature on the conflicts in the Soviet successor states focuses on
characteristics of the parties. In particular, this literature focuses on the separatist states and their
impact on the conflict’s dynamics. Charles King and Dov Lynch point to the existence of these
separatist regions and their development into (somewhat) functioning states as complicating the
dynamics of the conflict and its resolution. As King explains: “the crystallization of independent
statelike entities has meant that the resolution of these conflicts is not so much about patching
together a torn country as about trying to reintegrate two functionally distinct administrations,
militaries, and societies” (King, 2001 p.525). King also explores the implications of these statebuilding projects on parties’ motivations to settle. As the stagnant conflict evolves into systematic
normalcy, a variety of groups and individuals become invested in the status quo; as King notes,
asking “cui bono” can illuminate a number of forces acting to maintain the status quo. Examples
abound:
Both the separatists and their erstwhile opponents in central governments benefit
from the un-taxed trade and production flowing through the former war zones.
Even in less unsavory ways, individuals inside and outside the conflict areas have
an interest in maintaining the status quo—from poets who have built careers
extolling their newfound statehood to pensioners worried about how their meager
incomes might be further diminished if the country were once again integrated. It
is a dark version of Pareto efficiency: the general welfare cannot be improved—
by reaching a genuine peace accord allowing for real reintegration—without at
the same time making key interest groups in both camps worse off (King, 2001
p.525).
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King asserts an additional aspect of the motivation to maintain the status quo, claiming that the
governments running the separatist states often function as well as their central state adversaries.
That separatists have been able to “build states that now function about as well as the recognized
countries of which they are still formally constituents,” King asserts, is the real obstacle to
settlement (2001, p.535). This argument is certainly persuasive, but only in cases where it is the
reality. While this was most likely the case in 2001 when King published the article, the Georgian
metropolitan state has experienced tremendous economic growth and increased stability since the
Rose revolution in 2004, with GDP growth of nearly 10% in 2006 and 12% in 2007 (The World
Fact Book 2008: Georgia, 2008). Thus, while there may have been a time when separatism was in
part motivated by the ability of the de-facto state to function and better provide for its constituents
than the metropolitan state, this no longer the case and should not be the obstacle to settlement
that King argues it is. Of course, the most recent round of fighting between Georgia and Russia,
in late Summer 2008, undoubtedly had an effect on the relative level of Georgia’s state
functionality. Russian attacks devastated much of the state’s military capacity and national
infrastructure, disabling major roads and transportation hubs, and creating a mass humanitarian
crisis as thousands of Georgians living in or around the areas of conflict fled to other parts of
Georgia. As of yet it is too early to know what long term effects the August war will have on
Georgia’s economy, or if it will slow the tide of foreign investment that has had a large part in
driving the country’s economic growth.
Dov Lynch further explores the de facto states of the former Soviet Union, citing their
existence as the main reason for the asbsence of progress toward settlement (Lynch, 2004). He
cites a combination of external and internal drivers as being behind the status quo that has
dominated these conflicts since the early 1990’s. (He also emphasizes that the conventional
wisdom attributing this status quo to primarily to external drivers, namely the role of Russia, is
misconcieved and narrow sighted.)
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Because his focus is specifically on the separatist states in these conflicts, the internal
drivers that he speaks of refer to things being done inside or by separatist states. He points out
three main drivers: the insistence on absolute sovereignty based on international conventions and
adherence to the principle of national self-determination, fear and insecurity, and subsistence
systems that have developed under the weak governments and foster the growth of criminal
elements in the economy (Lynch, 2004). First, the existence of these separatist states in isolation
for so many years has bolstered their belief in sovereignty. Aside from the basic elements of
sovereignty: territory, population, and government, these de-facto states have also developed
limited institutions and financial systems. These systems reinforce the belief and insistence on
their right to sovereignty. Furthermore, the strong sense of fear and insecurity in the de-facto
states has also led them to bolster their security in whatever ways they can, and typically they
maintain a military with rather wide mobilization capacity. These military forces are part of the
state-building projects that have sustained the separatists during the long frozen periods of the
conflict. Finally, the economic isolation felt by separatist states for many years has led to the
creation of subsistence systems for survival and a return to primitive economic systems such as
barter (Lynch, 2004).
Externally, Lynch points to Russian intervention, the role of international organizations,
and the role of the metropolitan states. The term metropolitan, as Lynch uses it, refers to the
central state from which the separatist or de-facto states have seceded; in the cases Lynch
examines the metropolitan states would be Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. Lynch modfies
King’s claim that the separatist states are probably better off than their metropolitan counterparts,
pointing out several reasons for why the metropolitan states are not particularly enticing to the
separatists.Of these external drivers, Lynch lists the assistance of international organizations,
particularly humanitarian organizations, for enabling the separatist states and keeping them afloat
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in terms of meeting the most basic needs of their populations (Lynch, 2004). He also points to the
role played by the metropolitan states and Russian intervention.
This book was published shortly after the Rose Revolution, and therefore cannot account
for the massive economic upturn experienced in Georgia after 2004, nor the violence experienced
in the summer of 2008, but it does improve on King’s claims by focusing on the perception held
by separatists that they may be better off, rather than claiming this to be a reality. Again,
however, this raises the question of whether this perception is still widely held or whether the
prosperity experienced in Tbilisi has made ripples in Abkhazia. Lynch also notes, that regardless
of economic improvement, the metropolitan state of Georgia is still dominated by nationalist
politics, and caters to the radically nationalist Abkhaz Government in Exile made up of former
Georgian officials from the pre-war government of Abkhazia (Lynch, 2004). So long as
Georgia’s political system is dominated by nationalist figures it is unlikely to appeal to minority
separatists.
Lynch acknowledges Russia’s role in maintaining the status quo and protecting the
separatist states, but denies the claim that many (especially the metropolitan states) make that
Russia is the key factor in the emergence and resolution of these conflicts, focusing rather on
developments in the separatist states themselves. However, the fighting between Georgian and
Russia during the summer of 2008 showed dramatically just how much of a player Russia is in
these conflicts. While the outcomes of this brief war have yet to be determined, it is very possible
that Abkhazia or South Ossetia may achieve either indepenence or annexation with Russia due
primarily to Russia’s insistence and formidable power.
We might adopt Lynch’s conceptualization of these conflicts with regard to ripeness
theory disscussed earlier. Hurting stalemates have been reached in all the Soviet successor
conflicts, but rather than turning to settlement to attenuate the pain of stalemate, parties develop
internal mechanisms, such as subsistence and barter based economic systems, as well as reliance
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on external sources of support to help offset the pain of stalement. On the other hand, it might be
argued (perhaps by supporters of ripeness theory) that these conflicts have not in fact reached a
true mutually hurting stalemate or have not yet reached what might be considered as a threshold
of ripeness. Lynch makes two arguments in his work that add to this conceptualization of
ripeness. First, he argues that it is only in regards to offical peace negotiations that these conflicts
are frozen, where in reality they are not really frozen at all but are in fact rather dynamic beneath
the surface. Second, he argues that the status quo in these conflicts is maintained by certain
driving factors that originate inside the separatist states and that act on the separatist states.
Perhaps it is possible to intregrate these arguments into an understanding of this conflict
as framed by the theory of ripeness. This conceptualization would say that the stagnation or
intertia of frozen conflict is due to the fact that although parties have reached a hurting stalemate
the conflict has not yet reached a point of intensity or painfulness severe enough to motivate
parties to settle (which will be referred to as ripeness for resolution for the sake of clarity). In the
case of Georgia and Abkhazia parties do not reach this threshold because factors such as state
building projects in the de-facto states, external support, and profiteering help separatist groups
subsist through the stalemate and therefore keep the conflict or status quo at a tolerable level of
pain. Charles King briefly referred to this status quo as “something close to equibrium” (2001, p.
525), and although his work did not elaborate on the use of this term, the notion of equilibrium
will become more useful as literature on social change is explored later in this review. This
conceptual framework that integrates Lynch’s arguments with the idea of ripeness as a threshold
illustrated below.
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Ripeness for Resolution

Figure 1: Forces keeping the status quo below the threshold of ripeness for resolution.

However, if we are to take this as compelling explanation for why the conflicts of the former
Soviet Union have not settled, there are some problems that must be accounted for. As
previously discussed, both King and Lynch’s theories are based at least somewhat on the
assumption that the governing bodies of the separatist states function as well as their counterparts
in the metropolitan states.
Furthermore, the synthesis described above offers some possible explanation for why
such conflicts seem unable to escalate to a point where the conflict is ripe for resolution.
However, it fails to explain why the conflict has not particularly de-escalated in the more than a
decade since ceasefires were established. There has been little warming of relations, opening of
borders, or loosening of restriction, and what there has been was rather fleeting. In other words,
while factors such as de-facto state building and international assisstence push the conflict’s level
of intensity down, what is pushing back up so as to maintain the equilibrium or status quo that has
reigned for so long?
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It seems then that part of accounting for the longevity of frozen conflict is understanding
why it does not de-escalate to the point where manageable relations are reached or can be
negotiated. One primary factor that could be seen as preventing the de-escalation of such
conflicts, and in particular the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, is the presence of displaced peoples
who desire but are unable to return to the regions from which they fled. In the case of Georgia,
there is a population between 200,000 and 300,000 ethnic Georgians who lived in Abkhazia but
fled during the war in the early 1990s. These internally displaced persons (IDPs) are a significant
factor in the conflict; and a large majority express a desire to return to Abkhazia but are unable to
do so under current conditions. However the frozen nature of the conflict and the current status
quo are enough for many IDPs to retain the hope of eventual return.
With this sizable population being such a significant factor in the resolution of this
conflict, a consideration of the dynamics of prolonged displacement, as well as the political role
of organized IDP coalitions (in this case the Abkhaz Government-in-exile) may shed some light
on the inertia that this review seeks to understand.

Prolonged displacement & refugee dynamics. In the last fifty years, predominating
attitudes to refugees and other forcibly displaced persons have shifted dramatically. Previous to
World War II, the provision of sanctuary to those viewed as fleeing unjust persecution was
common practice in much of western culture. This was a tradition largely stemming from and
beginning with the English offering of sanctuary to the French Huguenots in the late seventeenth
century (Marfleet, 2006). In the Cold War era, the notion of “refugee” was more politicized, with
the term often connoting one who has defected or fled from an enemy state. Until 1980, in fact,
the U.S. government limited the term refugee to mean persons fleeing communism (Whitaker,
2003). However, with the fall of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War attitudes towards
forcibly displaced persons shifted towards policies of exclusion and limited granting of amnesty.
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Such populations have in many ways come to be seen as an economic and security burden to host
states, and perceptions of displaced persons have shifted from victims of broad geopolitical
conflict to conflict inducing populations and opportunists.
Another shift in policy has occurred in terms of preferred approaches to displaced
populations. Prior to the end of the Cold War, it was generally accepted that the nature of the
individual’s flight meant that return was not generally perceived as a viable option. Integration
and third country resettlement were generally preferred as long-term solutions. In the post-Cold
War world, however, voluntary repatriation has become a primary focus in the refugee field. This
focus has been largely based on the assumption that displaced persons want to return. Although
this is very often the case, this assumption has also led to some rather ominous repatriation
operations that were far from voluntary. Such was the case in several instances such as the
repatriation of Rwandan refugees from Tanzania, refugees repatriated from South Africa to
Mozambique, and Tamil asylum seekers forcibly repatriated from Switzerland in an agreement of
the Swiss and Sri Lankan governments (Black & Koser, 1999).
This policy shift goes hand in hand with shifting perceptions of displaced persons and the
changed nature of war. Such populations are often viewed as hazardous, costly, and detrimental
by host countries, particularly in the context of conflict. In some cases where host countries
border the conflict region, refugees and IDPs are marginalized and isolated for fear that their
presence will encourage the conflict to spill across the border. In other instances, such as is often
the case with populations of internally displaced people, displaced populations become a form of
leverage in the conflict. Their return becomes wrapped up in the terms of victory for the host
country, meaning that their integration into the host society comes to be seen as a sign of accepted
defeat. As such, many host countries opt to keep refugees and IDPs separated from the rest of the
population, often restricting them to camps or concentrated centers near the border. Policies of
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this sort have been seen with Rwandan refugees in Tanzania, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon,
and with various groups in the Balkans.
This increasingly strong view of voluntary repatriation has also had an effect on the
approach taken to conflict resolution in some cases. In many cases, international efforts to resolve
conflict focus largely on creating conditions that allow refugees or other displaced persons to
return; this was, for example, a prominent approach to the conflicts in the Balkans, and was a
significant component of the Dayton Accords (Whitaker, 2003). It is possible to see how this
approach may lend itself to a dangerous sense of false resolution: glossing over the roots of
conflict in order to create the speediest return possible to normalcy. Furthermore, many NGO’s
and relief organizations that provide aid to displaced persons are expanding their mandates to
include activities in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. While this indicates an honorably
broad scope, it also means that organizations and their service providers are being pushed into
performing duties that they may not have the capacity or qualifications for (Ferris, 2003).
One can understand why, in most cases, voluntary repatriation would be the optimal
long-term solution to displacement. However, the complexities and contradictions of return are
greater than they may initially seem. The literature on return and repatriation identifies a
phenomenon referred to as the myth of return as central to this issue. The myth of return refers,
most basically, to the desire and aspiration entertained by refugees, other forcibly displaced
persons, and immigrants to return to their country or region of origin. The term myth is used
because this belief is often held in situations where people have been displaced for years or even
decades, and where realistically return is highly unlikely. The myth is in many cases a coping
mechanism rather than the actual anticipation of returning. It is a way of dealing with the
dilemma of living in two different contexts: in the displaced community (even if this community
is limited to the family) and in the host society (Al-Rasheed, 1994). It is also important to note
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that the myth of return is a term created by outside researchers to describe a particular mindset;
the term “myth” is not typically used by displaced persons to describe their own views.
The myth of return occurs not only in individuals but also in displaced communities,
where it is often acted out and reinforced. Refugee scholar Roger Zetter (1999) offers a
conceptualization of the myth of return as an adaptive coping mechanism. It may be more helpful
to think of this phenomenon as the myth of return to home, rather than simply the myth of return,
because what is mythologized is the idea of the home that was lost rather than simply the act of
returning. The idealization of returning to home is a way of expressing hope for the eventual
restoration of what was lost, both physically and symbolically (Zetter, 1999). Zetter
conceptualizes the refugee’s world or experience as a triangle, whose three points represent the
past, future, and present. The continuity of this triangle therefore represents the continuity to life
as we are constantly transitioning from past to present and from present to future. However, as
Zetter explains, the experience of forced displacement fractures the triangle and severs the
connection between the points of past, present and future. As this occurs the all-important
element of continuity is destroyed. In the refugee triangle the parameter of the past is fractured,
and the past-present and past-future connections are damaged or jeopardized. As such,
contradictory behaviors of simultaneously adapting to place and mythologizing the return home
can be understood as parallel efforts to repair or restore the fragmented triangle (Zetter, 1999).
While those such as Zetter attempt to understand the dynamics of this phenomena, others
such as Daniel Warner emphasize the idealization that goes on with the myth of return, and the
way in which this makes repatriation more difficult and more paradoxical than one may initially
believe. Warner argues that the myth is rooted far more in nostalgia than the recollection of
reality. Return very often becomes a social and political motto within displaced communities,
leading both the community and outsiders to embrace return as a policy and strategy, while
overlooking the complexities involved in doing so. There is a “considerable gap between policy
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makers’ idea of voluntary repatriation and the actual experience of refugees” (Warner, 1999
p.161). Warner explains that the nostalgia of home is in part due to the desire in people to
reconcile the present with the past. However, this rift cannot be closed; we cannot go back
because that to which we may wish to return is no longer there. Warner also claims that in some
ways, our desire to prioritize the return of refugees is, in a way, a reflection of our own desires to
return to a world of alignment and symmetry. As a result, voluntary repatriation is inclined to
overlook the extreme complexity of what happens to refugees once they find themselves in their
country of origin.
The conceptualization of the myth of return lends some depth to the issue of return that
policies of voluntary repatriation can overlook or oversimplify. It also provides the realization
that for displaced persons, the desire or promise of returning home is probably far more complex
and conflicting than it may first appear. In approaching the issues of prolonged displacement and
return as significant factors in protracted conflict or frozen conflict it is important to consider the
complexity of return and ask what degree to which displaced persons wrestle with doubt and fear
about returning.

Field Theory. These questions and issues may be better illuminated by looking at the
social-psychological literature about group decision and social change. Social scientist Kurt
Lewin’s theories on the subject of opposing forces introduce another way of looking at
motivation, change, and the resistance to change. Lewin’s field theory posits that there are
restraining and driving forces at work against each other within an individual’s own “field.” In
this view, a lack of change is the result of “opposing and countervailing ‘forces’ that continuously
operate to produce what we experience as stability” (Brager & Holloway, 1992). Restraining
forces work against change while driving forces move toward it, thus when these forces are
relatively balanced the result is stability (Lewin, 1969). The framework derived from this theory
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is known as force field analysis, which seeks to identify the opposing forces within a given social
field with the intent of manipulating these forces to produce a desired change. Today, this type of
analysis is most often used in organizational contexts to help plan for and facilitate change within
an organization. However, many refugees and IDPs who experience long term displacement often
find themselves in a state of limbo, so to speak, unable to return and unable or unwilling to
integrate. As such, consideration of the driving and restraining forces within a community of
displaced persons may yield some insight into this seemingly stagnant situation.
Lewin’s work is concerned with issues of change and planning for change, particularly
certain types of social change within group or organizational dynamics. In evaluating prospects
for social change, Lewin identifies several factors that influence group action: channels, gates,
and gatekeepers. Channels are the means through which the group acts or collects resources. In an
experiment aiming to bring about change in the food eaten by selected families, the channels
identified are their means of getting food, such as buying or growing it (Lewin, 1958). Gates or
gating agents, as well as the disposition of the gatekeepers that control them are a significant part
of systems. As Lewin explains: “the constellation of forces before and after the gate region are
decisively different in such a way that the passing or not passing of a unit through the whole
channel depends to a high degree upon what happens in the gate region” (Lewin, 1958 p.199).
An example of this might be university admissions. An admissions board may set up strict
policies to keep all but the most qualified students out; however once a student is admitted, the
university does all that it can to propel the student toward success. In this case the admissions
process is a gate, and the individuals who sit on the admissions board are gatekeepers.
Lewin’s theories regarding motivation and his concept of quasi-stationary equilibria may
be most illuminating to the discussion here. Lewin’s work is offered as an alternative to the
prevalent thinking of his time which assumes that action is a direct result of motivation. On the
contrary, Lewin argues that this motivation passes through a constellation of conditions which
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may or may not lead to action. From this, Lewin derives the concept of a force field containing
countervailing forces that either drive or restrain action (Brager & Holloway, 1992). However,
this is susceptible to the misinterpretation that the slightest change in either force will produce
action, and this is not the case. As Lewin explains, if this were the case “a state of blockage or
extremely inhibited action results rather than that clear one-sided action which follows a real
decision” (Lewin, 1958 p.203). Rather than either restraining or driving forces gaining a slight
edge, what allows decision to be made is when the potency of one alternative is diminished such
that the other alternative dominates the situation.
The state resulting from a balance of driving and restraining forces is what Lewin terms
quasi-stationary equilibrium. It may be useful to consider long-term displacement as resulting
from a long standing state of quasi-stationary equilibrium, where the forces driving and
restraining the decision to integrate into the host population (or alternately to return) are balanced.
Or, on another level, the stagnation of frozen conflict could be interpreted in this way as well. It
could be said that the forces driving the parties towards resolution are on balance with the forces
restraining them. Interpreting the status quo of these frozen conflicts as a quasi-stationary
equilibrium may illuminate some of the factors impeding progress.
It should be noted this sort of force field analysis is intended for social phenomena that
can be regarded as a process rather than a thing (Lewin, 1958). However, it seems that long term
displacement can be viewed as a process, a series of group and individual decisions and action.
The stagnation of frozen conflict can likewise be considered a process, an active engagement in
the status quo. As such it seems that keeping an eye to the conflicting forces that drive towards
the resolution of frozen conflict and those that restrain it may be a useful way to approach the
inertia that appears to dominate the status quo.
One area where this concept has been applied to conflict is in literature on the concept of
inducing ripeness. This concept is based on the idea discussed earlier that there is a certain point
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where intractable conflicts become ripe for resolution. As it is conceived by Zartman (2000),
ripeness occurs at the point of mutually hurting stalemate – a point where the continuation of
conflict is seen by parties to be more painful than the cost of settlement. The concept and
literature around inducing ripeness is concerned with finding ways to bring parties to this point of
ripeness without having to reach a mutually hurting stalemate or experience the violence and
destruction that it often takes to get parties in an intractable conflict to get to that point.
Coleman (2006) lists “fostering ripeness” (p. 549) as a main guideline to approaching
intractable conflict, and refers to ripeness as “a commitment to a change in the nature of the
relations of the parties from a destructive orientation toward a more constructive state of
coexistence” (2001, p. 549). Coleman also notes the value of Lewin’s theory of social change in
approaching the task of fostering ripeness in an intractable conflict. “The study of the conditions
for change” he notes “begins appropriately with an analysis of the conditions for ‘no change,’ that
is, for the state of equilibrium” (Lewin, 1947 p.208) as quoted by Coleman, 2006). Coleman
goes on to assert that therefore “to better locate and comprehend the various paths to ripeness in a
conflict it is valuable to attempt to understand the dynamic forces that keep a conflict in a state of
‘unripeness’” (Coleman, 2006 p.550). This can be applied to frozen conflict in the same way that
Coleman applies it to intractability. Frozen conflict therefore should be viewed as equilibrium
whose apparent stability comes from the opposing forces acting upon it, rather than as a static
state. This corroborates well with the concerns that Lynch (2004) and King (2001) express
regarding the term “frozen” and the lack of activity or motion it implies. As they both argue,
these frozen conflicts are quite dynamic and the players and context have changed significantly
since the outbreak of conflict. If we view the frozen state of these conflicts as a state of quasistationary equilibrium, the change and dynamic nature that Lynch is concerned with is a
contributing force to this frozen nature rather than a contrary phenomenon.
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Coleman goes on in his discussion of equilibrium to note how this concept from Lewin
can be more specifically applied to induce ripeness in a conflict. The state of “unripeness” can be
broken by either adding driving forces or removing restraining forces. However, driving forces
that can induce ripeness in intractable conflict include the experience of catastrophe, the
perception of hurting stalemate, or the threat of physical force (Coleman, 2000), and the addition
of such forces to a conflict system will increase tension, aggressiveness and emotionality, and
create fatigue. These are less than ideal conditions for peacebuilding. On the other hand, the
removal of opposing forces in a conflict system, such as rage, distrust, or hopelessness, can alter
the balance in the equilibrium while reducing tension (Coleman, 2000). Furthermore, Coleman
goes on to cite the concept posited by Burgess and Burgess (1996, 1997) that due to the zero-sum
and non-negotiable issues that are typically at stake in intractable conflicts, it may be more
effective for third parties to orient their intervention to focus on the process of the intervention
rather than the outcomes of the intervention. Coleman notes that “if their initial attention is
focused on creating a fair and effective process, perhaps a range of possibilities will emerge
leading to a sense of openness to negotiation in general” (2000, p.306). By combining these two
premises on the approach to intractable conflict, Coleman proposes that “interventions aimed at
removing resistance-forces related to the conflict process will result in great disputant ripeness
than interventions that introduce driving-forces related to the outcomes of the conflict” (2000,
p.306).

Conclusions
There are numerous theories and observations offered by various fields that contribute to
a better understanding of frozen conflict and the reasons for its longevity, some more compelling
than others. Certain theories, factors, and schools of thought stand out as particularly
illuminating. The concept of ripeness is central to understanding why these conflicts are so
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resistant to moving forward in the peace process. Similarly, explanations offered by Dov Lynch,
Charles King and other scholars of the post-Soviet sphere are particularly helpful in identifying
the role that the de-facto states play in perpetuating the status quo. While these theories, when
synthesized, help us understand why the conflict has not escalated to a breaking point, we require
further explanation to understand why the conflicts do not de-escalate. The sizable population of
displaced people in such conflicts (Georgia-Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Cyprus), and the
dynamics underlying their prolonged displacement are a key to understanding the inertia of
frozen conflict. Such populations are significant stakeholders in these conflicts, and the fact that
after decades of displacement they do not fully integrate into their host population ensures that
these conflicts will not fade away or de-escalate while these populations remain in limbo.
This review has discussed the ways in which factors such as de-facto state building,
international aid organizations, and other structures act as attenuating factors in the conflict,
pushing the level of the conflict’s intensity down. However, it may be necessary here to expound
on how the factor of IDPs or other displaced populations serves as a force that pushes up on the
conflict intensity level. It seems that there are some obvious ways that a displaced population
might have this effect. Displaced populations can organize politically to wield influence in their
host community and with the parties involved in the conflict. It is also not unheard of for
displaced populations to supply recruits for or even organize paramilitary organizations that take
on an active role in the conflict. The displaced Palestinian population is just one example of these
phenomena. However there are other less obvious ways that a displaced population can act as a
driving force that actively pushes the intensity of a given conflict up, or similarly act as a
blocking agent that passively prevents the intensity of the conflict from de-escalating. The study
in this paper seeks to shed some light on these less obvious ways that a seemingly passive or
inactive IDP population can act as a force in frozen conflict.
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One such avenue through which a displaced population can act as a force is through their
relationship with the governing elites involved in the peace process. As discussed earlier in this
review, a displaced population that is unable or unwilling to return home, and at the same time
does not integrate into the host society for any number of reasons maintains a particular
relationship with the governing bodies of that host society. Generally speaking, host countries
should theoretically be highly motivated to secure the return of any displaced population within
their borders. In particular, when a host country is one of the parties in the conflict, the presence
of a displaced population should provide motivation in the peace process. As Julie George notes
in regards to the Georgian government: they
“have many reasons to exhaust bargaining strategies to regain the Abkhaz
territory. For one, the IDP situation has exhausted the government’s housing and
health resources. Georgian cities were not prepared to accept the onslaught of
more than a 1/4 of a million people needing homes, employment and basic care”
(George, 2003).

However, as George also notes, political elites often have incentives to maintain stalemate and
prevent resolution. In the case of Georgia, which will be discussed in greater detail later, certain
government apparatus draw their power and authority from the presence of the displaced
population as a distinct and segregated population. Furthermore, if a group of governing elites is
able to leverage the displaced population for advantage in negotiations, to win favor from the
international community, or for reasons of political popularity, it is possible that these incentives
can outweigh the motivations to secure their return through successful peace processes. However,
if the attitudes of the refugee population itself are to carry significance and be worth
consideration within a realistic assessment of the conflict, these attitudes must somehow support
the escalating system hypothesized here. This is the crux of what the proceeding study
investigates: the attitudes of the IDP population, and how they play a concrete role in
perpetuating the conflict.
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Finally, if we view the conflict through the framework offered by Kurt Lewin and field
theory the inertia or frozenness with which this paper is concerned appears not so much as a lack
of any movement, but rather a point of equilibrium between opposing forces. Furthermore, field
theory can be of use in understanding the limbo in which the displaced populations in these
conflicts live, perhaps lending clues to why the conflict appears stuck, in the way that the
displaced populations also appear stuck.
Focusing on the relationship between frozen conflict and displacement that has developed
in this review, it appears that there are two plausible alternative rival hypotheses that explain the
stagnation of frozen conflict, and the role of displaced persons in it.
The first hypothesis looks at the issue on the conflict level, and builds on the concepts
offered by Zartman and Lynch. This hypothesis posits that the frozen conflict exists at certain
equilibrium, at a level of intensity or painfulness that is below a threshold where the conflict is
painful enough that parties are motivated to settle, or one might say where the conflict is ripe for
resolution. However, this equilibrium is also at a level that is too high to be ignored, or to allow
relations between parties to normalize on their own. Some of the drivers that Dov Lynch
identifies, such as the state-building projects and de-facto state structures of the secessionist
regions, peacekeeping forces, and international organizations push the level of intensity down,
keeping it below the point of ripeness. At the same time the sizable displaced population,
particularly if organized and politically mobilized, as well as the activities of paramilitary or
partisan organizations keep the level of conflict intensity up, preventing de-escalation. Thus the
conflict is “stuck” so to speak between these countervailing forces so as to appear immobile or
frozen. See figure 2.
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Ripeness for Resolution

Figure 2: The equilibrium of frozen conflict.

The second hypothesis looks at the conflict at the internal level of the displaced
population. This hypothesis posits that although the official claim of refugee or IDP groups is to
return to the area from which they were displaced, there are countervailing forces within
displaced persons on both community and individual levels. The forces for return and for
recompense which are more visible are counterbalanced by less visible forces against return, thus
leaving the population in an uncertain state of limbo. The conflict of these forces, acted out in
displaced communities, therefore prevents the return of the displaced population while also
preventing their integration into the host community.
The remainder of this thesis will illustrate the testing of these hypotheses on a particular
case, that of the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict and in particular the IDP population that has resulted
from it.
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Case Background
Introduction
As the Soviet Union collapsed, much of the world’s attention turned to the dramatic
events taking place in Russia and Eastern Europe. Revolutions in Eastern Europe, the
reunification of Germany, and tumult in Moscow dominated headlines in the late 1980’s and
early 1990’s. Soon thereafter, headlines streamed in about armed conflict in little known places
like Georgia and Azerbaijan. In this area the emerging states of Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia,
and Georgia were all engaged in open conflict in the early 1990’s.
In the newly formed state of Georgia, conflict raged between the metropolitan state and
two breakaway regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Both conflicts were violent and bloody,
inflicted tremendous damage, and carried high costs for both the separatist parties and the state of
Georgia. In the years since the conflict, there has been some movement toward resolution
between Georgia and South Ossetia. Multiple negotiations have yielded both successes and
setbacks between the parties, yet despite the setbacks, there has been movement in the GeorgiaSouth Ossetia conflict, and the movement has been more or less in the direction of resolution. The
conflict between the Georgian State and Abkhazia, on the other hand, has made no such progress
toward resolution.
This chapter will offer a background of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict and the
population of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) produced in this conflict. Like other conflicts
in this region, the Georgian Abkhazian war erupted shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union. A
ceasefire in 1994 put an end to the armed conflict and, despite occasional eruptions of violent
skirmishes, has held since. In the period since the ceasefire, Abkhazian Georgian relations have
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been suspended. Abkhazia has been isolated by an internationally mandated blockade and is
unable to trade, crippling any aspirations for economic growth. Meanwhile a population of
150,000 - 200,000 IDPs that fled to Georgia have been unable to return to their homes for over a
decade. This chapter will discuss the history of Georgian-Abkhaz relations and look at the root
causes of conflict that developed before and during the Soviet era.
This chapter will also look at the events occurring in what might be called the frozen
period of the conflict (1994-present), including attempts at negotiations and third party attempts
at intervention. This case will also focus particularly on the IDP population created in the war:
this population’s distribution in Georgia, the resources and aid available to them, and their effect
on the greater Georgian state. The issue of return is paramount in dealing with this population;
and this study will also discuss previous attempts at return, IDP positions on return, and other
third party attempts to work with the IDP population.
It is important to bear in mind the context within which the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict
has played out. During the span of this conflict the state of Georgia has dealt with civil war,
revolution, another secessionist region, South Ossetia, and most recently a brief but intense war
with Russia. All of these issues and events have molded the environment in which the GeorgianAbkhazian conflict exists, and have profoundly affected the Georgian government’s capacity for
dealing with this conflict as well as the way both sides have approached the conflict and its
settlement. Meanwhile, Georgia’s neighbors to the south, Armenia and Azerbaijan, have been
engaged in a similarly frozen conflict involving the secessionist region of Nagorno-Karabakh,
while similar separatist tensions in other Soviet successor states such as those between Moldova
and Transnistria have also been ongoing. While these conflicts have not necessarily had a
profound effect on each other, they are typically discussed by scholars of Soviet and post-Soviet
affairs as a distinct group of conflicts, involving similar root causes, key issues, and triggering
points. Finally, the events in Kosovo play an identifiable role in the events of the Georgian51

Abkhazian conflict as well as the other Soviet successor wars. The independence of Kosovo, and
the support given to it by the Western Powers has not gone unwatched in other parts of the former
Soviet Union, and is claimed by separatist regions like Abkhazia, as well as by the Russian
government who has supported some of these separatist de-facto, as precedent and evidence for
why they are entitled to independence as well.

Roots of Conflict: Pre-Soviet
The conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia certainly has roots in Soviet federal structure
and the Soviet approach to national and ethnic groups within the USSR. Yet it also has a history
that begins long before the rise of the Soviet Union, and it is worthwhile to examine the more
ancient roots of this conflict. The Caucasus region has historically been home to numerous and
distinct ethnic groups and many have maintained a distinct identity throughout centuries of rule
by outsiders such as the Persian, Ottoman, and Russian empires. Abkhazians and Ossetians are
just two of many distinct groups such as Adjarans, Mingrelians, Swanians, and a sizable minority
of Armenians whose identity and languages persist in modern day Georgia.
The degree to which the Abkhaz have stood apart from Georgians throughout history
varies according to the source. The fact that both Georgians and Abkhazians have spent much of
modern history under Ottoman, Russian, or Soviet rule further complicates any attempt to
establish historical precedents regarding the two groups’ relationship. It is generally agreed upon
that Abkhazians and Georgians are ethnically distinct. As Liana Kvarchelia explains:
For centuries, Georgians and Abkhazians, peoples with very different ethnic
origins and languages, lived in neighboring territories. There were periods in
their history when Abkhazia, as a separate principality, was under Georgian or
Ottoman vassalage. There was also a period when the western and some eastern
areas of Georgia were part of the Abkhazian Kingdom. (1998, p.18)

However, there is disagreement about Abkhazians’ origins, which is relevant to both sides’
claims to rightful sovereignty over the modern day territory of Abkhazia. Some claim that
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Abkhazian statehood, based in and around modern-day Abkhazian territory, has existed for over
1,200 years (Kvarchelia, 1998). Meanwhile there are other historical theories, espoused primarily
by Georgian scholars, which claim that Abkhazians are the relative newcomers to the territory,
which was previously under Georgian domain (Kvarchelia, 1998).
When discussing the ancient origins of Georgians, Abkhazians, and their relationship, it
is important to bear in mind that the unified political entity that is now called “Georgia” is a
relatively new creation. Before Russian rule, the territory that now makes up the modern state that
is the Republic of Georgia was essentially divided into two kingdoms or two main groups of
kingdoms. Throughout much of its history, Georgia has been divided into eastern and western
kingdoms or principalities by the Likhi mountain range that runs north to south through central
Georgia. The eastern part, most commonly know as Kartli (or Iberia in classical recordings) is
home to the capital city Tbilisi. The western part was known by classical authors and the ancient
Greeks (among others) as Colchis, and to Georgians by names such as Imereti or Abkhazeti
(Suny, 1988). There are instances of eastern and western Kingdoms being consolidated under one
ruler, most notably under Bagrat III in the early 11th century (Suny, 1988), yet such instances are
more uncommon than not.
Throughout its long history, Georgia has been dominated by foreign empires, and as the
Ottoman and Persian empires rose in the 14th century, Georgia became a crossroads and a
battleground between the empires. Although the entire south Caucasus region traded hands
between Turkish and Arab powers several times, by the early 17th century East and West Georgia
were largely divided by their loyalties. Western Georgia pledged loyalty to the Ottomans while
Eastern Georgia ruled at the discretion of Iranian shahs (Suny, 1988). One effect of Ottoman
influence in Western Georgia was the adoption of Islam by both Abkhazians and Adjarans (Suny,
1988).
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Towards the end of the 18th century, Georgian rulers turned to their increasingly imperial
neighbors to the north. Russian hegemony offered protection and security that was seen as
preferable to the conflicting and tumultuous rule of either the Persian or the Ottoman Empire.
Eastern Georgia, or Kartli, was the first to come under Russian protection, in the late 1770’s
(Slider, 2005); and by 1804 all of modern day Georgia was officially annexed by imperial Russia.
However, as Russian and Ottoman tensions grew, parts of Western Georgia, including Abkhazia,
became pawns that great powers played against each other. “During the Crimean War, the Turks
stirred up the Abkhaz against Russia at the time of the [Ottoman] invasion of Mingrelia” (Lang,
1962, p.97), and Sukhumi subsequently became a launching point for the Ottoman invasion of
Western Georgia (Lang, 1962).
The Russians consolidated their rule in Abkhazia shortly after the end of the Crimean
war. During the long era of Russian rule that followed (as part of both the Russian Empire and the
Soviet Union), Abkhazians would suffer numerous abuses at the hands of these new rulers. The
years after the war coincided with the annihilation of the Circassians, a north Caucasian ethnic
group with whom the Abkhaz had cultural and ethnic connections (Lang, 1962). Many
Circassians were exiled to Turkey, and numerous Abkhazians followed them. This period also
saw massive deportations and forced exile from the area in and around Abkhazia. Many
Abkhazians and other people of North Caucasus fled or were deported to Turkey. “The first
deportations of Muslims from the region by the Russian Empire started in 1828 with the victory
in the war” (Tarkhan-Mouravi & Sumbadze, 2006 p.284) while the main flux of Abkhazians went
to Turkey during 1864-1878. These people, who became known as the Makhajirs or the Muhajirs,
are said to number over 400,000 in Turkey today (Kvarchelia, 1998; Tarkhan-Mouravi et al.,
2006). Whether these numbers are accurate or not, they point to the fact that Abkhazians view the
period of Russian rule as a time of persecution when Abkhazian national identity was assaulted
by Soviet policies of both “Georgification” and “Russification.”
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Following the Russian Revolution and overthrow of the Tsars in 1917, Georgia declared
independence under the protection of Germany in 1918. It should be noted that in this short-lived
Georgian constitution, little indication is given to the status or sovereignty of Abkhazia
(Coppieters, 2001). Although this independence was recognized by major European powers and
even Vladimir Lenin in 1920, it was overthrown in 1921 when Georgia was invaded by the
Bolshevik army (Lang, 1962). In 1922 Georgia joined the Soviet Union as part of the
Transcaucasian Federative Republic.

Soviet Roots of Conflict
Many scholars and analysts of the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict see it as having roots in the
Soviet Period. Some point to the treatment of ethnic minorities under Soviet rule while others
point to the Soviet federal structure as a source of conflict. Before delving into these theories
though, it may be helpful to outline several key events in the early Soviet period. In the initial
years of the Soviet Union, Georgia was incorporated as part of the Transcaucasian Federative
Republic, along with Azerbaijan and Armenia. Each of these entities carried the title of
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) within Transcaucasia; and at the outset the
Abkhaz also maintained this status as Soviet Republic putting it on equal footing with Georgia
(Toft, 2001). This status was codified in Abkhazia’s constitution in 1925, which today serves as
the legal basis of their claim for independence. Abkhazia was later incorporated as a part of
Georgia in 1931, when Stalin reorganized the federal structure of the Soviet Union. At this point
Abkhazia became an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic under the jurisdiction of the Union
Republic of Georgia (Lang, 1962).
Stalin’s policies of terror and purging were felt throughout the Soviet Union in the 1930’s
and 1940’s. The Caucasus was no exception, and any expression of national discontent was
targeted as potentially mutinous. However, it was also during this period that Abkhazian national
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identity was particularly assaulted. Under various Soviet policies, influxes of non-Abkhazian
workers immigrated to the region and the Abkhazian language was subordinated to both the
Russian and Georgian languages. As Soviet historian David Marshall Lang explains:
“By 1926, autonomous Abkhazia, covering 3,240 square miles, had a population
of 174,000 of which the Abkhazians themselves accounted for less than one
third. Under the Second Five-Year Plan, Abkhazia was directed to step up
tobacco production substantially, and more Russians, Georgians, Armenians and
Greeks were brought in to work on new plantations and industrial projects. The
Abkhazians, who resented these encroachments on their cherished autonomy,
protested and in the end, fell completely into disgrace with the Kremlin" (1962,
p.256).
These policies, aimed at weakening the Abkhaz national identity, were imposed by the Soviet
regime and accomplished through policies of “Georgianization,” making it difficult for Abkhaz
nationalists to identify the source of the national oppression they experienced (Coppieters, 2003).
These policies became a major grievance for Abkhazians and a significant motivator in the
conflict that erupted in the early 1990’s. They were further exacerbated by the debate that
developed between Abkhaz and Georgia scholars in the 1970’s and 1980’s, in which each camp
developed new theories and unearthed new evidence that their own people first inhabited the area
around Abkhazia and that the other group (Georgians or Abkhaz) were the relative newcomers to
the area (Coppieters, 2001).
Throughout this period, Abkhaz authorities petitioned the Soviet central government in
Moscow to remove the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic from Georgian jurisdiction and place it
under Russian rule. Each time the request was denied, but certain cultural concessions were given
instead, providing greater power in regional government and media (Zverev, 1996). Finally, in
1989 several thousand Abkhaz signed the “Lykhny Declaration” which called for the formation
of a Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia, separate from Georgia (Lynch, 2004). This
declaration launched an outbreak of violent clashes and a string of events that would develop into
the conflict that remains unresolved today between Georgia and Abkhazia.
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Outbreak of War
The years 1989-1994 were a remarkably tumultuous time in the Caucasus region,
particularly in Georgia. It is important to remember the extent of this tumult when discussing the
events leading up to and during the Georgian-Abkhaz war. Within this same time frame the
Georgians also declared independence, fought another separatist war with South Ossetia, and
experienced a military coup d’état that ousted the country’s first president, installed a second
president, and resulted in civil war.
Georgian nationalism and the desire for autonomy were growing in the late 1980’s and
coincided with the signing of the Lykhny Declaration. Georgians, particularly those in Abkhazia,
reacted negatively to the declaration. These reactions mingled with the strong anti-Soviet and
anti-communist sentiments of the time. Later that year armed clashes broke out in Sukhumi over a
schism that developed between Georgian and non-Georgian faculty at the university in Sukhumi.
The Georgian faculty left the university to found a branch of Tbilisi State University in Sukhumi
(Lynch, 2004; Zverev 1996; Coppieters, 2003), which was subsequently subjected to
vandalization and attacks.
In October 1990 Zviad Gamsakhurdia was elected as Georgia’s first president, and in
April 1991 Georgia declared its independence from the USSR. Gamsakhurdia’s election did little
to quell fears of marginalization by ethnic minorities within Georgia, as he was known to be
radically nationalistic and to support exclusionary state-building policies that alienated minorities
(Lynch, 2004). Later in 1991, Gamsakhurdia negotiated an agreement with Abkhaz leadership
that would grant Abkhazians over-representation in the regional parliament and guarantee a nonGeorgian majority. The agreement was wildly unpopular with Georgians nationwide and
generally failed to resolve the tension between Abkhaz and Georgian groups in Abkhazia (Lynch,
2004; Zverev, 1996; Coppieters, 2003).
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In the winter of 1991-1992 Gamsakhurdia was ousted by a coalition of military and
paramilitary groups, sending him into exile and installing a military council headed by Eduard
Shevardnadze. However, even after the violent clashes in Tbilisi had ended, Gamsakhurdia
retained substantial support in the western regions of Georgia where “Zviadist” forces were
organized (Lynch, 2004). Shortly after taking power, the military council headed by
Shevardnadze abolished the 1978 Georgian constitution and replaced it with the pre-Soviet
constitution of 1921 in which the legal status of Abkhazia is not specified (Coppieters, 2003).
Later in July 1992, the Abkhazian parliament responded by declaring that Abkhazia would revert
to a 1925 constitution which described it as an independent Soviet republic.
The eruption of armed conflict shortly followed, with Georgian forces marching into
Abkhazia on August 14, 1992 (Lynch, 2004; Zverev, 1996). The reasons for the Georgian
offensive are not generally agreed upon. Some sources simply explain that Georgian forces
moved in (Lynch, 2004). Others explain that the march was done in response to Zviadist military
activity in the area of the Georgia-Abkhazia border which threatened the railroad line running
through Abkhazia to Russia. As such, some sources describe the movement of Georgian troops
into Abkhazia as a police action (Zverev, 1996; Coppieters, 2003).
At first the Georgian troops overwhelmed the Abkhazian forces, pushing them out of
Sukhumi and forcing them to withdraw to Gudauta in the northwest part of the region. However
in 1993, bolstered by Russia support in the form of weapons and Slavic officers (Lynch, 2004) as
well as fighting forces from the North Caucasus, the Abkhaz launched a series of highly
successful counter-offensives. In late September 1993, Abkhaz forces captured Sukhumi, thus
expelling the Georgian forces and causing the majority of ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia to flee
(Zverev, 1996; Coppieters, 2003).
UN sponsored talks between Georgia and Abkhazian began in Geneva in November
1993, and a formal ceasefire was signed in December. Further talks resulted in an agreement
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signed in April 1994 to deploy a peacekeeping force to maintain the ceasefire line. This
agreement was not implemented, however, due to disagreement over who should sponsor the
peacekeeping force (PKF) and where they should be deployed. Finally in May 1994 an agreement
was reached on the specifics of the PKF (Walker, 2000). This agreement specified the creation of
security zone (demilitarized zone) within 12 km of Inguri River on both sides. It also called for an
additional restricted-weapons zone within 12 km of either side of the security zone (see map on
following page). The agreement also specified that the peacekeeping force would operation under
a CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) mandate and that troops would come from a
number of CIS states. This CIS peacekeeping force would be charged with monitoring the
security and restricted-weapons zones, and would “promote the safe return of refugees and
displaced persons, especially to the Gali district” (Agreement on a Cease-Fire and Separation of
Forces, 1994 p.3). The activities of this peacekeeping force would also be monitored by the UN
Observer’s Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). The figure below illustrates the territorial provisions
of the agreement.
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Figure 3: Map of demilitarized area.

Only part of this agreement was implemented, however. A small fraction of the IDPs
have been able to safely return, and the “CIS” peacekeeping force is composed entirely of
Russian troops (Walker, 2000). Yet, by and large the basics of the ceasefire and demilitarized
zones held without incident until August 2008, with the exception of the skirmishes that took
place in Gali in the spring of 1998.
Gali is a region in the southeast of Abkhazia, bordering Georgia, and was a major
Georgian population center before the war. By the spring of 1998, between 40,000 and 60,000
Georgian IDPs had returned to the Gali region, partly under the supervision of a low-profile
UNHCR (United Nations High Commission on Refugees) repatriation program. The program was
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relatively successful: conditions in Gali improved and drew significant amounts of humanitarian
aid from external sources (Coppieters, 2005; Walker, 2000). However the Georgian returnees
were without formal security guarantees, and were frequently harassed by the Abkhazian militia
who sought to demonstrate sovereignty over the region. In response, the Georgian guerilla or
paramilitary group know as the White Legion adopted the task of providing protection to the
Georgian returnees (Nodia, 2000; Walker, 2000). The White Legion, who was openly supported
by the Georgian Abkhaz-government-in-exile, carried out raids and attacks on both the
Abkhazian militia and the Russian PKF. The Abkhaz responded by moving 1500 militia members
to the Gali region, carrying out counter-raids on Georgian villages where the White Legion were
believed to be based. Fighting ensued, and in 1998 erupted into what has come to be called the
“Six-Day War,” and the majority of the newly returned Georgian villagers, approximately 50,000,
fled the area – being displaced for the second time (Nodia, 2000; Walker, 2000). These events
made painfully clear the need for renewed efforts at negotiations and in particular “dictated a
clear need for regulating the return of refugees to Abkhazia” (Coppieters, 2005, p.287). Today it
is estimated that between 10,000 and 20,000 Georgians have returned to the Gali region. These
returnees, however, are typically discriminated against by local authorities, and often are unable
to register, unable to vote, and are often subject to highly inflated tax rates (Coppieters, 2005).
Many other IDPs that live in parts of Georgia near the Abkhaz border now return during the day
to work their farmland or orchards in the Gali region.
Since the 1998 outbreak of violence in the Gali region little has transpired in regards to
either the resolution of the conflict or the status of the IDP population created in it, and the
conflict has remained largely frozen since its outbreak. However, the summer of 2008 saw the
renewed heating of tensions along the Georgian-Abkhaz border. The outbreak of fighting
between Georgian and Russian forces in August, 2008 began in and around the separatist region
of South Ossetia, but a second front of fighting soon opened along the Georgian-Abkhaz border,
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with the fighting spreading into the Georgian border city of Zugdidi. One would imagine that this
most recent fighting would affect the ability and willingness of Georgian IDPs to travel between
their land in Gali and their current homes in Georgia. It has likely also affected those 10,00020,000 Georgians that have chosen to unofficially return to Gali. However, it should be noted at
this point that the study upon which this paper is based, as well as most of the supporting
theoretical research, was conducted and compiled well before this most recent round of fighting
broke out. As such, it is unable to address in depth the effects that the fighting in the summer of
2008 had on the long-term outlook of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict or the Georgian IDP
population. In addition, it is also possible that some aspects of this conflict may have changed
since the data in this study was collected.
The preceding section has reviewed some of the historical events and factors that are
related to the development of conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia. The roots of this conflict
have been attributed to historical factors as recent as the handling of ethnic and minority
dissatisfaction during the infancy of Georgian statehood, to the policies implemented during
Soviet rule, and as old as the emergence of consolidated kingdoms in modern-day Georgia and
Abkhazia as much as 1,200 years ago. The following section will discuss some of the central
theories on how this conflict developed and emerged, and what issues are at its core.

Theories on the Conflict
Theories that attempt to explain the outbreak of conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia
highlight a number of factors. The federal structure that emerged in the Soviet Union under
Stalin’s rule is credited by many Soviet scholars with fostering separatist ambitions in various
regions across the former Soviet Union after its fall by setting up locally run governing
institutions in certain ethnic minority regions and thus endowing these regions with varying
degrees of regional autonomy. Not only in Georgia, but in Azerbaijan and Moldova, Central
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Asia’s Ferghana Valley, and in various Russian regions such as Chechnya and Tartarstan ethnic
tensions have arisen that can be traced to the region’s status under the Soviet Federal system. In a
related but different group of interpretations of the conflict, theories credit the ineptitude of the
fledgling Republics in the building of multi-ethnic states and inability to accommodate the
concerns of ethnic minorities within their borders. Still others point to the unyielding nationalist
fervor that consumed the people of the successor states as well as the autonomous regions within
them. This uncompromising nationalism created a political environment particularly hostile to the
development of power-sharing arrangements. Most likely, all of the factors emphasized by these
theories collaborated to create the conditions from which the conflict was born, but each theory
tells a great deal about the position both parties were in during the late 1980s/early 1990s.
The behemoth USSR was comprised of dozens of distinct ethnic groups and nationalities.
Bruno Coppieters explains that the Soviet structure was highly contradictory: it was highly
centralized politically yet rather decentralized at the administrative level (2003). To dampen the
threat of nationalist ambitions and secession, a federative system was created that conferred
varying degrees of autonomy and recognition on the many ethnic groups and nations throughout
the Soviet Union. The fifteen Union Soviet Socialist Republics, which would later become the
same fifteen former Soviet states, enjoyed the highest degree of autonomy under this system.
These republics were in theory created around major ethnic groups or titular nationalities, such as
Kazakhs, Uzbeks, or Georgians. Smaller national and ethnic groups were often given recognition
with varying degrees of autonomy within the other Union Republics. Below the Union Republics
were the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSR’s), below these were the Autonomous
Regions or “Oblasts,” and below these, the “Otkrugs” (George, 2001). The Union Republic of
Georgia contained three such autonomies: The ASSRs of Abkhazia and Adjara, and the South
Ossetia Oblast. During the Soviet era this system worked to pacify and control the many ethnic
groups and nations that made up the USSR, often employing a “divide and conquer” strategy in
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the process. This ensured that any ambition on the part of these smaller titular nationalities for
greater autonomy became the problem of the Union Republics, rather than the central Soviet
governance in Moscow. Furthermore, this federal system weakened national unity within the
fifteen Union Republics, which in turn weakened their ability to pursue any ambitions of
independence they may foster. However, after the fall of the Soviet Union the remnants of these
Soviet structures and the nationalist ambitions they often fostered, in many cases exacerbated
ethnic tensions that had been kept latent for decades (George, 2001).
Other theorists point to flawed state-building practices at the outset of independence.
Monica Duffy-Toft points to the challenges inherent in multi-national state-building and the
conditions present in Georgia that made it even more difficult. “The combination of the shock of
independence, combined with long simmering nationalist resentments and a large, powerful,
imperialist neighbor, made it impossible for Georgia to establish stable institutions capable of
moving it towards its goal of a strong, multinational and democratic state” (Toft, 2001 p.123). As
a multi-national state emerges, minorities must decide whether to voice concerns to the majority
or exit the state; and the rhetoric and policies of the national majority tend to determine this
decision. Fierce nationalism dominated Georgian politics at the time, as exemplified by
Gamsakhurdia’s radically nationalist and often exclusionary rhetoric. Abkhaz (and South
Ossetians, for that matter) interpreted such rhetoric and policy as driving towards a Georgian
nationalizing state, making the option of exit the preferred course of action, even if it meant
subjugation to another state (Toft, 2001).
In a similar manner, Coppetiers points to the inability of the Soviet successor states to refederalize the various ethnic groups within their borders. Despite the existence, and success, of
the extensive federal system throughout the Soviet era for accommodating nationalist ambitions,
newly formed successor states were unable to retain or remodel this federal system to
accommodate national minorities. Coppetiers explains that this resulted from the resistance to
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power-sharing that emerged. “A strong stand against power-sharing agreements with other
national communities was made by all political elites and publics of the newly independent states,
including the breakaway republics” (Coppieters, 2001 p.11). This resistance, he explains, was
partly due to the way that democratization during the Soviet break-up coincided with mass public
mobilizations in defense of national interests (2001).
All of these theories point to a combination of conditions present in Georgia and
Abkhazia at the fall of the Soviet Union that enabled the development of conflict while disabling
both parties’ capacity for dealing with tensions non-violently. It should be understood that the
overwhelming motivation of both the Abkhazian and Georgians in the lead up to conflict should
be characterized as fear. Paranoia and uncertainty ran rampant during these tumultuous years,
with the actions of both parties usually feeding rather than alleviating the others’ anxiety. The
actions of both parties were largely governed by the fear of marginalization. In the face of
Georgian nationalism that was so fervent that it often was manifested as an attitude of “Georgia
for Georgians” at the expense of minority rights, ethnic groups such as the Abkhazians feared that
subjugation to Georgian statehood would equate to destruction of Abkhaz national identity.
Likewise, Georgians were shaky in their new and unstable statehood, and feared the prospect of
absorption or invasion by Russia. They viewed claims for minority rights or increased regional
autonomy as a perilous threat to state sovereignty, and at times suspected such claims to be the
result of collusion with Russia. Furthermore, both groups were so traumatized by the experience
of Soviet rule that avoiding what they perceived as continuation of this experience became
paramount. Unfortunately, as is often the case in ethnic conflict, these fears were more perception
than reality.
In summary, the major interpretations of the development of conflict between Georgia
and Abkhazia all point in one way or another to the legacy of Soviet rule and the instability
surrounding the breakup of the Soviet Union. Some theories emphasize the power given to
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regional nationalities under the federal system employed by the Soviets and claim that this system
essentially primed a number of regions for separatist conflict. Other theories focus more on the
inability of the successor states to adequately accommodate these titular nationalities, either
through the structural inability to develop the power-sharing mechanisms necessary for a multinational state or through the public and moral inability of the majority in these states to make
room for ethnic minorities within their sweeping nationalist fervor and nationalist rhetoric.
However, fear and the perception of the other party as a potential threat to the independence and
autonomy that was so feverishly clamored for at the fall of the Soviet Union is a central factor in
all of these interpretations. However, as much as these analyses of events tell about the
emergence of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, they do not explain why the conflict has been so
resistant to resolution, or why it entered and has largely remained in a frozen state since the
implementation of a ceasefire. As such, it is necessary to explore the events and attempted efforts
at resolution that have transpired since the initial period of armed conflict ended in 1994.

Attempts at Resolution
Although negotiations have proceeded almost continuously since the ceasefire in 1994,
remarkably little progress has been made in them. The status quo that settled in shortly after the
ceasefire has more or less remained. As Ghia Nodia explains of early negotiations: “the
continuous meetings of delegations were more ritualistic in their character: the parties knew they
were expected to negotiate, but believed that in fact the solution depended on Russia, and each
hoped to reach a separate deal with the latter. Until then, they could just enjoy visiting places like
Geneva” (Nodia, 2000). Increased tensions in Gali, the “Six-Day War,” and the threat that the
situation may devolve into full-scale war, injected a new sense of urgency and importance into
the negotiations. There was a realization that in order to reduce violence the delegations would
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have to work together, relying on their own negotiating skills, rather than focusing on Russia
(Nodia, 2000).
Additionally, in June 1997 Abkhazian President Vladislav Ardzinba met with the
Georgian Foreign Minister and senior Russian officials. It was reported that a possible agreement
was reached during these talks. The details were not made public, but the agreement reportedly
specified that the two parties agreed to live “within the confines of a shared state within the
boundaries of the Georgian SSR as of 21 December 1991” (Walker, 2000 p.164). The tentative
agreement also provided for the repatriation of Georgian IDPs, but did not specify a timetable and
allowed the Abkhaz to continue the lengthy process of screening returnees (Walker, 2000).
The tentative agreement fell apart before it was signed. Hardliners in both Georgia and
Abkhazia rejected various provisions, and the agreement began to collapse under the weight of
this disapproval. Russian officials attempted to resuscitate the agreement with shuttle diplomacy
between Ardzinba and Shevardnadze, but to no avail. The groups then turned to the United States
and the UN, requesting a peacekeeping force to replace the existing Russian force, but both
replied that their peacekeeping forces were already overstretched (Walker, 2000). In August
1997, the two presidents signed a no-use-of-force agreement, which was seen as a major
breakthrough, but produced little movement in the peace process, as it did not address the key
issues of status and return. Talks continued with increased intermittency, but produced no
workable solution to these key issues.
In a more recent attempt to breach this stalemate, UN Special Representative of the
Secretary-General Dieter Boden released a discussion paper on the conflict in 2002. The paper,
commonly known as the Boden Document, attempted to outline a possible compromise between
the parties with the hopes of re-engaging them in negotiation. In its essence the document
suggests that Abkhazia return to Georgian sovereignty with the greatest level of autonomy and
self-rule possible. The document also recommended the gradual return of limited numbers of
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IDPs, first to the Gali region and later to other parts of Abkhazia. The Abkhaz authorities rejected
these suggestions, and refused to officially acknowledge the document (Coppieters, 2005).
Like the Boden document, most suggestions for resolution offered by scholars involve a
return of Abkhazia to Georgian territory with the greatest possible autonomy for Abkhazia. Most
solutions to the issue of status suggest that the parties enter a “common state” arrangement, which
would most likely take the form of a federal or confederal association (Lynch, 2004; King, 2001,
Walker, 2000). Approaches to the IDP question suggest a gradual return of IDPs, starting with a
large scale return of IDPs to the Gali region and gradual return in other parts of the region
(Lynch, 2004). If this proves to be unworkable, others suggest that the Abkhazian borders be
redrawn to place certain former Georgian enclaves (such as Gali or the Kodori Gorge) under
Georgian jurisdiction (Walker, 2000).

The IDP Population
One of the largest and most painful effects of the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia
is the population of Georgians from Abkhazia that have been displaced since the outbreak of the
war. Abkhazia was an ethnically mixed region at the time of the war, with Abkhazians
comprising about 17% of the population, Georgians comprising 44%, and other groups such as
Russians and Armenians around 31% (Zverev, 1996). Between 250,000 and 300,000 Georgians
fled the region in 1992 and 1993 and very few have returned.
Many (42%) of these internally displaced peoples (IDPs) initially settled in the
Samegrelo region, which borders Abkhazia, and particular in the regional capital Zugdidi. Other
sizable populations relocated to Tbilisi (33%) and Imereti (12%) (Gotsiridze, 2003). Recently,
however, large numbers of IDPs have been relocating to the Tbilisi area in search of work. Nearly
half of this population lives with other IDP families in collective housing provided by the
government. These facilities are typically large institutional buildings leftover from the Soviet era
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such as schools, hospitals, and Sanatoria (Soviet vacation lodging for the proletariat masses).
Unemployment is high for IDPs, particularly those living in collective centers, and residents there
often subsist off small patches of arable land around these buildings converted to gardens or
livestock pens.
“At the most basic level, IDPs are a drain on the resources of the new states” Lynch
explains of the cost of the displaced population to the Georgian state (2005, p.95). The aid
received by these IDPs is paltry in most ways, yet collectively it is enough to be a costly burden
to the government, particularly a government that in recent years has struggled to fund such
essentials as a military and police force. In 2001, expenses for the Ministry of Refugees amounted
to 57.2 million Lari (GEL), or approximately 27.6 million US Dollars (USD). This amounted to
just over 6% of the state budget, equal to healthcare and education expenses combined. However,
on the ground this expenditure only amounts to a monthly stipend of 7-11 USD, “bread money”
as many IDPs call it, for reasons easily discerned (Gotsiridze, 2003). Furthermore, government
subsidies for utilities in collective housing units amounted to 25 million GEL in 2001. Certain
services are provided by city governments, such as public transportation: it is estimated that the
city of Tbilisi provides such services at a cost of around 8 million GEL per year, 5% of the city’s
budget (Gotsiridze, 2003).
The effect of this population, which constitutes between 5-7% of Georgia’s general
population, is vast. Their presence has been a significant factor in Georgia’s development and in
negotiations with Abkhaz authorities. The IDP question is a major point of contention in the
settlement of the conflict, and will most likely prove to be one of the trickiest issues to work
through in any successful peace agreement.
The IDP issue in many ways goes to the heart of what the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict is all
about. For Abkhaz nationalists the issue of Georgian IDPs is tied to the threat of cultural and
national annihilation. Abkhazians fear that a massive influx of Georgian IDPs would make them a
69

minority in their land once again subjecting them to retaliation and loss of electoral control; and
the sheer numbers make this a compelling source of fear. For the Georgians the IDP population
not only poses a significant challenge to growth and democratization in the new state, but is also a
painful reminder of the unexpected military defeat and loss of a treasured region of the country.
The relative social isolation and dependence of this population has negatively impacted the
political, social, and economic growth of the state, and return of IDPs has been a central demand
in Georgia’s approach to the Abkhaz conflict (Lynch, 2004).
As George Khutsishvili explains, the issue of IDP return is a central part of both parties’
actual and declared positions as well as part of the best and worst case scenario for each. The
positive ideal scenario for Georgians would likely include the “rapid return of all IDPs to their
homes,” while the negative ideal would see the Abkhaz “expatriate all remaining or returned
ethnic Georgians” (Khutsishvili, 2006, p.290). By the same token, the positive ideal scenario of
the Abkhaz would require Georgia “not to raise the issue of repatriation of the refugees.” Even
more telling is the Abkhaz negative ideal scenario which would have the Georgian government
“forcibly settle masses of refugees in Abkhazia, giving them a free hand in occupying Abkhaz
homes whenever claimed by the repatriates and allowing acts of vengeance” (Khutsishvili, 2006,
p.291).
Stalemate over the IDP issue cannot be understood without seeing the perceived
demographic threat that they pose to Abkhazian ambitions of sovereignty. Before the conflict
erupted in 1992, ethnic Abkhaz made up only about 18% of the population of Abkhazia, while
ethnic Georgians composed nearly 42% of the population. Sizable Armenian, Russian, and Greek
populations made up the remaining 40%. Thus, even after the expulsion of most of the Georgian
population, ethnic Abkhazians are still outnumbered in the region by non-Abkhaz. The return of
roughly 250,000 ethnic Georgians to the region poses a threat to whatever demographic and
electoral authority the Abkhaz may have now.
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This stalemate is then further compounded by the Abkhaz Government-in-Exile. This
governing body is comprised of ministers and parliament members from the pre-conflict Abkhaz
government that were forced to flee in 1992, and is considered the official representative body of
the IDP population in Georgia. This organization wields a significant amount of power and
influence in Georgian politics and is notoriously hard-lined regarding IDP return and Georgian
sovereignty over Abkhazia. This body consists of 25 delegates and a supreme presidium, and
maintains among other things 11 ministries and a department for foreign affairs (Lynch, 2002;
George, 2003). The Government-in-Exile also draws a budget from the main Georgian
government, part of which is dispersed through this body to provide the monthly pension that
many IDPs receive and part of which includes a military budget (George, 2003). The stated
purpose of this body, and the group of political elites that run it, is to provide a representative
governmental apparatus to the IDP population until the regional government in Abkhazia can be
restored. It follows then that the authority and existence of this apparatus is dependant on the
existence of the IDP population as a distinct and separate entity within Georgia. This body has
not faced election since it originated in 1992 and will likely “continue to represent the IDPs until
a new political regime is established in Abkhazia” (George, 2003 p.26). Because this group
draws its authority from the ambiguous status quo of the IDP, whereby this population remains
displaced but non-integrated in Georgian society, it would follow that this group would have little
to gain from either a negotiated settlement or from increased integration of the IDP population
(George, 2003).
The way in which the apparatus of the Abkhaz government in exile could be said to
bolster the conflict is two-fold. First, as a powerful group of elites within the Georgian political
system the Government-in-Exile often takes a hard, radically nationalist line on conflict
settlement issues, and are often the first to call for military responses to incidents that arise, and
are thus able to impede the ability of the Georgian government to compromise or bargain in
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settlement negotiations. Second, this structure of having the IDP population represented
specifically by this special government body also gives the rest of the Georgian government a
way out of answering directly to the IDP population. It does this by “channeling the political
force of the 250,000-strong IDP population” thus acting as a “safety-valve in domestic politics”
(Lynch, 2002 p. 844). If the government does not have to answer directly to the IDP population, it
is then able to pursue a more hard-line position on Georgian sovereignty in Abkhazia and the
return of the IDP population, which is far more politically popular than advocating a settlement
involving compromise or power-sharing. This Abkhaz Government-in-Exile therefore links the
existence of the Georgian IDP population as a segregated and distinct entity in Georgian society
to stalemate producing behavior by government elites. This behavior in turn is largely responsible
for the lack of movement in the would-be Georgian-Abkhazia peace process, and serves to
entrench the conflict in its frozen state.

Conclusion
This section has attempted to provide the background information about the GeorgianAbkhazian conflict and the IDP population that resulted from it that is needed to understand the
context in which the study presented in this paper was conducted. The intertwining histories of
Georgia and Abkhazia are long and complex. The origins of the conflict between these actors that
remains unresolved today is largely traced to the era of Soviet rule, the systems of regional
governance that were set up during that period, and the trauma that both groups were so eager to
escape as that era ended. However, one cannot fully understand the claims for independence
made by Abkhazians or the claims for sovereignty over that land made by Georgians without
understanding the pre-modern and early-modern history of this region. The cascade of events that
came during and shortly following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the rapidity with
which the build-up to war occurred shows that latent tensions had surely been mounting between
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these groups during the final decades of Soviet rule. The war that resulted, though arguably brief,
was intense and highly destructive; and among these tragic results were the displacement of as
many as 250,000 ethnic Georgians from Abkhazia, the vast majority of who remain in other parts
of Georgia today and continue to live as displaced persons nearly fifteen years later.
This section also looked at the frozen period that developed after a ceasefire was signed
in 1994. As this state of “frozen-ness” is the primary concern of this paper, this section has
reviewed the major attempts at resolution or negotiated settlement in the attempt to identify
events or historical-political factors that may have contributed to the unique qualities of this
frozen state that have been thus far discussed in this paper. The history of this conflict as written
does not offer sufficient answers as to why such conflicts take on this frozen state and then go
unresolved for so long. The following sections describe the methods and results of the study that
was conducted in the context of the Georgian-Abkahzian conflict and the IDP population
involved in it. This study will attempt to shed light on the nature of frozen conflict and on the
question of why some such conflicts go unresolved for so long. The review of literature relevant
to this question produced two plausible hypotheses on this issue.
One hypothesis suggests that frozen conflict exists at an equilibrium of sorts and is kept
in this equilibrium by the opposition of forces that both drive the intensity of the conflict up and
those that push the level of intensity down, keeping the conflict below a breaking point that
would demand action toward resolution. This hypothesis offers examples such as de-facto state
building and international organizations as the de-escalating forces while factors such as
paramilitary activity and the presence of IDP populations serve as driving factors that push the
level of conflict intensity up. Given the connection between the presence of the IDP population,
the power wielded by the Abkhaz Government-in-Exile, and the bargaining behavior of
government elites, the following study attempts to identify the degree to which the attitudes of the
IDP population in the context described in this chapter does serve as a driving factor.
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The second hypothesis suggests that a key to understanding the protraction of frozen
conflict lies at the internal level of the IDP population, and in the opposing forces at work in this
population. These opposing forces compel IDPs either to stay in the host community or to return,
and it is this contradiction of forces that prevents the return of the displaced population while also
preventing their integration into the host community. With respect to this hypothesis, the
following study seeks to identify and understand the forces compelling the Georgian IDP
population to stay and integrate or those forces compelling them to return to Abkhazia, and in
doing so attempts to understand the quasi-stationary equilibrium at work in this community
(Lewin, 1958). Both of these hypotheses which will be explored in the proceeding study with the
intention of generate further understanding and further hypotheses for future study of this issue.
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Methodology
Overview
This study seeks to identify causes and variables that help in understanding frozen
conflict, its seeming resistance to change, and the role of displaced people in frozen conflicts. The
study was conducted with the aim of exploring these issues and relationships in greater depth by
investigating a particular population of displaced persons involved in frozen conflict. In the
context of this study, the respondents are all Internally Displaced Persons living in Georgia that
were displaced from homes in Abkhazia as a result of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict of the
early 1990’s.
This study is exploratory in nature; it is done with the intent of expanding and deepening
the understanding of the relationship between frozen conflict and displaced populations, and of
generating, rather than testing, hypotheses. As such the depth provided by studying the
experiences and perceptions of individuals within the context of a single conflict study was
preferred to the comprehensiveness of a comparative study. This format allows for greater insight
into the more intimate dynamics of displacement and this particular form of intractability.
The subject field of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict was narrowed to a study of the IDP
population produced in this conflict. This allowed a more in-depth and compact study to be
conducted, and focused on a population that is pivotal in the conflict, yet is also accessible, as
high-ranking government officials and negotiators typically are not. Furthermore, there are few
accessible and published studies of this population, and existing literature proved to be unable to
address this study’s questions pertaining specifically to the role of IDPs in this conflict.
75

However, for the sake of clarity it should be noted that this is not a case study in the
Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. The investigation conducted in the course of this project is a classic
survey study; its aim is not to investigate the case of a particular conflict, but rather to investigate
players in a conflict who operate under a certain set of circumstances. Specifically it seeks to
investigate people who are and have been displaced by a conflict that has come to be considered a
frozen conflict. The respondents interviewed in this study are individuals who demonstrate these
characteristics who, for mostly practical purposes, all happen to be involved in the same conflict.
Certainly there would be advantages to conducting a study that pulled respondents from a variety
of conflict contexts. Such an approach would provide a more comprehensive sample, and would
allow the investigator to draw more widely applicable conclusions. However, given the scope of
this study, as well as logistical limitations such as time and resources, the way to best pursue the
goal of developing a deeper and more intimate understanding of the phenomena described in this
paper was to focus on a microcosmic slice of this phenomena by choosing to interview
respondents from a single conflict context.

Procedure
This study sought to create greater understanding of the relationship between the
phenomena of frozen conflict and the populations displaced by it. To do so, the study hoped to
explore the thoughts and perceptions of individual IDPs displaced by the Georgian-Abkhazian
conflict. The study was conducted on a site visit to the Republic of Georgia in the summer of
2007, and its central focus was the interviewing of Georgian IDPs displaced during the 19921994 conflict in Abkhazia. Interviewees varied in age, gender, socio economic status and
location. IDPs below the age of 18 were excluded from the study for two reasons. First, the
interviewing of minors would introduce complexities and vulnerabilities that the study was not
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designed to accommodate; and, it seemed necessary that interviewees be at least 4-5 years of age
at the time of the conflict to have sufficient recollection of the events around it.
The subject pool was selected from four cities in Georgia that are major IDP population
centers: Tbilisi, Zugdidi, Kutaisi and Batumi. A majority of subjects live in collective centers, the
collective housing sites provided to the influxes of IDPs by the Georgian government. Most of
these collective centers are converted from large institutional facilities such as hotels, hospitals
and schools. Many tend to be on the outskirts of town and are often more self-reliant or subsistent
than typical Georgian residences. The primary reason for the prominence of this characteristic in
the sample was the difficulty in finding IDP interviewees that lived in private residences.
The research instrument used is a questionnaire developed for the purpose of this study.
The questionnaire (see Appendix A) includes both closed and open-ended questions, and was
designed to gather both qualitative and quantitative data. It was developed in English and
translated into Georgian with the aid of faculty and staff at Tbilisi State University. The
questionnaire was then piloted with a staff member at TSU who is also an IDP from Abkhazia.
This piloting was conducted to ensure that the questionnaire did not contain any offensive items
or language, that the questions were comprehensible to interview participants, and that the
questionnaire was translated accurately.
The questionnaire contains two sections. The first section gathers demographic
information about the subject such as age, gender, and place of residence before displacement.
This section also contains some open ended questions about aid received by participants and their
perspective on integration and return. The second section contains questions about subjects’
perspectives on conflict, and seeks to gather their perceptions of Abkhazians and feelings about
the prospect of future contact and coexistence with Abkhazian’s. Within these sections there are
clusters of questions attempting to glean information about several central topics: the aid received
by IDPs, perceived integration into the host community, feelings toward Abkhazians, feelings
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about the prospect of return, desired conditions of return, and experience with conflict resolution
processes and willingness to engage in them.
The construction of the questionnaire was largely informed by various theories discussed
in the literature review. The overarching structure asks for respondents’ thoughts on both the
circumstances of their displacement and quality of life since displacement as well as their
perceptions of Abkhazia and the prospect of returning there. The questionnaire was constructed as
such in an effort to identify forces, as per Lewin’s theory of force field analysis, acting on the IDP
population pushing/pulling in the direction of either integration or continued desire to return to
Abkhazia. In particular, the series of questions that ask about the aid and assistance received by
IDPs, as well as items asking about how they feel they have been treated by the host community
attempt to identify the forces at work around the integration of the IDP community. Meanwhile,
the questionnaire also contains items such as: “if you were to return, what fears might you have
about doing so?” and “if you were to return, what part of this would be most challenging for
you?” Such items are intended to identify forces acting on the population in regards to the
possibility of return.
The literature on prolonged displacement and refugee dynamics covered in the literature
review also informed a number of items on the questionnaire. Zetter (1999) describes the
contradictory behavior of simultaneously adapting to place and mythologizing return home as
part of the myth of return. In this vein, the questionnaire features several items asking
respondents if they wish to return and why. These items are followed by a section asking
respondents the degree to which feel integrated in the host community, and asks them to rate the
treatment they have received from the host community. This section also asks whether
respondents wish to return to the same area or town, or even the same home, from which they
were displaced. This ties into Warner’s discussion of the myth of return and the nostalgia and
idealization it involves.
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Later in the interview, respondents are asked to talk about how they feel about
Abkhazians in general, and how comfortable they would feel with varying degrees of contact or
closeness with Abkhazians. For example, respondents are asked whether they would be willing to
dialogue with Abkhazians, and whether they would be able to live in the same town or become
friends with Abkhazians. Such items are included in the questionnaire in an effort to get a sense
for the level of animosity that may exist between the communities, and in a way to gauge the
parties’ relationship in regards to ripeness or readiness for resolution, as per the theories of
Zartman (2000) and Pruitt (1997) discussed earlier. In addition to asking respondents about their
feelings towards Abkhazians, the questionnaire also features several items that ask, in an indirect
way, about the political conditions surrounding return. For example, respondents are asked:
“under what conditions would you be willing to return to Abkhazia?” and “what would it take for
these conditions to exist?” These are asked in an effort to gauge the entrenchment of the
community in its positions and the negotiability (or lack there of) of such positions. In this way
the questionnaire aims to get a better idea of the general level of intractability of this conflict as
seen by the IDP community.
The interviews were conducted in a variety of locations, typically the location of greatest
convenience for the interviewee. Several interviews were conducted in classrooms offered by the
Department of Conflictology at Tbilisi State University, and most were conducted in the homes
of interviewees. Interviews lasted between 20 and 45 minutes, depending on the length of the
responses given. The interviews were semi-structured, in that they followed the prepared
questionnaire, but that probing and clarifying questions or statements were not scripted ahead of
time. This structure let the interviews gather the desired information while allowing participants
to expound on topics of particular concern to them. Although interviews were conducted face to
face, they were for all practical purposes anonymous, as names and contact information were not
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taken from interviewees and in that the researcher could not possibly identify or locate
participants on an individual basis.
Out of 45 interviews conducted, 42 were conducted with the assistance of a translator. In
most cases this translator also served as a guide, meaning that they had knowledge of where to
find IDP enclaves within their city or neighborhood, and helped in locating these enclaves and in
recruiting interview subjects. The three interviews conducted without a translator were with
interviewees fluent in English, who were recruited through acquaintance with the researcher.
Five different translators assisted in the interviews, all of them IDPs. The fact that they were all
IDPs was unintended by the investigator, but it should not be extremely surprising that they were.
It is entirely possible that the various colleagues and acquaintances that assisted in finding or
introducing translators to the primary investigator, given knowledge of the study’s topic, would
opt to recruit IDPs to act as translator for the study. Subjects in Tbilisi and Zugdidi were located
with the assistance of translators, who also served as guides to collective centers with which they
were already familiar. Interviews in Kutaisi were conducted through a translator at the offices of
the Kutaisi Teachers Union, an educational NGO. Subjects were recruited by staff members of
this organization, and include their acquaintances and colleagues. Subjects in Batumi were
located with assistance from the Ministry of Refugees in Adjara; and were recruited with the aid
of a translator.
The questionnaire was reviewed with all translators prior to conducting interviews to
ensure understanding of the questions and their purpose. Interviews were conducted in Georgian
language, using the Georgian translation of the questionnaire that had been developed. Responses
were translated to English to be recorded. These responses were recorded in writing by the
researcher, and when circumstances and subjects permitted, were also recorded by digital voice
recorder. Prior to the start of each interview, the nature and length of the interview process, the
purpose of the study, and the identity of the researcher were explained to subjects. It was
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discovered that it was particularly important that subjects know that the researcher was not
working for an NGO or humanitarian aid organization. This was an important practice for two
main reasons. The first is that in some IDP communities there appeared to be a degree of
animosity felt toward the relief or humanitarian aid community, which likely is connected to a
sense of disappointment in relief organizations and the significant drop in aid received by the
Georgian IDP community after the Georgian-Abkhazian war ended in 1994. The second reason is
that it was critical to the ethicality of the study to make clear to respondents the purpose of the
interviews and what would, and what would not be done with the information they provided.
Specifically, it was important that respondents not be misled into thinking that the study was part
of aid-related or government-related study in which they may believe that their responses could
carry certain consequences, such as the receipt of increased aid.

Summary
Data gathered in this study was analyzed both quantitatively and qualitatively. Qualitative
factors calculated include factors such as place of residence before displacement, age, gender, and
current place of residence (in private or collective housing). The data corresponding to close
ended items in the questionnaire was also analyzed quantitatively. Responses to open ended
questions were analyzed qualitatively for indication or reference to certain themes related to the
hypotheses posed here, such as security or return. Themes emerging from the data, such as
deference to government and disempowerment were also analyzed. Results of this analysis, as
well as faults or limitations of the study are discussed further in the following chapters.
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Results
Overview
This study is based on interviews conducted with 45 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
of Georgian ethnicity who were displaced from Abkhazia as a result of the Georgian-Abkhazian
war in the early 1990’s. The data presented in this section consists of the responses given in these
interviews. This study was conducted in an attempt to give further understanding to the questions
posed thus far in this paper. The primary question that is pursued here is: what accounts for the
longevity of certain conflicts, particularly those that are typically labeled as frozen conflict, and is
there a connection between displaced populations produced in these conflicts and their longevity?
A review and synthesis of existing literature pertaining to this question has yielded two plausible
rival hypotheses.
In brief, the first hypothesis suggests that frozen conflict exists at a sort of equilibrium
and is kept in this equilibrium by the opposition of forces that drive the conflict and those that
push the level of intensity down, keeping the conflict below a breaking point that would demand
action toward resolution. This hypothesis suggests that factors such as de-facto state building and
international organizations serve as de-escalating forces while factors such as paramilitary
activity and the presence of displaced populations serve as driving factors that push the level of
conflict intensity up. Looking specifically at the factor of refugee presence, this analysis seeks to
answer whether the IDP population produced in the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict does indeed act as
a driving force in the conflict.
The second hypothesis suggests that a key to understanding the protraction of frozen
conflict lies at the internal level of the IDP population, and in the opposing forces at work in this
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population. These opposing forces compel IDPs either to stay in the host community or to return,
and it is this contradiction of forces that prevents the return of the displaced population while also
preventing their integration into the host community. With respect to this hypothesis, the analysis
seeks to identify and understand the forces compelling the Georgian IDP population to stay and
integrate or those forces compelling them to return to Abkhazia, and in doing so attempts to
understand the quasi-stationary equilibrium at work in this community (Lewin, 1958).
This body of information is analyzed with a two tiered approach. The first level of
analysis looks at the conflict at the level of the IDP community, and looks at responses given by
the interviewees with respect to particular questions that attempt to draw out and identify the
forces and motivations compelling IDPs to stay or return. The second level of analysis attempts to
understand the IDP population as a factor in the broader Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. Rather
than looking at the data on an item-by-item basis, this level of analysis looks at the whole body of
information collected in the interviews, and identifies themes that emerge from the data regarding
the IDPs’ perception of the conflict and their role in it. This two-tiered analysis is also preceded
by a look at the demographic profile of the subject pool.

Demographics
45 individuals were interviewed in this study. The demographic information recorded in
these interviews included age, gender, and current city or region of residence. Interviewees were
also asked for limited information about the conditions of their flight from Abkhazia such as the
date they left Abkhazia and where they initially went after leaving.
In terms of current residence, interviews were conducted in four cities/regions: Tbilisi,
Kutaisi, Zugdidi, and the Batumi Region which includes both the city of Batumi and a smaller
nearby town called Khabuleti. The breakdown of individuals interviewed by current location is as
follows:
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•
•
•
•

Tbilisi - 14
Kutaisi – 9
Zugdidi – 9
Batumi – 13

It should be noted that while these four areas represent the largest centers of IDP populations,
they are not proportional to the distribution of the IDP population in Georgia today. For example,
just over half of the IDP population currently lives in Tbilisi, while Tbilisi interviewees make up
roughly one-third of this study’s subjects. (Characteristics and flaws in sampling will be
discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.) The study also found that 62% of the people
interviewed currently reside in compact or collective center with other IDPs. These compact
centers are usually large buildings previously used as hotels, schools, hospitals, etc. that were
converted to house the influx of IDPs during and after the war with Abkhazia.
Persons interviewed hailed from six different areas in Abkhazia: Gali, Sukhumi,
Ochamchiri (Ochamchira), Guleribshe (Guleripshi), Kvarcheli (Tqvarcheli), and Gagra (see
figure 6).

Place of Origin
Gali
Sukhumi
Ochamchiri
Guliribshe
Kvarcheli
Gagra

Figure 4: Place of Origin
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Figure 5: Map of Abkhazia

A very limited correlation emerged between subject’s place of origin in Abkhazia and the area to
which they relocated. 7 out of 9 Zugdidi interviewees hailed from Gali, and of the 15 people
originally from Gali, 7 relocated to Zugdidi. This correlation is most likely explained, however,
by the fact that Gali and Zugdidi are in close proximity, essentially bordering each other. A small
correlation also appears between people hailing from Sukhumi and those relocating to Tbilisi (6
out of 14 people from Sukhumi relocated in Tbilisi). This study does not have the capacity to
explain such a correlation, but one may speculate that certain evacuation systems may have
brought IDPs from Sukhumi to Tbilisi, or the fact that Tbilisi is by far the largest population
center in Georgia may also explain this correlation.
Of the 45 people interviewed, there were 14 men 31 women. This proportion reflects a
bias in this study’s sampling rather than the actual proportion of men to women in the Georgian
IDP population.) The subject pool was also broken down by age group as follows:
25 & Under

26-35

36-45

46-55

55 & Under

14 (31%)

6 (13%)

9 (20%)

9 (20%)

7 (16%)
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No particular correlation was found between origin and age, origin and gender, or age and gender,
indicating that flight from Abkhazia was not limited by age or gender, but occurred across the
Georgian population in Abkhazia.
What may be more significant, in terms of demographic data, is information about the
circumstances of Georgian IDPs’ flight from Abkhazia. Information such as the date on which the
interviewee left Abkhazia, or where he/she first went after leaving Abkhazia can provide some
information on the nature of this sample.
The IDPs interviewed all left Abkhazia between 1991 and 1993, with the majority (75%)
leaving in 1993. The following diagrams show when the IDPs left Abkhazia, Figure 8 shows this
by month and Figure 9 shows a day-by-day breakdown of the month of September 1993, during
which a sizable portion of respondents left.
25
20
15
All IDPs
10
From Gali
From Sukhumi

5
0

Figure 6: When respondents left Abkhazia: by Month

86

7
6
5
4
All IDPs
3
From Gali
2

From Sukhumi

1
0

Figure 7: When respondents left Abkhazia: by date

As the figures show, there is a spike in the number of IDPs leaving in September 1993,
particularly between September 26 and 29. This corresponds to the events taking place in autumn
1993, namely the resurgence of Abkhazian forces and the driving of Georgian forces from most
of Abkhazia. In particular these dates correspond to September 27, 1993, the day on which
Abkhazian forces captured Sukhumi and which is known to many Georgians as the Fall of
Sukhumi. From the fact that such a large portion of the interviewee pool left within a short period
of time, one could inference that those who left were motivated by a tangible sense of threat or
fear.
As this demographic data was recorded basically for the purpose of creating boundaries
around the study’s subject pool, this pool may be summarized as follows. Interview respondents
are randomly (if not equally) spread across gender and age groups. They are originally from
various parts of Abkhazia, but represent primarily the population centers of Sukhumi and Gali;
and they have settled in the larger population centers in Georgia. Many left Abkhazia in the later
part of 1993, particularly in late September, 1993 correlating with the fall of Sukhumi to
Abkhazian military forces, and a majority of respondents currently reside in compact centers.
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This sample roughly represents the majority of IDPs in terms of the characteristics of place of
origin, the time of flight from Abkhazia, and place of settlement in Georgia. However it should
not be considered as entirely representative of the greater IDP population in Georgia for reasons
that will be discussed in a later section. Thus, with a profile of the IDPs included in this study, we
can move on to the main substance of the interview data.

Level 1 – Forces within the IDP Community
This first level of analysis addresses the hypothesis largely informed by Lewin’s theory
of quasi-stationary equilibrium (1958), positing that the stagnation of the IDP community is
reflective of the stagnation of the overall conflict. This stagnation in the IDP community is the
result of an equilibrium formed by opposing forces that both compel the population to stay and
settle in the host country or to return to the conflict area from which they fled, in this case
Abkhazia. The section of the analysis seeks to extract from the pool of interview data the forces
and motivations compelling IDPs both to stay and to return to Abkhazia. To do this, the interview
questions, and corresponding answers, are sorted into groups. These four groups are sorted to
address IDPs’ desire to return, their current situation in the host territory, the perceived situation
in their home territory, and IDPs’ perceived skills and ability in handling conflict. It should be
noted that the way in which questions are grouped in this analysis does not reflect the order in
which they were asked during the interview process. (The questionnaire shown in Appendix A
reflects the order in which questions were asked in interviews). Furthermore, in processing the
responses for each interview item, the analysis had the capacity to look for patterns based on
region, age or gender and will discuss the appearance of noticeable patterns as they come up.

Desire to return. It is logical to first establish what the stated motivations of the IDP
community are regarding return. Subjects were asked about their desire to return and the reasons
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for wanting to do so. Of the 45 individuals interviewed, 42 said that they wanted to return to
Abkhazia. All of these 42 said that they wanted to return to Abkhazia to live there, and would go
back to the same town or area that they were from. Of the three who did not want to return, two
said they would still want to go back to Abkhazia to visit, but did not want to live there because
they had established a life in their current city (Tbilisi in both cases). The third stated that she is
too old to make the journey back. As such, it seems appropriate to say that there is a very strong
stated desire within the pool to return to Abkhazia.
The subjects gave a variety of reasons for wanting to return to Abkhazia. For the
purposes of this analysis, these responses were grouped into positive reasons for wanting to live
in Abkhazia and negative reasons for not wanting to live in their host community. In other words,
the responses were separated into those that show the drawing or pulling force of living in
Abkhazia and those showing a driving force pushing away from integration in the host
community. From the 42 interviewees that expressed a desire to return, this grouping showed that
41 positive responses were given while three negative responses were given. (It should be noted
that many responses cite more than one factor or reason, so some responses may be doublecounted and appear in more than analysis category.)
The negative reasons given all addressed a general dislike of living conditions in the host
community. One respondent explained: “I don’t like here, in here it’s very good to be a guest, but
in Abkhazia it’s very beautiful country” (Interview T5, 2006), while another said “I think of the
whole time I’ve lived here that I am as a ghost” (Interview Z3, 2006).
Overwhelmingly, however, the reasons given for wanting to return referenced aspects of
life in Abkhazia that the individual enjoys or longs for. The following groups were the most
common reasons given:
•
•

Reference to “my own” or “because it’s mine:” Cited by 18 interviews.
Reasons of homeland or place of birth connection: “I was born there.” Cited by 12
interviews.
89

•
•
•
•
•
•

Love of the land: “Abkhazia is a beautiful place.” Cited by 7 interviews.
They miss and want to see family and friends. Cited by 6 interviews.
Reasons of ancestral ties: it is where their parents/grandparents were born. Cited in 6
interviews.
Superior quality of life. Cited by 6 interviews.
Desire to regain or live in the individual’s lost house. Cited by 4 interviews.
Desire to visit graves. Cited by 2 interviews.

The predominant group of reasons given for wanting to return includes those such as: “because it
is mine, it’s my land” (T14, 2007) or “because I want to live in my own house” (T3, 2007). It
seems that such motivations could be interpreted two ways. At once they seem to represent a
sense of rights-based entitlement or ownership. Yet they also seem to reference the desire for a
sense of ownership and permanence. It may be noteworthy that 12 of these 18 respondents
currently live in collective housing (2 live in private housing, 4 are unknown).
Cross referencing these responses with age groups also found some possible correlation
between respondents age 25 and under and reasons in the category of “it is my own country” or
“it is my own home” as well as reasons that reference connections to place of birth such as the
motherland or homeland (see chart below for the cross-reference of age groups and reasons to
return). Note that many interviewees under the age of 25 were quite young (11 or under) when
they left Abkhazia, and therefore may not have developed more tangible or material driven
reasons for wanting to live there, such as higher quality of life. This suggests that intangible
drivers or motivations, such as connection to the motherland, may be quite strong in younger
IDPs.
In fact, looking at the breakdown of reasons for returning in the whole sample, we see
that intangible reasons dominate tangible ones (36 references to intangible reasons, 26 references
to tangible motivations). The strength of these intangible motivations will be important to bear in
mind when the analysis looks at IDP perceptions of return and the rather tangible difficulties they
anticipate there.
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The qualification of tangible and intangible motivations reflects two larger groups that
emerged from the responses given. Responses citing the aesthetic value of the land, the desire to
visit graves, superior quality of life, longing for friends and family, and the desire to regain
houses abandoned in Abkhazia were all considered tangible motivations. Meanwhile, ancestral
ties, reasons of homeland or motherland, and references to “my own” or “it’s my house” were
grouped as intangible motivations. These classifications require some explanation. Two grouping
emerged naturally from the set of responses. Some of these responses were motivations for return
that one could begin to grasp and even conceive of ways that such motivations could be satisfied
by some alternative means other than returning to Abkhazia. To give an elementary example, if
one’s motivation to return is to regain a superior quality of life that they experienced prior to
fleeing, then one could conceivable devise ways to elevate that person’s quality of life in another
part of Georgia such that it would fulfill the needs driving this motivation. While some of these
tangible motivations have more easily conceivable alternatives than other, they are similar in that
the possibility of such alternative ways of satisfying the motivation is feasible. On the other hand
it would be far more difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of anything that would alternatively
satisfy ones desire to return to their motherland or return to a place where they have ancestral ties.
There is nothing other than the place they left (Abkhazia in this case) that can satisfy these
motivations.
There is another way to think of this distinction. The motivations in the tangible group all
describe or refer to aspects of one’s life in Abkhazia; one’s quality of life, friends and family, the
ability to visit family graves, and having a house are all aspects of one’s life or lifestyle. On the
other hand the intangible motivations of ancestral ties, motherland/homeland, and “my
land/house” are all connected to the essence of that person’s conception of Abkhazia. These
intangible motivations do not refer to aspects of their life in Abkhazia that are now absent, but
refer to Abkhazia itself, and for that there is no substitution. The distinction between these two
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groups of motivations is important to the peacemaking process and negotiation of IDP return. The
group’s motivations for returning, and the tangibility of these motivations, affects whether and by
what means these motivations and the underlying interests and needs that accompany them can be
fulfilled. Tangible motivations are more likely to be connected to earthly and material aspects of
one’s life such as one’s house or friends and family. By contrast, intangible motivations are more
connected with certain psychological phenomena than with any material aspects of life. As such,
a peace process or negotiated agreement on return would have to accommodate these two groups
of motivations in different ways, and would have to approach the interests underlying them in
different manners.
Tangible Motivations
Intangible Motivations
Aesthetic Visit
Miss
Quality Regain “My
Ancestral
Homeland/
value of Graves Fam.
of life
House own,” Ties/parents motherland,
land
&
mine born there
born there
Friends
Total
8
2
6
6
4
18
6
12
- 25
2
1
8
1
7
261
1
3
2
35
362
1
2
1
4
3
1
45
464
1
2
2
1
3
1
2
55
56 +
1
1
1
1
2
Table 2: Breakdown of motivations by age group.

Situation in host community. Understanding conditions in the host territory is central to
identifying the forces that compel IDPs either to stay or to return. This section examines
conditions for IDPs in the parts of Georgia where they now live in order to better understand
these motivations. In doing this it looks at the assistance that Georgian IDPs have received in the
host community, the current aid situation, and their views on integration into their new
communities outside of Abkhazia.
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The study found that most of the IDPs that were interviewed received at least some sort
of assistance directly after being displaced. This assistance is said to have come in a variety of
forms and from a number of sources. When asked what type of assistance they received, 37
people out of 45 respondents (82%) reported that they received some sort of aid, including food,
clothing, a place to live and other services. They also reported having received this aid from a
variety of sources: predominantly from the government, but also from foreign aid, the Red Cross,
and local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The tables below show the
breakdown of these sources.
Types of Aid
Food
Products*
Clothing
Place to Live
Money
Job
Nothing

34
15
12
10
3
1
8

Sources of Aid
Government
International
Organizations (IOs)
Foreign Aid
Red Cross
Local NGOs
UN/UNOMIG
Do not Know
Relatives & Neighbors

75%
33%
26%
22%
7%
2%
18%

*Products = non-food groceries such as soap,
detergent, toiletries, etc

34
11

76%
24%

7
12
8
2
3
2

16%
27%
18%
4%
7%
4%

Table 3: Types and sources of aid received by respondents.

After the initial influx of IDPs, however, the amount and frequency of aid received dropped off
dramatically. 37 of 45 interviewees say that now they receive 11 (or 14) Lari2 per month from the
government. Nine of these 37 reported having received other aid such as light or electricity, or
receiving food and products on an irregular and infrequent basis, while the other 28 claimed that
they receive only the 11 Lari payment. Seven respondents reported that they receive nothing. As
such, it seems that the quality and amount of aid received by IDPs has gone down, and that the
assistance situation for many has gotten worse since the initial wave of aid received directly
following their flight from Abkhazia.

2

At the current exchange rate of roughly 1 USD = 1.5 Lari (GEL), this monthly IDP pension is worth
approximately 7-9 USD.

93

When asked how assistance could be made better, the respondents gave a variety of
answers. Many suggested simply that more be done: more money and aid be given, that it be
given more frequently, and that more types of help be offered. Some suggested that there be
training and job opportunities created for IDPs while others expressed the belief that the
effectiveness of aid was hampered by government corruption and problems in distribution.
Interview B8, for example, responded that “a lot of humanitarian goods were coming here, but I
heard that the Georgian government was exchanging for things they wanted and keeping this”
(B8, 2007). Interview B6 similarly responded that “humanitarian aid coming from foreign parties
was going to ministry and in their pockets, and was not reaching IDPs” (B6, 2007). Several other
approaches were offered as well:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Give More (money, aid, “help”) - 9
Do not Know - 6
Eliminate Corruption - 6
Improve how aid is delivered/organized - 9
Return them to Abkhazia- 4
Give them their own house/property - 4
Give Jobs - 3
Opportunities/Education/Training Programs - 2

The individuals interviewed were also asked several questions about their integration into the
general population in their area. The study asked participants about the nature of their integration,
how well they perceive themselves to be integrated, and how integration could be facilitated.
Overall, 56% of respondents reported themselves to be generally well integrated and 31% found
themselves poorly integrated. Meanwhile another 13% (6 people) did not directly address the
question but rather gave answers such as “the Adjarans have been very good to us” (B8, 2007).
This may be explained by the way in which certain subjects were solicited, something that will be
discussed in the research discussion. This could also reflect a personal or culturally rooted felt
need to be diplomatic or circumspect or not disclose negative sentiments to strangers or outsiders.
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Interviewees were also asked to rate the treatment they have received in their host
community on a scale from one to five, one being poorly and five being well.

Number of Respondents

Integration Scale
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

Integration Scale

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Rating of Treatment by Host Community: 1 = Very Poor, 5= Very Good

Figure 8: Integration in host community.

As the figure shows, the overall sentiment from the IDPs that were interviewed is that they have
been well treated by their host community. In addition 56% of interviewees reported that they
consider themselves well integrated. This is somewhat surprising in contrast to the 77% that
reported that they currently receive either no aid or only 11-14 Lari per month in aid, as this
should demonstrate that conditions have worsened for IDPs during the time of displacement. One
may speculate that perhaps participants’ views and expectations of other Georgian citizens are
quite different from their views and expectations of the government.
Participants were also asked for suggestions of how integration could be improved or
facilitated. The most common answers were the need for permanent normal homes, employment
and a combination of the two; and, interestingly, improved relations with the local population was
also a predominant answer. Also interesting was that the answers of 9 out of 13 interviewees
from Batumi were spread between “improving relationships with the local population” and “we
can’t/won’t integrate.” This suggests that the relationship between the general population and the
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IDP community in Batumi and the Adjara region may be particularly tense. The response to this
question breaks down as follows:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Permanent home/ not live in compact centers (11)*
Employment (9)*
Improved relationship with local population (9)
Rights - 2
Do not know or can’t answer – 5
We won’t/can’t integrate so send us back – 6
Integration is not a problem – 2
Other - 5

*7 said both a home and employment.

The data pertaining to IDPs’ perspectives on the current situation in their host communities gives
us a less than clear picture of the forces and motivations either keeping them in or driving them
away from their current homes outside of Abkhazia. On one hand, the aid they receive has
diminished to nearly nothing, and although only one third of interviewees considered themselves
to be poorly integrated, all but 2 interviewees were able to offer suggestion for how they be
helped to integrate more fully, and of these nearly two thirds suggested concrete tangible
measures that could conceivably be implemented by the government or other organizations.
This information shows decreased resources and a lower quality of life as a tangible force
compelling these individuals to either go back or somehow exit their current way of life. At the
same time, the suggestions for better integrations indicate that there is a motivation in the
majority of respondents to find employment and private housing if given the opportunity, and in
this way more fully integrate with the local community. What this suggests is that there should be
little to no motivations for IDPs to remain in their current state or lifestyle, which is that of
prolonged displacement and segregation from the general Georgian population. However, the
persistence of this lifestyle among IDPs suggests that there are less obvious forces pushing the
IDP community both away from integration and away from return. These issues may be clarified
by looking at IDP perceptions of their home territory and the prospect of return there.
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Perceptions of home country. In order to identify some of the factors that would both
draw and repel IDPs from returning to their home territory, the study asked participants a number
of questions about the challenges and difficulties they would anticipate if returning to Abkhazia
and how they look at the possibility of coexistence with the Abkhaz. Given the breadth of this
information, this section is broken into two smaller sections, one pertaining to fears and concerns
expressed regarding return and the other pertaining to relationships with Abkhazians. This section
also touches on the issue of security, which the information shows is a definite factor in the study
of IDP perceptions and motivations.
Participants were asked a number of questions regarding their feelings about Abkhazians
in Abkhazia, contact with Abkhazians, and the possibility of coexistence. The study shows that
roughly half (47%) of the people interviewed have had contact with Abkhazians since being
displaced and roughly half (53%) have not. It also found that, when asked, the majority, 67%, of
interviewees expressed positive or innocuous feelings toward Abkhazians, while only 15%
expressed feelings towards Abkhazians that were overtly negative or aggressive (do not know or
can not say – 9%; other – 9%). The negative feelings expressed included comments such as: “I
feel to them aggressive, because they are aggressive, they are aggressor, they who live in my
house and who is aggressive to me, why I cannot be aggressive to them.” However, this person
then added “I say this about Russians, Abkhazian people are “blind gun” or weapon for them”
(T1, 2007). In nine of these responses the participant echoed this sentiment that the Russians or
other minorities in Abkhazia (such as Turks or Armenians) are more responsible for their
displacement. In fact, there was a certain phrase used in several of these responses that referred to
the Abkhazians as a “blind gun,” inferring that the Abkhaz were essentially used as a tool for
Russian aggression.
Participants were also asked to rate, in terms of difficulty, certain aspects of coexistence
with Abkhazians. Individuals rated these tasks on a scale of one to five, one being very simple
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and five being very difficult. They were asked about the difficulty of living in the same town as
Abkhaz people, living next door to Abkhaz people, being friends with Abkhaz people, and
sharing important things with Abkhaz. The answers are graphed in Figure 11 below.

Ease of Coexistence Scales

Number of Respondents

30
25
20

Live in Same Town

15

Live Next Door

10

Be Friends
5

Share

0
0

1

2
3
4
5
Ease of Task: 1= Very Easy, 5= Very Difficult

Figure 9: Georgian IDPs ease of contact with Abkhazians

As the figure shows, 1 was the most common rating for all the aspects of coexistence mentioned.
However, note that the spike for sharing land is noticeably lower than the others, and has the
highest number of 5 ratings. A number of interviewees (14) showed difficulty with this question
and answered such as “I don’t want anything of others – I want only what is mine” (B13, 2007) or
“if it’s mine, why?” (T11, 2007).
The study shows thus far that a fraction of the IDPs interviewed harbor overtly negative
or aggressive feelings towards Abkhazians, while many others appear to have a rather
conciliatory or non-threatening attitude. However, the data from the scale questions suggests that
if pushed, this conciliatory attitude may give way to a more aggressive stance. As the figure
shows, most respondents found the idea of living next door to, befriending, or living in the same
town as Abkhazian to be easy and non-threatening. However, the sharing of important things such
98

as land or other resources enters a gray area, so to speak. Arriving at an agreement of how limited
resources are to be shared between two or more groups requires more close work and cooperation
than simply living in the same town as someone. As the data shows, there are less respondents
that answered one (easy) and more that answered 5 (difficult) for this item than any other, and 14
respondents struggled with the question. This suggests that the level of uncertainty and required
cooperation that comes along with the sharing of resources is uncomfortable for many IDPs.
However, these are exactly the kinds of challenges that are common in the reintegration or
repatriation of displaced populations, and the level of discomfort with such tasks displayed in this
study’s sample suggest that the IDP population may be less prepared to once again coexist with
Abkhazians than they claim to be.
Interview participants were also asked to describe any challenges they would foresee if
returning to Abkhazia, and any fears they might have about doing so. A variety of answers were
given, and responses were initially separated into two groups: significant challenges and minor or
no challenges (which includes responses where there was expressed optimism about overcoming
the challenge). 62% of interviewees anticipated significant challenges, while 12% expected minor
or no challenges (Other: 11%).
The classification of responses as either significant or minor/insignificant was based on
the respondent’s perception of that challenge rather than the substance of what the challenge is.
For example, many respondents named the need to rebuild their house or find a new house as a
challenge. An answer such as “the biggest problem will be reconstructing of everything lost finding what they had there” (T14, 2007) would be classified as a significant challenge. However,
a response such as “after war everything is ruined - lost houses… but if we go back we will
rebuild our houses” (B10, 2007) would be classified as insignificant because of the respondent’s
expressed perception of this as a surmountable challenge.
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It may, however, better illustrate the collective response to this question to indicate the
types of challenges that are anticipated. Challenges that fall under “starting a new life,” such as
finding a home and a job, were the most commonly mentioned (roughly half of the responses).
Other challenges included relationship based and emotional challenges (six interviewees) such as:
“the most serious [challenge] would be cooperation with Abkhaz and to make friendship” (K2,
2007); as well as challenges to their security such as: “trust… we never know if someone will
come to our house at night” (B3, 2007). Meanwhile, seven interviewees responded that they
would not expect any significant challenges. For example: “for the government to gain control of
Abkhazia (is the main problem) – then it would be very easy” (K4, 2007). Another offered that
“the joy of being back would be greater than any problems there” (B1, 2007).
Responses to the question of what fears they may have about returning were broken down
into groups of significant fears and minor fears. The responses were grouped by the same criteria
as the responses to the challenges of returning. That is, the categorization of the response was
based not on the substance of the fear noted in it, but by the significance or severity placed on that
fear by the respondent. 49% expressed fears or concerns about returning, while 22% expressed
minor or no concern (other or not applicable - 20%). The most common fear mentioned was that
of security and protection (13 respondents) followed by the fear of beginning another conflict
(seven respondents). Other fears included relational problems such as friendship and acceptance,
while several people responded that in regards to return, they had fear but they were not sure of
what.
In an attempt to press the issue of fears and concerns from a different angle, subjects
were asked about their willingness to confront Abkhazians in different situations. First, subjects
were asked whether they would be willing to participate in a dialogue with Abkhazians, and if so,
what fears or apprehensions they may have about doing so. Asking about willingness to dialogue
allows the instrument to address the present respondents with the possibility of contact in a
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different way. The idea of dialogue is more immediate and less vague than the general idea of
contact with Abkhazians. Dialoguing presents the respondent with a more precise mental image
of contact: being face-to-face with Abkhazians and discussing difficult issues with them.
Furthermore, the question about dialogue presents the respondent with a premise of contact with
Abkhazians in a controlled and presumably secure situation. 87% responded that they would be
willing to participate, while only 11% said that they would not. The fears or concerns expressed
by those willing to participate included apprehension about discussing difficult topics, bringing
up painful emotions, and first impressions. Only one person expressed any fear of violence or
being threatened. Later, interviewees were also asked whether they would be willing to return to
Abkhazia under the status quo (i.e. without state protection) provided that they were first able to
meet and build relationships with people that would be their neighbors there. The answer was
overwhelmingly “no.” Only 6% would be willing to return under these conditions, another 6%
said they did not know, and 88% was not willing, with many adding that under no circumstances
would they return to Abkhazia without the protection of the Georgian state.
The fact that 88% of this pool demands Georgian protection as a pre-condition to return
underscores the seriousness of certain fears and trepidations expressed by the IDP population and
discussed in these findings. A common aspect of the fears and challenges mentioned is that many
have to do with not experiencing again what the IDP community has already experienced. The
fear of beginning another conflict is the most obvious expression of this, yet concerns about
security and protection may stem from the threat they experienced that triggered the initial flight
from Abkhazia. Furthermore, the challenges of “starting a new life” would not be unlike the
challenges that IDPs faced when it became apparent that they would not be returning to Abkhazia
right away. One can see how these fears and concerns could be rather strong motivations against
returning, particularly without the safeguard of Georgian government control. Furthermore, these
fears were compounded in 1998 when roughly 50,000 Georgians that had returned to the Gali
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region in eastern Abkhazia were forced to flee again due to pressure from Abkhaz militia groups
(Lynch, 2001). In addition to the trauma of this re-displacement in 1998, the fighting in August
2008 and the widespread displacement of Georgians that resulted from it has likely had a deep
impact on the Georgian IDP community and likely strengthened the fear of repeating the
experience of displacement. This remains to be assessed. Yet recognizing the significance of
these events, it is quite possible that the government protection or security guarantee that the IDP
community demands before going back is not simply to protect against violence or crime, but also
to protect them from repeating the experiences of flight and displacement.

Conflict skills. One force acting on the possibility of return may be the perceived lack of
skills to handle the perceived challenges that IDPs may face upon return. The final section of this
initial level of data analysis pertains to the interviewees’ skills, ability, and confidence in
handling and confronting the conflicts they may face in either remaining or returning. If we are to
understand the apparent stagnation of the Georgian IDP community as being the result of
opposing and counterbalancing forces, then a perceived shortage or surplus of skill and adeptness
in handling conflict could serve as one such force. In this section participants were asked about
their experience and preferred methods for handling conflict, whether these methods would apply
to conflicts they may face if returning to Abkhazia, and given these opinions on conflict, under
what conditions they would be willing to return.
To establish previous experience with conflict and cooperation with Abkhazians,
participants were asked if they had participated in any peacebuilding or grass-roots reconciliation
projects or activity with Abkhazians since being displaced. 25% had participated in such an
activity and 75% had not. This 25% may be a misleadingly high figure as subjects were found
through purposive convenience sampling, which may have selected for IDPs with more exposure
to peacebuilding and conflict resolution methods than the average Georgian IDP.
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Participants were then asked to think about the types of conflicts they most often face in
their current lives (such as with family or neighbors) and to describe the ways that they usually
approach or deal with these conflicts. Responses were categorized as generally as either evasive
approaches, proactive approaches, not sure, and other. 42% of people responded with avoiding or
evasive approaches to conflict such as “I try always to avoid such situations” (K9, 2007) or “I try
to be patient because I fear retaliation” (B3, 2007). 27% of people noted proactive approaches
such as “to compromise and [have] supportive attitude to counterpart” (T12, 2007) or in some
cases trying to win. However, few gave responses that might be considered aggressive or
defensive. The types of conflict that participants expect to face in the event of return to Abkhazia
include conflicts about property issues and stolen property, and conflicts about participation in the
war and losses experienced because of the war. 29% of people responded that they expected little
or no conflict if returning to Abkhazia.
Participants were also asked to think about how they would handle the conflicts that they
expected to face in Abkhazia. The various answers given were grouped into approaches that
relied on outside authority, such as the government or legal measures, and approaches that selfreliant. 35% gave responses that they would turn to an outside authority to deal with conflicts,
while 42% stated that they would use conflict approaches that were self-reliant. Most of these
self-reliant approaches were rather vague, however, such as “I will resolve with diplomacy and
with talk” (T1, 2007) or “I will try to solve with peace” (Z5, 2007).
These findings show that a sizable portion of the IDPs interviewed tend to avoid conflict
and prefer to resolve conflicts and disputes through outside authorities. At the same time, there is
another sizable group that cited taking proactive approaches to conflict and preferred to solve
conflicts themselves. However, in looking at the proactive and self-reliant approaches that were
offered, very few offer anything more specific than “with diplomacy,” “with talking,” or “will
solve peacefully.” Even when respondents were probed with questions such as “what if
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diplomacy doesn’t work” little more specific strategy was given. In addition, 29% of interviewees
expect little or no conflict and 75% have had no experience working cooperatively with
Abkhazians since displacement. What these results may indicate is that while the IDPs that were
interviewed may have some skills and confidence to deal with potential conflicts, they may also
be unprepared to deal with conflicts they may encounter if returning.
With these conflict handling issues in mind, Participants were asked about return and the
conditions that would be necessary for them to return. It should be noted that this set of questions
was developed later in the study, and that it was only asked to individuals that expressed a desire
to return. As such this set of questions was asked to 32 of the 45 IDPs that were interviewed.
From these 32, the following conditions were given as necessary for return:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Peaceful conditions/ no war – 10
Georgian Jurisdiction- 8
Government protection/guarantee – 7
Russians leave – 3
Just for Abkhazians to say its ok – 1
Economic improvement – 5
Restoration/ rebuilding – 2
Other – 5

*Some respondents gave answers that fell into more than one category, for example listing both economic
improvement and Georgian jurisdiction as necessary to return. Such answers were counted for each
category they addressed.

Finally, participants were asked if there were any conditions under which they would return to
Abkhazia under the current status quo, or in other words without Georgian control over the
territory. Overwhelmingly participants said they would not be willing to return without Georgian
jurisdiction: 88% said no, 9% answered yes, and 3% responded that they did not know.
Considering that one third of the IDPs interviewed expect not to face any conflict once they
return, and that no one expressed the anticipation of insurmountable conflict, it seems curious that
almost all of the people interviewed would refuse to return without the Georgian state having
jurisdiction over the region. Similar to the assertions made in the previous section, this
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contradiction suggests that protection from Abkhaz may not be the only reason for wanting there
to be Georgian state control over Abkhazia. As was suggested in the previous sections, this may
be part of a broader desire to avoid repeating the experience of displacement and the various
traumas that accompany it. Or, it is possible if not likely, that there is another reason or force
connected to this demand for Georgian jurisdiction despite a relatively confident outlook on
potential conflict with Abkhazians.

Conclusions. This section of the analysis has identified a number of forces and
motivations at work within the Georgian IDP population. However, it has not yet identified a
clear group of forces that would explain the stagnation or non-movement of the IDP population.
Reviewing these forces, the study finds that a mix of tangible and intangible motivations are
pulling and pushing IDPs towards return, integration, and their status quo.
The section regarding IDPs’ desire to return showed that the goal of returning to
Abkhazia on a permanent basis was nearly unanimous among the interviewees, and that beneath
this stated desire was a collection of intangible yet apparently very strong motivations for return.
The section regarding IDPs’ perceptions of integration and the host community where they
currently live showed overall that there are no apparent forces drawing IDPs toward their current
status quo. Meanwhile, there appears to be the motivation and ambition toward things that would
lead to greater integration such as employment and housing outside of a collective center. What
this indicates is that there must, on some level, be forces that are pulling IDPs into their current
situation of prolonged displacement and non-integration. While the study has shown that there are
certainly deficiencies in the assistance given to IDPs, and that more could be done to facilitate
integration, on some level it is ultimately the decision of individual IDPs and IDP families to
actively pursue integration. Therefore, there must be something that makes the segregation and
limbo of the status quo preferable to integration.
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This is all further complicated by the sections about IDP perceptions of the home
territory, the possibility of coexistence, and their perceived ability to deal with conflict. When
asked about possible fears and concerns about returning, the study found that a majority of
respondents expressed some fears and possible challenges about returning to Abkhazia.
Furthermore, the most prominent fears were in regard to security, protection, and the fear of
starting another conflict. This shows that, despite the stated desire to return, there are very
tangible motivations for not doing so. Furthermore, this section shows that as stated a conciliatory
attitude towards Abkhazians is far more prevalent than an overtly aggressive one. However, when
confronted with the task of sharing or perhaps giving something up for Abkhazian counterparts, a
more aggressive attitude comes to the fore in a portion of the interviewees.
At the same time, the section on perceived conflict skills shows mixed and contradictory
results regarding conflict handling skills, confidence in dealing with conflict, and needs for return
among those interviewed. The study found a high degree of stated confidence in the ability to
handle and deal with whatever conflicts IDPs may face if returning to Abkhazia. In fact one-third
of those interviewed anticipated facing no conflict if returning. Yet this section also showed little
experience dealing with conflict, and tendency to turn towards outside authorities to resolve
conflicts. It also showed that the primary conditions required for return are a peace deal, a
security guarantee, and Georgian jurisdiction over Abkhazia. In fact, the overwhelming majority
of IDPs said that under no conditions would they return to Abkhazia without the Georgian
government having control over the region. As this demand seems to contradict the somewhat
confident and optimistic outlook on coexistence with Abkhazians, this may suggest that there is
something other than simply protection from Abkhazians that IDPs would get from Georgian
control. And, as was posited earlier, what IDPs may be looking for in Georgian security
guarantees may also be protection against experiencing that which IDPs have already
experienced: not simply the peril and fear of flight, but also the challenge and upheaval of starting
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over. The table below summarizes the forces for and against return to Abkhazia and for or against
staying in their current locations.

+

Forces for staying
• High stated level of integration
• Motivation to integrate (displayed
through desire to find permanent
housing and employment)

-

• Lack of permanent homes and
employment.
• Diminishing and insufficient aid.

Forces for returning
• Stated desire to return.
• “Intangibles” given as motivations for
return (i.e. drivers that cannot be
replaced or supplanted outside of return
to Abkhazia)
• Low stated anticipation of conflict.
• Conciliatory attitude towards Abkhazians.
• Fear of personal security or threat.
• Fear of starting another conflict and
threat of reliving the experience of
displacement.
• Challenge of starting over again.
• Lack of conflict skills.

Table 4: Summary of forces for staying and returning to Abkhazia.

Thus what this section has done is highlight inconsistencies and identify places where
there should be a strong force acting on IDPs but there does not appear to be. In other words there
appears to be a gravity of sorts keeping a large portion of IDPs in their status quo despite their
stated preference for the markers of integration such as employment and stable housing. Yet, one
thing that this part of the analysis does seem to suggest is that the attitudes and motivations of
individuals in the IDP community are behind the forces that act against each other to produce the
inertia that keeps this population in the current status quo. This suggests that the attitudes of this
population are connected to the status quo that it maintains by neither returning nor integrating.
As such this also suggests that their attitudes are connected to elite governing apparatus that rely
on the IDP status quo for authority, and in turn use this authority to act as drivers and agitators in
the conflict. In the next section, the analysis will attempt to identify and make sense of broad
themes present within the whole body of interview data. By looking at the emerging themes the
analysis should be able to give a deeper understanding to these gaps, and to identify the role of
this community within the broader conflict.
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Level 2 – Emerging Themes
The previous analysis yields useful information about the forces and motivations at work
within the Georgian IDP community, as well as what might be thought of as black holes within
the field of forces acting on and within the IDP community. These are places where a seemingly
strong force appears to have less impact on the movement and motivations of the IDP community
than it aught to. This would lead one to expect an equally strong counter force to develop in
opposition, yet there are places where no such counter-force is readily apparent. These places
where it seems that there should be some force either pushing or pulling to maintain the
equilibrium, but where no such force is apparent are what may be thought of as these black holes
within the field of forces acting on the Georgian IDP population. However, an item-by-item
analysis of the interview data can only do so much to provide an understanding of this population,
its motivations, and its role in the Georgian Abkhazian conflict. Patterns and themes also emerge
from looking at the interview responses as a whole body of information instead of breaking it
down by item. This second level of analysis will identify some of these themes, some of which
are informed by the literature and others which emerge from the data. These themes speak to the
role and position of this IDP community within the theatre of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict as
well as having relevance to understanding IDPs in frozen conflicts more generally.
The first level of analysis dealt largely with the first hypotheses about opposing forces
within the IDP community, seeking to identify these forces. The second level of analysis deals
with the second hypothesis by trying to better inform our understanding of the role of the IDP
community in the greater Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. The second hypothesis in this paper
asserts that frozen conflict is held at equilibrium between a low-intensity level of non-conflict and
the threshold in intensity that can be thought of as ripeness; and that it is held there by forces that
both drive and suppress the conflict. This equilibrium remains at a level of intensity high enough
that peace is unlikely to develop from de-escalation and fading of the conflict; yet it is at a low
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enough level of intensity that peace is unlikely to result from a mutually hurting stalemate and the
resolution ripeness it is said to induce (Zartman, 2000). While this study is not able to test this
hypothesis in whole by examining all of the factors involved, it can begin to test it by looking at
one of these driving or suppressing factors and determining the role that this factor plays.

Selective aggression. There are a number of ways that a given population or party may be
identified as a driving factor in a conflict. Driving factors are those which serve to perpetuate or
escalate the conflict, and parties may act in this capacity in a variety of ways that are too
numerous to list. For example, a group can act as a driving factor directly by taking up arms in
the conflict, or more indirectly by supporting a faction involved in the fighting, by demanding
that their side continue fighting, or by obstructing the peace process in any number of ways. The
Georgian IDP population has acted as a driver for the conflict in some of the more obvious ways
that a group can. For example, the IDP population supplied men that fought in the GeorgianAbkhazian war of 1992-1994, and the Georgian-Abkhaz Government in Exile, comprised of
Georgian members of the pre 1992 Abkhazian regional government, has been a staunch opponent
of any form of Abkhaz sovereignty. However, in the attempt to illuminate the role that the
Georgian IDP population has played in this conflict, this study sought to identify some more
subtle trends in this population that may either confirm or disconfirm their role as a driving force
in the conflict.
One way to begin may be to look for signs of aggression and ill-will towards Abkhazians
expressed by IDPs. This may seem like an unpromising direction, as earlier in the analysis the
study found that when IDPs were asked about their feelings towards Abkhazians 76% responded
with feelings that were generally positive or non-threatening, while only 15% showed overtly
negative and malevolent feelings. However, looking for less obvious signs of aggression towards
Abkhazians shows some hostility in more than 15% of the interview pool. To illustrate, selective
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aggression is shown by some interviewees whereby certain groups of Abkhazians, such as one’s
neighbors, are viewed positively while other select groups are viewed as enemies, such as
Abkhazians who fought in the war. For example, when asked about the prospect of meeting
Abkhazians in dialogue one person said “I would be happy to meet my neighbors, but I’m not
sure about Abkhaz I don’t know – I’m afraid I will get killed” (B9, 2007); another responded:
“yes, I meet them if they don’t give part in the war – but the people who killed my uncle - I don’t
want to meet them” (T7, 2007). This is particularly seen in this group of interviews around the
subject of the IDP’s abandoned house. The sentiment expressed by interviewees in Kutaisi,
“people who live in their own house are good people” (K1, 2007), is exemplary of this selectively
aggressive attitude towards Abkhazians. What this statement also says is “people who live in my
house are bad.” Looking at the entire interview data, this study found 30 examples in 22
interviews of this selective aggression towards Abkhazians. This means that about half of the
IDPs interviewed demonstrated this theme somewhere in their interview; and, while this is not a
great enough portion to make a generalization about all Georgian IDPs, it does suggest that some
degree of hostility towards Abkhazians, though hidden or subtle, does exist in the IDP
community. Thus it could be said that such hostility would serve to drive the conflict or at the
least that aggression and hostility would serve to entrench a group in a chosen position, and that
this entrenchment would drive the intensity of a conflict up.

Georgian government control. The entrenchment in just such a position is another theme
that appears in the interview data. The insistence on bringing Abkhazia under Georgian
jurisdiction is common not only in Georgian political rhetoric, but also among IDPs when talking
about return. This sentiment was seen quite clearly in the first level of analysis where 82% of
those asked said they would not return to Abkhazia without an official peace deal and without
Georgian control over Abkhazia. However, this theme of not wanting to return without Georgian
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control is present throughout the data, and it is in the unsolicited references to this demand that
one can see clues as to the reason for it as well.
It is not uncommon in conflict for entrenchment in a position to be rooted in a rightsfocused mentality and desire to “win,” so to speak. One could speculate that this sense of rightsbased entitlement is seen in the interviewees who said they want to return because “it is mine, it’s
my land” (T14, 2007), and this is one of the possible reasons that so many IDPs insist on having
Georgian control before they return to Abkhazia. However, a look at the interview material
shows that the need for protection is a central and very real reason for this demand. 29 references
to Georgian control were seen in 27 interviews, just over half of the pool. Of these 29 references,
18 specifically mention protection, safety, or fear, which shows that this is a considerable
motivation in the IDP community. One respondent noted, for example, “I would be afraid, I never
go back to this territory if I have no guarantee from our government that it is safe” (T13). Another
noted: “when the government gives [the] promise of protection [we’ll] return” (K1). Furthermore,
2 interviews made references to the events that occurred in the Gali region of Abkhazia in 1998.
“There was once when [the] Georgian government already helped IDPs to go back to Gali, and
Abkhazians shoot them because it was not official” (T12).These events are discussed in detail in
the Case Background chapter, but in brief this refers to the armed clashes that transpired in early
1998 when a large number of Georgian IDPs moved back to their homes in the Gali region of
Abkhazia, but did so without aid or protection of the Georgian government. Clashes between
Georgian nationalist militias and Abkhaz forces transpired and resulted in a great deal of violence
and the re-displacement of nearly 50,000 IDPs. For obvious reasons, this has become something
of a traumatic event for many Georgians, particularly IDPs, and while 2 references is not a sizable
portion of the data, it does indicate a sentiment that likely exists through much of the IDP
community. As such, the study suggests that a fear-based insistence on Georgian control of
Abkhazia as prerequisite to return is a factor within the IDP community. This insistence
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contributes to the entrenchment of a position that is difficult to accommodate, and as such shows
another way in which the IDP serves as a driving factor in the conflict. Furthermore, the fighting
that took place in August 2008 in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as into parts of Georgia
neighboring those regions, surely had a traumatic effect on Georgia’s IDPs as well as their
population as a whole. One could easily speculate that this would have had the effect of
underlining and reinforcing security concerns about the prospect of returning and would support
fears that returning to Abkhazia without Georgian state protection would lead them to repeat the
trauma of displacement yet again.

Disempowerment. At the same time as this insistence on government control, the study
also finds that there is a theme of deferment to government authority and of general
disempowerment among IDPs. A theme of powerlessness or lack of agency emerged in some
interviews. This was expressed in a variety of ways; in some cases it was expressed in terms of
deferment to authority or institutions to solve problems. For example, when asked about what
conflicts people expected to face if they return and how they might deal with them, a number of
interviewees said simply that the government would solve such problems: “everything will be
decided by government” (B7, 2007). In other instances there was a tendency towards “I don’t
know” answers, particularly when asked to offer suggestions for programs or ways to improve
certain services. This trend also came up in responses to questions regarding contact with Abkhaz
and willingness to participate in dialogue. For example, one person responded: “I’m not a
politician and meeting someone like me from Abkhazia wouldn’t mean anything, so dialogue has
to be on government level” (B7, 2007). In another case, when asked about the prospect of return
the respondent answered “I must be president to answer these questions” (T5, 2007).
There were 27 occurrences of responses that reflect this theme of disempowerment found
in 20 of the 45 interviews. There is a fair amount of speculating that can be done about the
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causes of this trend towards lack of agency, and the significance that it has for the study. It is
possible and likely that to some degree this theme, and the trend towards “I don’t know”
responses, is descended from the era of Soviet Rule, and the political culture created during that
70-year period during which self agency and autonomy could be limited or subjugated arbitrarily
by the state. At the same time it is possible that this tendency is connected to the overall sense of
stagnation that is apparent in so much of the IDP community, with such stagnation and
hopelessness the task of offering alternatives and solutions begins to appear pointless. The first
part of this analysis identified the possible existence of some unapparent force or motivation that
pulls a large portion of this community towards the status quo. It is possible that this puzzling
pull towards non-integration and segregation is related to the theme of disempowerment and lack
of agency that emerges from the data.
In the study of refugees and the psychology of displacement, as was discussed earlier in
the literature review, there are certain coping mechanisms that have been observed in displaced
communities that may be of relevance here. “Linking” tendencies have been described in this
literature in cases where some aspect of life before displacement is recreated or perpetuated in
order to fabricate or maintain the connection between the former life, the current life of
displacement, and the hope for future return (Volkan, 1994, 2003; Zetter, 1999; Al-Rasheed,
1994). These linked aspects may range from placing undue importance on certain personal items
to recreation of the old home to the maintenance of IDP communities and the IDP identity
(Volkan, 1994, 2003).
The study of trauma and victimization has also noted that trauma, such as the experience
of forced displacement, can severely damage one’s identity and sense of self. As Wilson (2004)
notes: “identity involves a sense of self-sameness and continuity” (p. 114), yet traumatic
experiences have the effect of severing one’s connections to their past and their identity.
Similarly, Herman notes, “the core experiences of psychological trauma are disempowerment and
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disconnection from others” (Herman, 1942, p. 133). As such, survivors of traumatic experience
such as forced displacement are left with a weakened identity and sense of self. The identity of
victim, or in this case the identity of IDP, serves to redress this severed sense of self in several
ways. Herman notes that the identity of victim carries with it a “specialness” that the victim must
relinquish in the process of recovery (Herman, 1942). Relinquishing the specialness of victim
identity allows the individual to regain commonality and belonging in society, but also carries
with it “a feeling of smallness, of insignificance, a sense that one’s own troubles are ‘as a drop of
rain in the sea’” (Herman, 1942, p.236). When victim identity and the troubles that come with it
are as politically charged and carry such consequences as they do in the case of IDP communities,
recovery may not be an appealing trade-off for relinquishing this specialness. Furthermore, the
social status of victim, and the sense of shared victimization in communities involved in trauma
can promote cohesion in such groups (Roe & Cairns, 2003). Membership in such groups can
provide the needed sense of identity that is often damaged in survivors of trauma. Furthermore, in
the case of interstate and inter-communal conflict, the self-assigned status of victim group can
provide strength “vis-à-vis the international community, which usually tends to support the
victimized side in a conflict” (Bar-Tal, 2003).
There is both comfort and power in the homeostasis of maintaining the identity of victim.
First the displaced person draws comfort and commonality from being part of a displaced
community and the opportunity to recreate a lost past that that community provides. Furthermore,
the identity of victim carries a certain degree of specialness and power. As such, the degree of
power that the displaced community retains by maintaining its identity as a separate community
may shed light on the puzzling lack of integration the community in this study shows.
The amount and type of aid or assistance given to displaced persons certainly can either
facilitate or restrict the ease and speed with which individuals integrate into host communities.
However, on some level it is ultimately the prerogative of displaced persons to integrate into the
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host community or to actively pursue the possibility of return by remaining segregated from the
host community. By not integrating or perhaps on some level refusing to integrate, displaced
persons retain a certain identity and power much in the way that a victim does. By not integrating,
displaced communities ensure that they remain an issue for the host country/society and as such
they ensure that they remain an issue in the conflict. Nor will the conflict fade away without
resolution to the issue of displacement while that displaced population remains visible. By not
integrating, communities safeguard themselves against being ignored; they ensure themselves a
role in the conflict (even if it is minor) and with that role comes some degree of power in that
conflict and thus some degree of control over their own circumstances.

Conclusion
The second level of analysis has identified several themes that suggest that there are
sentiments and demands within the Georgian IDP community that may indeed indicate that this
community serves as a driving factor in the Georgian Abkhazian conflict. Half of the
interviewees display signs of what could be called selective aggression. This means that when
asked about their feelings towards Abkhazians, respondents report having no negative feelings
towards Abkhazians in general, and only harbor anger towards the certain limited groups of
Abkhazians, such as the single Abkhazian that has taken one’s house or only towards those that
fought in the war. Furthermore, there is a prominent theme in the interviews of demanding
Georgian control over Abkhazia, and that return is conditional to this demand. By making this
demand, the IDP community places itself as a driver between the level that the conflict is at
currently and any possibility of it fading away or de-escalating on its own. If the IDP community
does not simply fade into the Georgian population (which it does not appear to be doing) and if
this community makes clear that they will not be gradually returning to Abkhazia on their own
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(without Georgian protection) then it is unlikely that the conflict of which they are a part will
begin to fade drastically in intensity. These forces are illustrated in the table below.

Forces for staying
• Power retained by maintaining
distinct victim status as IDP
+
community

-

Forces for returning

• Selective or ‘hidden’ aggression towards
Abkhazians
• Fear of repeating experience of displacement,
exacerbated by violent clashes in Gali in 1998 and
events in August 2008.

Table 5: Forces for staying and returning to Abkhazia.

Both the first and second parts of the analysis uncovered signs of a powerful fear at work
within the community: the fear of returning to Abkhazia only to have to flee again and in turn
experience the trauma of displacement again. This fear is discussed in the first part of the analysis
as references to the fear of “starting the conflict again” and is also connected to the theme
discussed in the second part of demanding Georgian state control of Abkhazia as precondition to
return. Uncovering this fear of re-traumatization is a key part of understanding the entrenched
position within this community of requiring guarantees of protection from the Georgian
government as a prerequisite for returning to Abkhazia. The issue of IDP return and the
entrenchment of both sides on this issue is, in turn, a driving force in the conflict.
This leads to the final conclusion of these results. The first part of this analysis detected
that there was some unapparent force towards the status quo of prolonged displacement and
segregation that seemingly is stronger than the appeal of integration. Later, the analysis also
identified a theme emerging from the data that might be identified as disempowerment or the
acceptance of powerlessness, which is most visible in deference to government control. Looking
at phenomena that have been observed both in refugee psychology and in the psychology of
victimization, the analysis finds that there may be some connection between the resistance to
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integration and the issue of power. As was discussed above, by remaining visibly segregated and
thus maintaining the identity of a community displaced by conflict, the IDP population is able to
retain an undeniable role in the conflict and thus some amount of power. Furthermore, if one
takes this phenomena to suggest that there is some degree of intentionality on the part of the IDP
community in maintaining the status quo, then the argument can be made that the attitudes of the
IDP community do indeed actively drive the conflict. The status quo is maintained through some
degree of intentionality, thus the source of authority for the Abkhaz Government-in-Exile is
maintained; and as a notoriously partisan organization, that lobbies a hard nationalist line in
regards to the conflict and the full return of IDPs to Abkhazia the Government-in-Exile certainly
acts to drive the conflict. Thus, one can connect the attitudes of IDPs to the perpetuation of the
conflict’s frozen state posited in the framework presented earlier.
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Discussion
As the reporting of results in the previous chapter should show, the study conducted for
this paper is multifaceted and somewhat complex, and produced a sizeable amount of raw data.
Although the methods used in this thesis were as appropriate as possible for this subject, there are
some limitations to the study and its ability to draw definitive conclusions from the data. The
following discussion will outline caveats, shortcomings, and errors in several aspects of the study
and analysis conducted. Such caveats are found in the study’s design, its execution and data
collection, as well as the method and process of analysis.

Study Design
The study was designed to accommodate the information needs of this research within
the constraints posed by logistical and financial limitations, a limited period of time in which to
collect information, as well as the political limits that exist when conducting field research about
an ongoing or unresolved conflict. These various caveats will be discussed in turn.
This study was conducted to better understand the various factors at work in the
perpetuation of frozen conflict, and the role that displaced persons play in these dynamics. It
pursued this end by studying more closely the population of internally displaced persons that fled
their place of origin during the Georgian-Abkhazian war in the early 1990’s. It follows that the
discussion of this study should begin by briefly assessing the appropriateness and
representativeness of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict as an example of frozen conflict. In an
earlier chapter the following definition for frozen conflict was offered:
Frozen conflict is a particular phenomenon of intractability where the conflict
experiences a long period of what seems to be stagnation or non movement. This
period occurs after most of the violence in the conflict is ended by ceasefire, but
leaves the conflict unresolved and parties in a state of destructive and painful
ambiguity – particularly in regard to parties’ legal relationship with each other
and with the outside world, which becomes the status quo for those involved.
118

It could be said that because the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict fits this description almost exactly,
that it is indeed an appropriate and representative example for the study of frozen conflict.
However, such an evaluation is not so simple. Because there is little theoretical literature
available that offers anything resmbling a functional definition of frozen conflict, the term is
largely defined by the characteristics of the specific conflicts that the term is used to describe.
These are primarily the conflicts in Cyprus, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Georgia. As such, the
claim that Georgia and Abkhazia is an appropriate example based on its proximity to this
definition is a somewhat tautological argument. However, this problem would present itself if any
of the other conflicts often referred to as frozen were examined rather than Georgia and
Abkhazia. Furthermore, the legitimacy of focusing on Georgia as a critical case of frozen conflict
could be argued based on its importance in ongoing regional affairs and its relevance to policy in
the area. Perhaps more than other conflicts in this grouping, the Georgian Abkhazian conflict and
its frozen state is poised to have a significant impact on regional and international affairs. First, it
appears at the time of writing that Georgian affairs are taking on a significant role in shaping USRussian and European-Russian relations. Furthermore, the large portion of the CaspianMediterranean oil pipeline located in Georgia is often cited as lending international significance
to the separatist conflicts in which Georgia is engaged. Finally, the proximity of the RussianAbkhazian border to the site of the 2014 Olympic games, Sochi, also lends relevance and
immediacy to the Georgian-Abkhazian as a critical case of frozen conflict.
Having discussed the appropriateness of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict as an example
of frozen conflict, there are a number of other caveats to bear in mind with regards to the specific
study conducted. As should be clear by now, the study only collected data and information from
Georgians. For obvious reasons, it would have been ideal to conduct studies among populations
on both sides of this conflict. It would add greater depth to the study and allow it to draw stronger
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conclusions if it were able to provide an Abkhazian perspective on issues and themes such as the
return of Georgian IDPs and the possibility of coexistence with Georgians. However, given the
limitations imposed by the current political situation as well as risks to personal security
associated with traveling in a region not controlled by the Georgian government and where US
embassy officials are unable to provide protection to citizens, the collection of data from
Abkhazia was deemed beyond this study’s capacity.
There are strengths and weaknesses to the size of the sample used in this study. It could at
once be argued that the sample is too large in some respects and too small in other respects. A
larger sample could increase the representativeness and generalizability of the study and allow for
traditional statistical analysis of certain factors. At the same time, the size of the sample presented
challenges that a smaller sample would not. Using an instrument that collects both qualitative and
quantitative data in a sample of this size runs the risk of collecting more information than can be
effectively analyzed. Indeed, it was a challenge to distill the amount of data collected into
digestible amounts while preserving the integrity of the information and maintaining respect for
the individual subjects and the time they gave to the study.
However, despite the challenges presented by the size of this sample, it proved to be an
advantageous sample size for the aims of the study. First, the format of this study would not have
effectively served a significantly larger sample than the one studied here. The interviews were
semi-structured, which allowed for probing on some questions when needed, and posed open
ended questions which allowed respondents to expand on topics when they so wished. As such,
the study produced a dense, rich, and highly varied body of data. On some of the open-ended
questionnaire items this meant that no two responses looked the same, and that each required
individual interpretation in order to extract the desired information. At 45 interviews, it is entirely
possible to do this without losing the richness and individuality of the responses. Likely this
approach is just as possible with a sample size of 50 or even 60 respondents. However, at a
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certain point the sample would become too large to be appropriate for this type of individualized
analysis, and would be unable to adequately make use of the richness of the responses given. At
the same time this size of sample allowed to study to interview individuals from different regions
of Georgia, of different ages, and of various walks of life. This produced a variety and texture that
a significantly smaller sample would not generate. Thus, while admittedly this prevented a depth
of analysis that is possible with fewer subjects, it gave texture and variety to the data collected
that a smaller sample could not have provided.
Finally, it should be mentioned that there are certain challenges involved when targeting
for study a group that is widely considered to be a vulnerable population. The term vulnerable
population is typically applied to populations such as children, prisoners, the mentally disabled
and economically or educationally disadvantaged people (Royse, 2008). When working with
vulnerable populations the study must pay particular attention to ensuring that the study and
participation in it does not somehow cause harm to the subject. When working with a population
that has experienced significant trauma, such as the forcibly displaced, it is particularly important
to ensure that the instrument and research methods employed by the study do not cause retraumatization to the subjects, and that emotions brought up as a result of participation in the
study are handled appropriately and with sensitivity.

Data Collection & Sampling
The greatest challenges of conducting the study, and perhaps the most important caveats
to discuss, are in regards to the process of data collection and sampling method used. Conducting
interviews with the aid of a translator, unfamiliarity with local culture, and finding subjects with
limited personal connections presented significant challenges to the accurate collection of data
and assembly of a representative sample of subjects. Undeniably, these challenges had an affect
on the data collected.
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Sampling. A number of caveats should be noted in regards to the demographics of the
subject pool and discrepancies between this and the larger Georgian IDP population. The
interview subjects in this study were collected through a nonprobability sampling design that
would best be described as purposive sampling. Nonprobability sampling refers to a process that
unlike probability sampling does not use a mathematically random process to select a sampling
element, and is the type of sampling most often used in qualitative, as opposed to quantitative,
research. As Newman and Kreuger (2003) note: “qualitative researchers focus less on a sample’s
representativeness … the primary purpose of [nonprobability] sampling is to collect specific
cases, events, or actions that can clarify and deepen understanding” (p. 209). In other words, the
insight and depth of understanding that qualitative research seeks is favored over the
representativeness of a sample and generalizability of a study’s findings that quantitative research
favors.
Within the category of nonprobability sampling, this study would best be described as
one conducted via purposive or judgmental sampling. Purposive sampling is used in exploratory
or field research, and is one where the investigator uses various methods to select cases or
subjects for inclusion in the study with a specific purpose in mind or because they possess certain
characteristics, often using the judgment of an expert to select the cases (Neuman & Kreuger,
2003; Royse, 2008). One reason that an investigator uses purposive sampling is to study a hardto-reach or specialized population. In this study, subjects were selected due to membership in the
population of Georgian IDPs from Abkhazia, which is a hard-to-reach population about which
little statistical information is available. There are advantages and disadvantages to this method of
sampling. As Hochschild notes “Obviously, one cannot safely generalize from a sample of this
kind to a national population” however, she continues, “intensive interviews are a device for
generating insights, anomalies, and paradoxes, which later may be formalized into hypotheses
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that can be tested by quantitative social science methods” (1981, p.23-24 as quoted in Neuman &
Kreuger, 2003).
Interviewees were selected based on the characteristics of being an IDP of Georgian
ethnicity that fled from former residences in Abkhazia during and because of the GeorgianAbkhazian war, and were located using the local knowledge of guides in each area that interviews
were conducted. Interviewees from Tbilisi were recruited primarily through acquaintance with
translators or the primary investigator. Interviewees in Kutaisi and Zugdidi were found through
acquaintance with local peacebuilding and educational organizations, and several of the Batumi
interviews were arranged with assistance from the Ministry of Refugees in that region.
There are several main reasons why a random or probability sampling method was not
particularly feasible for this study. First, the fact that the study targets a very particular group or
population, Georgian IDPs, means that a traditional random sampling method such as random
digit dialing would not produce viable subjects or cases for the study. Furthermore, the method of
selected a random or statistically stratified subject pool from a list of IDPs living in the given area
was not a feasible sampling method either, as the investigator did not have access to such listing
if indeed they even exist. It could be argued that some quota sampling methods could have been
better integrated into the study. In quota sampling, the researcher identifies certain demographic
categories within the wider population, and determines proportionally how many subjects of each
category there should be represented in the sample. For example, the study could have aimed to
sample such that respondents were roughly half male and half female. However, the ability to
apply quotas to the subject pool was limited due to restrictions created by logistical issues such as
the availability of the translator-guides needed for most of the interviews, and the limited ability
to plan the data-collecting visits to areas outside Tbilisi. Some of the issues around the limited
ability of the investigator to successfully apply quotas to the sample are discussed below.
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There are several ways in which this sampling method may have affected the data. First,
the number of IDPs living in collective centers was higher in the sample than in the general
population: 62% in this study versus roughly half in the general IDP population (IDMC, 2006).
This discrepancy comes from having greater access to IDPs living in collective centers relative to
finding those living in private residences. Furthermore, interviewees were recruited on a
volunteer basis, and it became apparent that certain age and gender groups were more available
and more willing than other groups to talk about their experiences. First, there was a large
representation of women and young people. Part of this is likely due to availability, as middle
aged men were often not at home when interviews were being conducted. This issue of timing
could perhaps have been addressed by staggering the times when interviews were being
conducted. However, this timing was largely subject to the availability of translators and guides.
Another reason for this is that men that were 20-40 years old at the time of the war (or 35-55
now) were the most likely to have participated in the war, and because of the trauma they have
experienced taking part in this war they may be less willing to talk about their experiences. The
proportionately lower number of middle aged men may have affected some of the data collected.
It is possible that because of their experience with the war, this demographic would have
expressed feelings about the Abkhazians that are more aggressive and less conciliatory than other
demographics, and may have shown less optimistic views on the possibility and difficulty of
coexisting with Abkhazians. We do not know whether this is the case, but because the sample is
lacking in this demographic group the possibility exists that the data and findings may be skewed
to present the appearance of more optimistic and conciliatory attitudes within the IDP community
than what are actually there.
Furthermore, the associations through which some respondents were recruited may have
affected the data collected from them. Namely, this may have been an issue where some of the
respondents that were recruited through acquaintance with NGOs in Kutaisi and the
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Conflictology Department at Tbilisi State University in Tbilisi, or through the Ministry of
Refugees in Batumi. In Kutaisi, IDPs for interview were located with the assistance of an
educational NGO that works with the IDP community in that city. Several interview questions are
asked that deal with the respondent’s willingness to engage in dialogue with Abkhazians, their
prior experience with peacebuilding processes, and the ways that they personally tend to deal
with conflict in their lives. The associations of some respondents with such groups indicates that
these individuals were likely to have a greater familiarity with peacebuilding and conflict
resolution practices, and are more likely to have had conflict training, therefore demonstrating
greater ability to handle conflict in a non-destructive manner. Within the overall pool of data,
these interviews may have had the effect of skewing the data to give the population the
appearance of greater exposure and experience with peacebuilding processes and conflict skills
than is accurate.
The fact that several interviews in Batumi were arranged with the assistance of the
Ministry of Refugees in that region may have had similar consequences in terms of collecting
data that might be skewed or otherwise inaccurate. One such interview, number B1, is of
particular concern as it was actually conducted in the offices of the Minister of Refugees. This
produced noticeable irregularities in the responses given when compared to the responses given
in other interviews, particularly regarding the subject of assistance and aid received. For example,
when asked about the amount or type of aid that they receive now, a very common response was
“we only get 14 Lari ($7 US) a month,” or something similar to this. However, the respondent in
interview B1 responded to this question by saying enthusiastically “we get 14 Lari every month”
and noted that this was greater than the amount they used to receive. A thorough understanding of
the dynamics and relationship between the IDP community and the Ministry of Refugees is well
beyond the scope of this study. However, it is safe to say that the fact that the interview given at
the Ministry was far less critical of the Ministry and Georgian government overall shows that
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some of the responses given in this interview may not have been entirely ingenuous. Some other
interviews in collective centers in Batumi were coordinated by the Ministry. Specifically at the
collective center where interviews B5-B11 were conducted, it appeared that someone from the
Ministry had called in advance of the interview session to ensure that it would be possible to
conduct interviews there. Again, the relationship between the Ministry of Refugees and the IDP
population in Georgia, and the degree of disconnect between ministry rhetoric and the reality of
IDPs’ experience is certainly related to the subject at hand in this paper, but is not its focus nor is
it the main problem with which this paper is concerned. Certainly there is a level of questioning
required when data is collected in this context with the aid of government officials. However, the
data collected in interviews B5-B11 did not differ in any noticeable or dramatic way from data
collected in other regions and situations. It certainly did not depart from the main body of data in
the way that interview B1 did. As such it should not be considered to be exceptionally biased due
to the assistance of government officials in its collection.

Data collection. A number of logistical challenges also presented themselves in the
collection of data. Foremost among these was a set of challenges presented by the use of a
translator. Six different translators were used in the process of conducting this study. Because of
the low-budget approach with which the study was conducted, different translators were hired to
conduct interviews in each region or cities where interviews were conducted. This presented the
challenge of making sure that each new translator understood the questionnaire and purpose of
each item, and usually meant reviewing the questionnaire in a relatively short period of time. It
also meant that each translator brought their own preconceptions and interpretation of the
questionnaire to the interviews that they helped conduct. For example, when asking the question
“would you be willing to return without state protection, provided that you were able to build
relationships with the people that would be your neighbors there?” one translator interpreted this
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as “would you be willing to return under Abkhazian sovereignty?” This way of asking clearly
creates a loaded and significantly different question.
An additional factor to consider about the translators and guides that assisted in the study
is that all of these translator-guides were also IDPs. While this was entirely unintended by the
researcher, it presents certain issues in the data collection process that are worth considering. The
fact that the translators assisting in the interviews were also IDPs gave them a closeness or
intimacy with the subject of the interviews that has both advantages and disadvantages. The
negative aspects of this factor are that, given their proximity to the issues, there is a risk that the
translators might make inaccurate assumptions about participant responses or assume the ability
to interpret on their own responses or questionnaire items rather than asking for clarification.
However there are also advantages that come from having interpreters that have personal
experience with the topic of the study. First, this deeper understanding means that they are more
likely to understand certain regional expressions and idioms used within the IDP community, as
well as references to certain places and events. Furthermore, the fact that these translators were
members of the community being studied significantly increased access to this community, and
created a baseline level of trust between investigator and subjects that would otherwise have
taken a great amount of time to build. Given the advantages of deeper understanding of issues and
access to the IDP community, as opposed to the disadvantages mentioned above, it was likely a
great benefit to the study that translators involved were all IDPs.
The use of a translator also presents challenges to recording the responses given in an
interview. When these responses come through a translator, they are often truncated and the word
choice is often dictated by the translator’s knowledge of English rather than by the subtle
differences in meaning that word choice typically connotes. This has implications for data
analysis in that the data must be analyzed for substance rather than for content or word choice. It
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also means that the study likely lost some comments or details that translators found insignificant,
even though they may have been significant in analysis.
Finally, it should also be noted that some technical difficulties prevented the researcher
from recording all interviews as was intended in the study’s design. This presents similar issues
as the use of translators does, in that the researcher was not able to record every word and thought
expressed by the respondent.

Analysis Methods
A number of challenges that appeared in the process of collecting data reappeared in the
process of analyzing it. These primarily are issues that stem from conducting interviews in
Georgian or Russian while attempting to analyze them in English.
It is likely, if not certain, that a degree of meaning was lost in the process of translating
responses to English and consequently of interpreting these translations. First, there were a
number of responses that even with notes and a recording, were incomprehensible in regards to
the question asked. Without the ability to go back and clarify some of these responses, the
analysis had to group some of these responses as “other,” effectively losing the information in
them. Similarly, in order to be able to quote responses in this paper, the wording of some
responses had to be adjusted to make them logical and comprehensible to an English speaking
audience. And, as is always a problem when working in multiple languages, certain words and
sayings lose their full meaning in translation. This is also the case with the existence of cultural
connotations to certain terms and phrases. While a translator can interpret the words spoken by
respondents, they cannot translate the cultural context in which they are spoken. It should be a
given fact that references and associations were made by interviewees which the researcher could
not have understood and that the translator would have thought to explain.
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It is important as well to note why the data collected in this study did not undergo
statistical analysis to determine, for example, the statistical significance of certain differences in
the data. First, the purpose and intentions of the study do not lend themselves to statistical
analysis and significance testing. This research was conducted as an exploratory study, with the
intention of exploring a topic about which little data has been produced and in turn identifying
important issues in this topic and generating hypotheses and questions for further research. The
intention of the study is not hypotheses testing, which is the purpose of using inferential statistics.
Testing for statistical significance is done to establish whether the study’s results where due to
chance or due to the hypothesized relationship between variables (Neuman & Kreuger, 2003).
Furthermore, inferential statistics and significance testing rely on probability sampling. However,
as discussed earlier, this study utilized purposive sampling, which is categorized as a nonprobability sampling method. As such, it is neither necessary nor logical to include statistical
testing in the analysis of the data collected in this study.

Conclusion
This section has highlighted a number of caveats that one should bear in mind when
reading the findings and conclusions of this study. The non-random sampling method used means
that the representativeness of this pool is limited, and its findings should are not meant to be
generalized to the greater Georgian IDP population. Furthermore, middle aged men were underrepresented in the subject pool, while IDPs that were involved with local NGOs, had participated
in peacebuilding activities, or had received some form of conflict training were over-represented.
This may have the effect of skewing the data to make the IDP population appear more
conciliatory towards Abkhazians and better prepared to handle conflict than they actually are.
Finally, the use of translators and the challenges presented by translating interviews also means
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that some of meaning in the responses as they were originally conveyed may have been lost in the
translation and transcription process.
However, the reader should also bear in mind that many of these flaws are inherent in the
type of study that was conducted. Qualitative interviewing, collecting data in another language
and culture, working with a translator, and working with what is considered to be a vulnerable
population are all elements that complicate the execution and accurate analysis of a study.
However, these are all factors that enrich such a study as well. The obstacles presented by
language, culture, and logistics were all necessary in order to gather the thoughts and perspectives
of a population about which little is known; and it would be impossible to accurately understand
the role of this population in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict without attempting to understand
what they perceive their role to be.
All things being said, the existence of multiple shortcomings in this study is apparent.
However, this should not entirely discount the results and conclusions that it has produced. While
these challenges may have affected the representativeness of the data collected, they have not
affected the study’s ability to identify issues and sentiments that exist within the IDP community.
And, after all, the identification and understanding of such issues, and not hypothesis testing nor
the establishment of statistical certainties about this population, was the stated purpose of the
study.
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Conclusions
This thesis has attempted to explain the dynamics of the phenomenon referred to as
frozen conflict and to answer the question of why it goes unresolved for so long. In order to do
this, this paper first attempted to provide a working definition of the term “frozen conflict” and
what it implies about conflicts that are labeled as such. A review of literature from the subjects of
protracted social conflict, intractability, and post-Soviet conflict provided the pieces of an
understanding that classifies frozen conflict as a particular type of intractable or protracted
conflict. This type of protracted conflict is distinct in that violence is almost entirely halted after
the signing of a ceasefire, but the conflict itself and the legal status of participants in relation to
each other remains in limbo for years or even decades.
In order to answer the question of why frozen conflict experiences this extended period of
stagnation or a freezing of the peace process, the literature review turned to a number of fields
and subjects ranging from settlement and peace agreements, power sharing, the former-Soviet
Union, and refugee studies. This review helped to identify a number of central factors in the
freezing of certain conflicts, from which two plausible rival hypotheses were developed about the
dynamics and causes behind the stagnant nature of frozen conflict.
First, however, the review uncovered a number of insights into the nature of what have
come to be called frozen conflicts. Scholars of the Soviet successor wars such as Dov Lynch
(2004) and Charles King (2001) have suggested that the term frozen is inappropriate for these
conflicts, as it misconstrues them as inactive or static when, in reality, these conflicts and the
parties they involve can be highly dynamic. The legal status of the conflict and the parties
remains unchanged in such conflicts, but the parties themselves change a great deal, and with that
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the issues at stake in the conflict can change as well. As suggested in the literature review, it may
be more fruitful to think of frozen conflict not as a static state but as being in a state of
equilibrium. Borrowing from Lewin’s theory of force field analysis and quasi-stationary
equilibrium (1958), this paper suggests that frozen conflicts are held in equilibrium by opposing
forces acting against each other. There are forces that act to drive or push the intensity of the
conflict up and there are opposing forces that push the intensity of the conflict down and keep it
below the threshold beyond which the pain of stalemate would be great enough to motivate the
parties to settle. The conceptualization offered here refers to this threshold as ripeness for
resolution, borrowing the concept from Zartman (1989). This conceptualization of frozen conflict
as being in a state of equilibrium allows for an understanding of the phenomenon as something
that feigns the appearance of being static because little to no progress is made toward resolving
the political and legal status of the conflict, but underneath this surface is dynamic and changing.
This conceptualization of frozen conflict also opens avenues for further study of this phenomenon
in identifying and analyzing the various forces acting on a given conflict. From this
understanding of frozen conflict two plausible rival hypotheses emerged.
The first hypothesis suggests that, in terms of intensity, frozen conflict exists in a state of
equilibrium somewhere between peace and a threshold of intensity that might be considered as
akin to ripeness for resolution. The conflict remains at this equilibrium due to a number of factors
that either dampen the conflict’s intensity, keeping it below this ripeness for resolution threshold
or push the intensity of the conflict up, ensuring that the conflict will not simply dissolve or fade
away. Some of the factors that post-Soviet scholars identify as those that keep the de-facto states
afloat could also be identified as these de-escalating forces. Such factors might include the defacto state-building projects that take place in the separatist regions involved in these conflicts,
and the involvement of international organizations which provide just enough aid and assistance
to make the pain of stalemate tolerable for the parties involved. Meanwhile the escalating or
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conflict driving forces would include factors such as IDP populations and the activities of
paramilitary groups or militias.
The second hypothesis suggests that a key to understanding the protraction of frozen
conflict lies at the internal level of the IDP population, and in the opposing forces at work in this
population. Informed by Kurt Lewin’s theory of force field analysis and quasi-stationary
equilibrium (Lewin, 1958), this hypothesis posits that the seeming stagnation of long term
displacement is the result of opposing forces at work in the IDP community. These opposing
forces act on the IDP community compelling them simultaneously both to wish to stay in the host
community and to desire to return to their home territory, and it is this contradiction of forces that
prevents the return of the displaced population while also preventing their integration into the
host community.
This study opted to isolate one of the factors in this equilibrium framework with the
intention of further exploring this factor and the role it plays in the conflict as a force maintaining
this frozenness. As such, the hypotheses were explored through a study of a select IDP population
operating within the context Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. This conflict, between the Republic of
Georgia and the separatist region of Abkhazia, erupted into war between 1992 and 1994 and has
since gone unresolved. This study focuses on the sizeable population of ethnic Georgians who
were displaced from Abkhazia as a result of this war. This study, based on interviews conducted
with 45 Georgian IDPs during the summer of 2007, explored these hypotheses within the context
of this conflict. In regards to the first hypothesis, the study attempted to determine whether this
community does indeed act as a driving factor in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict by identifying
trends within the stated beliefs and perceptions of the IDP community that reflect this role as
conflict drivers. To address the second hypothesis, the study attempted to identify the forces and
motivations towards either return, integration or the status quo at work within the IDP population.
These forces were identified by collecting information regarding IDP integration and impressions
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of their host community, perceptions of their home territory, and thoughts on the prospect of
return. All of this was done with the intention that the study’s results would provide greater
understanding of the forces at work within this community, as well as point to one hypothesis as
more compelling than the other in describing the dynamics responsible for the stagnation behind
frozen conflict.
The study conducted for this project revealed a number interesting factors and issues at
work within the Georgian IDP population, and raised a number of additional questions about the
nature of frozen conflict and the role that displaced populations play in it. Both levels of the
analysis uncovered a number of interesting and thought provoking issues that would merit further
study. The first level of analysis was intended to identify and uncover the opposing forces acting
on the community of Georgian IDPs involved in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. The analysis
identified a number of strong motivations and forces at work in this population, and also found
several interesting contradictions within this field of forces. The study found that most
respondents reported a low expectation of conflict in the event of being repatriated to Abkhazia,
and the attitude towards Abkhazians among respondents was also found to be quite conciliatory.
Yet at the same time, in regards to the prospect of returning to Abkhazia, respondents reported
strong fears of starting another conflict and fears of personal security.
In another contradiction, when asked about quality of life and integration in parts of
Georgia where they currently live, respondents cited overwhelmingly a lack of aid or state
support that contributes to a rather poor quality of life. However, they also reported being very
well integrated into Georgian society and demonstrated a strong motivation to be better integrated
through steady employment and more fixed housing. Thus, while this section of the analysis did
not point to one hypothesis as a more compelling diagnosis of the situation, it did reveal some key
contradictions within the IDP community and its motivations to either return or integrate. Most
interesting, however are the forces that were not identified. The IDP population has been
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displaced for nearly fifteen years at the time of writing this, and remarkably few have undergone
what most would classify as integration into Georgian society. Much of this population still lives
in collective centers that were set up as temporary housing for them over a decade ago. Most
people in these centers are unemployed and remain largely segregated from broader Georgian
society. As such, one would expect to find a set of forces in this analysis that draws this
population towards this non-integrated status quo. However, the forces that were identified seem
to push or pull this population in all directions other than that of the status quo. Therefore, in the
force-field- analysis inspired approach to this population, it would appear that there is some force
pulling the IDP population towards the status quo that was not identified in the first part of the
analysis.
The second level of analysis was done to identify broad and emerging themes within the
interview data, and in doing so address the role of the IDP community as a driving force in this
conflict. According to the second hypothesis posed in this study, displaced populations, in this
case the Georgian IDP population, are examples out of a host of factors that serve to drives the
intensity of the conflict up. The analysis showed that while some findings from the first part of
the analysis would negate the role of the IDP population as a driving force in the conflict, this
second analytical approach found several broad trends that showed more subtle ways that they
can act as a driving force. First, the analysis identified a trend in the data towards what is termed
here as selective aggression. When identifying the degree to which a certain population serves as
a driving factor in a conflict, one obvious factor to look for is the level of hostility and aggression
they display towards the enemy side. The first part of the analysis showed that when asked,
respondents heavily (76% of respondents) stated that their feelings toward Abkhazians were
conciliatory and friendly. However the second part of the analysis showed that aggression
towards Abkhazians does emerge from data in more subtly stated ways, such as showing
aggression towards select parts of the Abkhazian population like veterans of the war.
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Entrenchment in a polarizing position is another way in which a party to a conflict can
serve to drive that conflict. A trend toward this kind of entrenchment also appears in the data in
regard to the multiple references to Georgian control over Abkhazia as a precondition to return
and the demand of the IDP community for security guarantees from the government. A number of
these responses that reference traumatic events in the IDP community’s history belie the need for
protection that lies behind these demands, and the fear of returning only to experience the trauma
of displacement again that lies behind this entrenchment. The entrenchment in this position of
course places the IDP population as a driving force between the current level of conflict
equilibrium and the possibility of it de-escalating. If the IDP community does not simply fade
into the Georgian population (which it does not appear to be doing) and if this community makes
clear that they will not be gradually returning to Abkhazia on their own without state protection
then it is unlikely that the conflict of which they are a part will begin to fade drastically in
intensity.
Finally, the analysis also produced an interesting finding in regards to a seeming
deference to outside control, particularly to the government, or a lack of agency among
respondents in regards to the out come of the conflict and their ability to impact it that also
emerged as a trend in the data. A return to the literature on refugee dynamics suggests that this
disempowerment may have connections to the trauma of displacement that they have experienced
and to the identity of victim that comes with such trauma. Some literature on psychological
phenomena related to victimization and trauma, such as that of Volkan (1994) and Herman
(1942) suggest that the identity of victim, or in this case the identity of IDP, provides certain
means of coping to the individual. These include a sense of cohesion and community among the
traumatized group, as a degree of power stemming from what Herman (1942) refers to as the
“specialness” of victim identity. As such, the lack of agency displayed may have to do with
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maintaining the role of IDP and with it the identity of victim and various means of coping that
come with it.
Looking at the numerous insights and issues raised in both parts of the analysis it would
appear that the most interesting and useful conclusions that can be drawn from this data are not
those which point to one hypothesis or the other as more compelling. Rather, the conclusions that
can be drawn from the synthesis of both levels of analysis say more about the role of IDPs in
these conflicts. By comparing the conclusions of both levels of analysis, the study found results
that suggest the existence of interesting and unexpected dynamics within the IDP population with
regards to its role in the conflict. Namely, these findings suggest the possibility that there may be
certain psycho-social phenomena at work in this population whereby the IDP community draws a
degree of meaning, identity, and even power from their role as victims in this conflict. By
maintaining the IDP identity as something distinct within the broader Georgian social fabric this
community is able to safeguard a distinct role in the conflict and with it some degree of power in
a situation in which they have otherwise been powerless. Furthermore, it is by remaining a
distinct and segregated entity in Georgian society that the attitudes of this population translate
into action that drives up the intensity of the conflict. The segregation of the IDP population and
their continued existence as a separate entity in Georgia is where the Abkhaz Government-inExile draws its authority. This apparatus has significant influence in Georgian politics, and
pushes for a hard-line approach to the Abkhaz conflict, actively acting as an agitating force and a
blocking force, preventing the conflict from de-escalating through negotiated settlement by
rejecting the compromises that would be necessary in a peace agreement. Thus, by passively
providing continued power and authority to the Government-in-Exile, the maintenance of the
status quo by the IDP, and whatever degree of intentionality there is in doing so, plays a role as a
driving factor in the conflict.
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These conclusions may not specifically answer the question of “why does frozen conflict
go unresolved for so long,” but it does lend an understanding to the role that IDP or refugee
communities play in the conflicts that displace them and to the dynamics of prolonged
displacement. Specifically, these findings suggest that the degree of power or powerlessness that
a displaced community is able to maintain may be connected to their ability to integrate into a
host community or their perceptions of repatriation. Yet further research is required into this
particular finding to draw any more solid conclusions from it.
This research leaves a large number of unanswered questions and avenues for further
research. In order to more fully understand the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict further research is
required, first and foremost, into the thoughts and perceptions of the Abkhazian general
population. In particular this research raises the need to understand Abkhazian views on the
conflict, on the Georgian IDP population, and on the prospect of IDP return. Outside of the
conflict context studied here, there are a number of questions raised in the review of theoretical
literature that have only begun to be addressed in this exploratory study. In order to better
understand frozen conflict and its dynamics, further research is needed in regards to other factors
that affect the frozen nature of these conflicts, such as the role of militia or paramilitary groups as
driving factors, or the role of international organizations in dampening the intensity of such
conflicts. Similarly, further understanding is needed into how the various factors that hold the
equilibrium of frozen conflict in place could be augmented or manipulated to mobilize the peace
process. Furthermore, this research begs the question of whether these findings have any
applicability to other conflicts: either other frozen conflicts like those in Cyprus or NagornoKarabakh, or other intractable conflicts that involve sizable displaced populations. It would be
worthwhile to know whether the findings presented here are specific to the Georgian-Abkhazian
conflict, to frozen or separatist conflict, or whether these findings about the role of IDPs in
conflict is in some way applicable to all populations displaced by conflict.
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In addition to these possibilities for further research, there are also a number of trends and
questions that this study was unable to explore due to its structure, limitations, and sampling
methods. There were a number of dominant sentiments and positions among respondents that
could be verified through a study with a more generalizable sample. For example, such a study
could be done to confirm that a majority of the IDP population, as opposed to a majority of the
participants in this study, would demand Georgian state protection before willingly returning to
Abkhazia. Furthermore, the exploratory nature of this study also raised several new issues for
future research. For example, it would be valuable to our understanding of the role of displaced
populations in conflict to pursue the relationship between victim identity and power and how this
relationship plays out in the identity as displaced person within a host society.
There are a number of areas and subjects in which the findings and the new questions
generated in this study could be applied. The most obvious area where these findings have
significance is in further developing the concept of frozen conflict as a particular phenomenon
under the umbrella concept of intractability. This study and its suggestions for further
investigation also hold significance for the various ongoing conflicts that are categorized as
frozen. Looking at the broader implications of this study, the findings and insights discussed here
could carry significance in the area of refugee aid and integration. In addition to societies engaged
in frozen conflict, these conclusions also have significance for conflicts where sizable displaced
populations are a significant factor in the conflict’s resolution, and for societies that are host to
sizable displaced populations. This study’s findings have suggested the idea that the maintenance
of refugee or IDP identity through segregation from the host community could be connected to a
way of maintaining a degree of power in the conflict and its outcome. It also suggests that when
this resistance to integration is combined with entrenchment in a polarizing position in regards to
return, that IDP communities can indeed act as a driving force in the equilibrium of frozen
conflict. This suggests that power and voice may be more important to displaced communities
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than they are typically credited as being. The important role that voice plays in peacebuilding and
in trauma healing has been recognized by theorists and practitioners alike, and numerous fields of
psychological study have recognized the “critical link between voice and identity” (d’Estree,
2006 p.107). Yet it is typical that when displaced populations are mentioned in relation to a
particular conflict they are regarded one-dimensionally as a cost of conflict, or as part of the
overall destruction caused by an armed conflict. All too rarely are displaced populations regarded
as stakeholders in a conflict, and more importantly as key players in a conflict’s resolution.
There is an emerging emphasis within the fields of humanitarian and refugee aid and
trauma healing towards the distinction between victim and survivor. This line of thinking posits
that in treating someone that has experienced trauma as a survivor carries with it a greater
emphasis and recognition of that individual’s dignity and autonomy than regarding them as a
victim. In turn, this thinking also emphasizes that in order to truly be of aid to the traumatized or
forcibly displaced, one must above all else treat them with dignity (Van Arsdale, 2006). In a
similar vein, this study’s conclusions suggest that it would be worthwhile for societies,
governments, and agencies that work with or host displaced communities to look into ways of
approaching these populations that treat them as stakeholder in a conflict, rather than simply as
victims. These findings raise the question of what would be the result if displaced populations
were more actively incorporated in the peace process. What would happen if refugees and
forcibly displaced persons were treated and regarded as the conflict stakeholders that they are? If
the governments involved in such conflicts worked with refugee communities on this level, would
this ease the struggle for power and control and thus facilitate temporary integration? If indeed
taking an alternative approach to displaced populations could facilitate integration (temporary or
permanent) then it could conceivably also help ease the tension around the issue of displacement.
Being that this is often one of the more irreconcilable factors in the conflict, particularly those

140

involving separatist dynamics, this alternate approach to displaced populations could conceivably
help ease protraction and facilitate movement in the peace process.
The results of this study also carry some implications and specific recommendations for
interventions carried out by non-governmental organizations and other groups involved in this
conflict. There are implications here for both the types of interventions being done and how nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operate in this context. First, a number of NGOs that are
engaged in grassroots peacebuilding conduct projects that attempt to improve relations laterally
between Georgian IDPs and Abkhazians. The idea behind this would be to ease the prospect of
return for both the IDP population and for Abkhazians by developing relations between the two
communities on the grassroots level. However, the results of this study have suggested that in
regards to the prospect of returning to Abkhazia, the issue of security is paramount. Their
attitudes overwhelmingly suggest that the IDP population perceives the Georgia government as
the only entity able to provide sufficient protection from harm and from the prospect of being
displaced again. Therefore, these findings call into question the utility of lateral Abkhaz-IDP
peacebuilding and the ability of such projects to address the pertinent needs of the conflict and the
parties involved.
At the same time, the findings that power may play a role in contributing to the status
quo of the IDP population also carries some implications for interventions and projects by NGO.
The results here suggest that involving the IDP population in the official peace process to a
greater extent would be a possible way to address this disempowerment. As such, it may be
beneficial to focus on building “up-down” relations and connections between the IDP community
and the various bodies that are said to represent their interests at the elite level. Part of increasing
the fluidity with which concerns and attitudes pass from the IDP community up through the ranks
of government is obviously to mobilize key individuals that can move among these levels of
society (Lederach, 1997). However, there are a number of ways in which NGOs could foster
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greater empowerment and involvement within the IDP community. For example, advocacy
training within the IDP community might serve to foster greater political involvement in this
community not simply on the issue of the conflict, but on improving quality of life among the
community and pushing for a meaningful way of addressing their situation and the issue of
integration. Finally, on another note, this study has also suggested that the provision of aid can
also serve to further entrench the status quo of the conflict when it is given as a sort of “lifesupport” providing both the IDP community and people in the separatist regions just enough
support to get by. This makes the status quo bearable but does not provide enough resources to
change or improve it. This suggests that aid providers to both the IDP and Abkhaz community
should attempt to channel resources to fund the improvement of the quality of life such as
investing in infrastructure or food production tools and supplies, rather than continuing to provide
subsistence-oriented aid.

Perhaps the most immediate areas of relevance for this study are for the GeorgianAbkhazian conflict. At the time of writing, the outcomes and status of the conflict between
Georgia and Russia are uncertain as of yet, and little talk of negotiations or peace processes have
been made public. However, roughly six months after the brief outburst of violence between these
states dominated news headlines it has become apparent that neither side is approaching the
issues of the separatist states and the populations displaced from them in a way that departs
significantly from the approach taken in 1994 when the initial ceasefire was signed. That is to
say, the governments and international organizations involved in this conflict failed miserably in
the mid 1990’s to confront in a fruitful and productive way the more contentious issues in this
conflict, particularly the issue of IDP return. The consequences of this failure are obvious: the
conflict has gone unresolved for roughly fifteen years and the population displaced by the conflict
has remained in a state of prolonged uncertainty and limbo during that time.
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Six months after the “August War” of 2008 ended, the analysis and debate over this brief
but intense conflict still tends to center on issues of Russia’s military conduct, questions of “who
started it,” and what these events mean for the former Soviet Union and the West. Yet, it would
be a significant loss if at some point this debate does not shift to the question of: “how did this
happen?” The unresolved status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia cannot be blamed entirely for the
recent outburst of violence between Georgia and Russia, but it did play a role in triggering and
allowing the most recent round of fighting there. As the international community watches events
unfold in and around Georgia, it should eventually be asking itself why these conflicts were
allowed to go unresolved for so long, and why the peace processes that began with ceasefire in
1994 and 1995 (in Abkhazia then South Ossetia respectively) were able to linger and stagnate for
so long without reaching any formal agreement on status. As these events continue to unfold in
the Caucasus, one can hope that the issue of the displaced persons involved and the question of
repatriation will be approached with the urgency, seriousness and inclusiveness that they clearly
merit.
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Appendix A: Maps

Map of Caucasus Region (http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/georgia-abkhazia/images/caucasus.jpg);

Map of Georgia & Abkhazia and demilitarized zones on their border (http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/georgiaabkhazia/maps.php)
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Appendix B: Interview Questionnaire

Section A – Displacement and Assistance Information
General Information:
1. In what area/region did you live before being displaced?
2. When did you leave?
3. Where did you initially go after being displaced? How long were you there?
About Assistance:
4. What kind of assistance did you receive immediately following displacement?
5. Have there been any changes between the amount and type of support that you used to receive
and the support that you receive now?
6. To your knowledge, what have been the sources of this assistance: government, international
agencies, NGO’s?
7. In your opinion, what are some ways that providers of aid and programs could be more helpful
to IDP’s?

About Return & Integration:
8. Do you seek to return to the area from which you were displaced?
9. If yes, is it to live permanently, to visit, to collect belongings, or for another reason?
10. Why do you want to return (or why do you not want to return)?
11. To what degree are you integrated (ie having permanent place to live, having a job, becoming
part of host community) here?
12. On a scale of 1 to 5, Are you treated well by people who live in the host community (5 being
very well, 1 being very badly)?
13. Do you see your integration here as permanent or temporary?
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14. What do you need for you and your family to be integrated here with native dwellers, and to
feel part of the community?

Section B – Experiences With and Thoughts on Conflict Resolution
1. If seeking return on a permanent or residential basis, do you intend to return to the specific
town/area where you resided before you left?
2. What are your feelings towards those who live in the region where you used live? How would
you characterize these people?
3. Have you had any contact with Abkhaz since being displaced? If so, how did you react to it?
How would you describe the experience?
4. If you were to return, what part of this would be most challenging/most difficult for you?
5. If you were to return, what fears might you have about doing so?
6. On a scale of 1 to 5 (5 being most challenging, 1 being the easiest), how challenging would it
be for you to:
-Live in the same town as Abkhaz people?
-Live next door to Abkhaz people?
-Be friends with Abkhaz people?
-Share land or other important things with Abkhaz people?
7. If you were to return, do you think that you would find it helpful to talk or meet with an
Abkhaz person before returning?
8. If given the chance would you be willing to participate in a dialogue or other meeting with
Abkhaz people?
a. If yes, what worries or fears might you have about doing this?
b. If yes, what would you expect to gain by participating?
c. If no, why not?
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9. Have you ever participated in a project or activity (since being displaced) where you worked or
met with Abkhaz?
a. If yes, please describe the experience.
b. If yes, please describe what was challenging and rewarding about this experience.
10. As you know, different people tend to handle conflict and disputes in different ways, for
example, some people try to avoid arguments or disputes, others see it as a competition that they
can win. Could you please tell me about the kinds of disputes that you typically face? (For
example: small disputes or arguments with neighbors, friends, or family?) How do you usually
deal with these conflicts?
11. What kinds of disputes do you think you might face in your community if you were to return?
12. How would you imagine that you would handle these types of disputes?
a. If this first approach doesn’t work?

Additional Questions if respondent wants to return to live permanently:
13. Under what conditions would you be willing to return?
14. What would it take for these conditions to exist?
15. Would you be willing to return without state protection if you were able to build relationships
or friendships with the people that would be your neighbors there?
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